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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to shed some new theoretical and empirical light on the issues 
of financial fragility and instability of the macroeconomic systems. The thesis consists 
of four independent essays. The first essay develops a macrodynamic model in which 
firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety play a central role in macroeconomic 
performance. Mathematical analysis and numerical simulations illustrate that the 
endogeneity of the desired margins of safety during the investment cycles is 
conducive to instability. Moreover, it is indicated that fiscal policy can reduce the 
destabilising forces in the macroeconomic system. The second essay explores, via a 
stock-flow consistent model, the macroeconomic channels through which 
securitisation and wage stagnation can jointly affect financial fragility. The results 
from simulation experiments provide support to the view that the combination of risky 
financial practices and higher inequality can substantially increase the likelihood of 
financial instability in the macro system. The third essay proposes a new bank 
liquidity ratio that explicitly considers the time-varying nature of liquidity by 
assigning weights on banks’ balance sheet items that depend on financial risks and 
perceptions. This ratio is estimated and assessed for the EMU-12 countries. 
Furthermore, the essay investigates the link between macroeconomic fragility and 
bank liquidity for the EMU. The empirical results suggest that banks in the EMU do 
not self-impose higher liquidity requirements when macroeconomic fragility 
increases. The fourth essay puts forward a liquidity index that extends Minsky’s well-
known financial taxonomy of economic units to the government sector. The index is 
estimated for Greece over the period 2001-2009. The data analysis supports the view 
that the financial fragility of the Greek government sector increased significantly 
before the sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Financial fragility, instability and the macroeconomy: The relevance of 
Minsky’s analytical framework 
 
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007-8 has brought to the fore the 
relevance of Minsky’s (1975, 1982, 2008) concepts of financial fragility and 
instability in the examination of macroeconomic systems. In Minsky’s theoretical 
analysis the complex financial arrangements in modern capitalist economies render 
them inherently unstable. Periods of prolonged prosperity and tranquillity increase the 
euphoria of economic units and can lead to growing financial fragility. This increasing 
financial fragility can set the stage for instability, recessions and crises. 
 
Minsky’s innovative thinking on the financial roots of crises has induced various 
analysts to label the recent financial distress a ‘Minsky moment’ (see e.g. Whalen, 
2008). Although some of the causes of the 2007-8 financial crisis were not at the core 
of the basic theoretical exposition of Minsky (e.g. household debt, global imbalances 
or increasing inequality
1), it is undoubtful that Minsky’s overall conceptualisation of 
the interrelationship between the financial and the macroeconomic systems provides a 
coherent basis for the understanding of the crisis events. Furthermore, Minsky’s 
dynamic and institutionally-specific perspective of the capitalist economies has been 
proved valuable for the macroeconomic analysis both in periods of prosperity and in 
periods of turbulence. 
 
The economic literature that has explored and extended the Minskyan analysis is 
extensive. So far, attention has been paid to the more detailed development of 
Minsky’s theoretical arguments, the modelling of certain aspects of Minsky’s 
theoretical insights and the use of Minsky’s conceptual framework in the empirical 
investigation of fragility and instability in modern economies. The recent crisis has 
enhanced the interest in Minsky’s ‘financial macroeconomics’ and has posed new 
challenges to the analysis of financial fragility and instability. 
 
                                            
1
 See, for instance, Davidson (2008A), Dymski (2010) and Palley (2010). 
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This thesis aims to contribute to this theoretical and empirical research. We use 
macroeconomic modelling to investigate, in an innovative way, the endogenous 
nature of firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety during the investment cycle, the 
implications of firms’ and banks’ financial behaviour for macroeconomic stability, the 
stabilising role of fiscal policy, as well as the impact of securitisation and wage 
stagnation on financial fragility. Furthermore, we propose a new bank liquidity ratio 
that explicitly considers the time-varying nature of liquidity. We estimate this ratio for 
the EMU-12 countries and we investigate econometrically the link between bank 
liquidity and macroeconomic fragility. Lastly, we develop a liquidity index that 
extends Minsky’s financial taxonomy of economic units to the government sector. 
This index is estimated for the Greek government sector. 
 
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the 
theoretical and empirical developments on financial fragility, instability and the 
macroeconomy. The literature covers both the Post Keynesian/Minskyan approaches 
and the mainstream ones. 
 
In chapter 3 we develop a stock-flow consistent macrodynamic model in which firms’ 
and banks’ desired margins of safety play a central role in macroeconomic 
performance. The model incorporates an active banking sector and pays particular 
attention to the leverage of both firms and banks. It is shown that the endogenous 
change in the desired margins of safety of firms and banks is likely to transform an 
otherwise stable debt-burdened economy into an unstable one. The endogeneity of the 
margins of safety can also produce, under certain conditions, investment and leverage 
cycles during which investment and leverage move both in the same and in the 
opposite direction. The chapter also investigates the potential stabilising role of fiscal 
policy. It is indicated that fiscal policy can reduce the destabilising forces in the 
macroeconomic system when government expenditures adjust adequately to 
variations in the divergence between the actual and the desired margins of safety.   
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In chapter 4 we put forward a stock-flow consistent model that allows the 
investigation of the macroeconomic channels through which securitisation and income 
inequality can jointly affect financial fragility. Particular attention is paid to their role 
in supporting a borrowing-induced expansion, a housing boom and an appreciation in 
MBSs prices that are of temporary nature. The results from simulation experiments 
provide support to the view that the combination of risky financial practices and 
higher inequality can substantially increase the likelihood of financial instability in a 
macro system. 
 
In chapter 5 we investigate two issues that have not been addressed in Basel III and 
which are of particular importance for the attainment of a more effective liquidity 
regulation. The first is the need for a dynamic definition of liquidity that takes into 
account the time-varying liquidity and stability of banks’ balance sheet items. The 
essay develops a new liquidity ratio that explicitly considers this changing nature of 
liquidity, by assigning weights that depend on financial risks and perceptions. The 
ratio is estimated and assessed for the EMU-12 countries. The second issue is the need 
for macro fragility-related liquidity requirements. We provide empirical evidence 
which suggests that the banking sector does not self-impose such requirements. Based 
on this evidence, it is argued that the regulatory agents should introduce a positive 
link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic fragility. 
 
In chapter 6 we develop a liquidity index that extends Minsky’s well-known financial 
taxonomy to the government sector. This index is applied to Greece for the period 
2001-2009. It is shown that the Greek government sector was Ponzi in the years 2001-
2002 and ultra-Ponzi thereafter. Moreover, the data indicate that the proposed index 
deteriorated substantially since 2006 revealing the growing fragility of the public 
sector in the years before the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. It is argued that this 
deterioration of the index is among the factors that contributed to the financial 
instability that the Greek economy has been experiencing over the last years. 
 
In chapter 7 we present the key findings of our thesis. In addition, we outline some 
directions for future research. 
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2. Financial fragility, instability and the macroeconomy: 
A review of the literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The notions of financial fragility and instability have been at the core of Post 
Keynesian macroeconomics since the 1980s when Minsky’s ‘financial instability 
hypothesis’ began to gain popularity among the scholars of this school of 
macroeconomic thought. Since then, many theoretical and empirical developments 
within the Post Keynesian framework have enhanced our understating of the complex 
links between the financial and the real spheres of the economy and the conditions 
under which financial fragility and instability are likely to emerge. Contrariwise, in 
the mainstream macroeconomic literature the notions of financial fragility and 
instability had received only limited attention till the emergence of the recent financial 
crisis. This is not accidental. In the dominant macroeconomic paradigm the financial 
factors play no significant role in the determination of macroeconomic performance 
(especially in the long run); hence, the financial structures of economic units are not 
important for the basic macroeconomic analysis. Moreover, in this paradigm the 
dominant view is that the capitalist economies are inherently stable. The case of 
instability is considered a scarce event that can largely emerge as a result of extreme 
exogenous shocks. 
 
The recent crisis has posed a significant challenge to the prevailing macroeconomic 
paradigm. The crisis has indicated that finance, fragility and instability are important 
missing elements in the conceptual framework of mainstream macroeconomics. 
Having been motivated by the crisis events, many scholars have attempted to extend 
this conceptual framework by introducing financial factors in the baseline analysis. 
However, the issues of financial fragility and instability have not yet been explored 
sufficiently within the mainstream macroeconomic paradigm. Moreover, when these 
issues are investigated, fundamental differences from Minsky’s original analysis are 
observed. 
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature on the issue of financial 
fragility, instability and the macroeconomy. We begin by presenting the concepts of 
financial fragility and instability according to the Post Keynesian/Minskyan 
perspective as well as according to the mainstream macroeconomic view. We then 
describe the various macro models in which the issues of financial fragility and 
instability have been explored. Lastly, we review the related empirical research. 
 
2.2 The concepts of financial fragility and instability in the macroeconomic 
theoretical frameworks 
 
2.2.1 The Post Keynesian/Minskyan perspective 
 
In Minsky’s (1975, 1982, 2008) theoretical framework, which largely draws on 
Keynes, monetary and financial factors are interrelated with the real sphere of the 
economy. Fundamental uncertainty and expectations play a decisive role in economic 
units’ behaviour and financial institutions and structures can significantly affect the 
stability of the macroeconomic system. Moreover, central in Minsky’s analysis is his 
financial theory of investment (the ‘two price’ theory), which places emphasis on the 
way that perceived financial risks (of both borrowers and lenders) influence 
investment and, thus, macroeconomic fluctuations.
1
 
 
The notions of financial fragility and instability are at the core of Minsky’s theoretical 
framework. According to him, the financial fragility of economic units at the micro 
level is determined by the relationship between expected cash inflows and expected 
cash outflows. The less the expected cash inflows relative to cash outflows the more 
an economic unit has to rely on refinancing and, hence, the more prone it is to adverse 
shocks. Based on this conceptualisation, Minsky has suggested a well-known 
classification between hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes. In a hedge 
finance regime, the inflows are expected to be higher than the sum of interest and 
principal repayment commitments. A hedge unit is deemed viable and debt financing 
is not expected. In speculative finance, economic unit’s expected inflows can cover 
                                            
1
 For a detailed analysis of Minsky’s economic theory see, inter alia, Dymski and Pollin (1992), Kregel 
(1992, 2007), Papadimitriou and Wray (1998), Fazzari et al. (2001), De Antoni (2007), Arestis and De 
Antoni (2009), Tymoigne (2009A), Wray and Tymoigne (2009), Nasica (2010), Argitis (2013A) and 
Keen (2013). 
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the interest payments but not the principal repayment commitments. As a result, a 
speculative economic unit is expected to take new debt in order to cover (partially or 
totally) the amortisation of debt commitments. Finally, in the case of a Ponzi finance 
regime, the economic unit cannot repay neither the interest nor the principal 
repayment commitments and must refinance its entire position with new debt. The 
Ponzi finance regime corresponds to the more financially fragile situation. 
 
The financial fragility at the macro level stems from the financial fragility of 
economic units at the micro level: a macroeconomic system is more financially fragile 
the higher is the proportion of economic units that participate in Ponzi financial 
relationships and economic activities (see e.g. Minsky, 1982, p. 22; Minsky, 2008, p. 
233; Tymoigne, 2011). In a financially fragile economy the stability of the system is 
highly dependent on refinancing. A disruption of this refinancing is very likely to 
cause a widespread financial distress.
2
 
 
Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ states that the capitalist economy has the 
tendency to endogenously become financially fragile.
3
 This hypothesis largely relies 
on Minsky’s view that stability is destabilising. In particular, Minsky argues that in a 
period of tranquillity, in which hedge finance is dominant and firms and banks are 
conservative in their investment decisions, the success of the investment projects, the 
favourable credit history and the fact that the last crisis gradually becomes a distant 
memory set the stage for a reduction in the perceived risk of economic units.  This 
reduction translates into lower desired margins of safety, leading to higher debt-
financed investment. Since there are no substantial problems in refinancing and debt 
repayment, the euphoria is generalised reducing further the perceived financial risks. 
According to Minsky, this growing optimism leads gradually to higher indebtedness 
and to a higher proportion of speculative and Ponzi units in the economy.
4
 The 
                                            
2
 Interestingly enough, Vercelli (2011) defines the financial fragility of a system by using the concept 
of structural instability. The latter refers to the case in which a relatively small disturbance can cause a 
qualitative change in the dynamic behaviour of the system. 
3
 For a synopsis of Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ by himself see e.g. Minsky (1982, ch. 3) 
and Minsky (1992B). 
4
 This point in Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ has often been criticised from a Kaleckian 
perspective (see e.g. Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2001). It is argued that an increase in the willingness of 
firms to invest and take on debt may not lead to higher indebtedness and financial fragility. The 
rationale is that higher investment leads to higher aggregate demand and, thus, to higher retained 
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fragility of economy’s financial structure can be reinforced by a potential rise in the 
interest rates resulting either from a rise in the policy interest rate of the central bank 
(due to inflationary pressures that accompany the investment boom) or from higher 
risk premiums (due to the deterioration in economic units’ financial position). 
 
Higher financial fragility increases the likelihood of a financial instability phase, i.e. 
of a phase of widespread economic and financial problems that can destabilise the 
macroeconomic system. Financial instability can emerge as a result of a change in 
expectations that adversely affects refinancing. This change in expectations can be the 
outcome of the deterioration in economic units’ financial position. The financial 
instability phase is characterised by significant difficulties in the repayment of debts 
and, thus, by an increasing rate of default. In their attempt to meet their financial 
commitments, economic units are also likely to be prompted to a distress selling of 
their assets placing downward pressures on asset prices. The rise in the desired 
margins of safety, the increase in the liquidity preference of both businessmen and 
banks and the widespread attempt for a decrease in indebtedness brings the economy 
into a deep recession. 
 
The financial instability phase may ultimately lead to a new investment and financial 
cycle: after a significant number of defaults hedge financing dominates and the 
conditions for a new tranquillity period are created. However, the duration and the 
severity of the financial instability process as well as the capability of the economy to 
enter into a new tranquillity period crucially relies on two factors: (i) economy’s 
institutional arrangements; (ii) the phase of the underlying long wave. 
 
Regarding the first factor, Minsky has stressed the stabilising role of thwarting 
mechanisms, i.e. of mechanisms which set ceilings and floors that constraint an 
explosive contraction or expansion (see Ferri and Minsky, 1992; Minsky, 1995).
5
 
Some important thwarting mechanisms are the labour market institutions, the ‘lender 
of last resort’ facility of the central bank and the countercyclical fiscal policy. For 
instance, a rise in government expenditures when the economy enters into a financial 
                                                                                                                             
profits. If the rise in retained profits outweighs the rise in investment, indebtedness may not increase. 
This is often called the ‘paradox of debt’. 
5
 See also Papadimitriou and Wray (1998) and Nasica (1999). 
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instability phase can set a floor to incomes and aggregate demand, preventing a severe 
crisis and facilitating the return to economic expansion. The nature and the magnitude 
of the thwarting mechanisms crucially affect the endogenous tendencies of the 
capitalist economies towards instability. 
 
Concerning the second factor, Minsky has made a distinction between short cycles (or 
basic cycles) and long waves (or super cycles) in the evolution of the macroeconomic 
system (see Minsky, 1964, 1995; Ryoo, 2010; Palley, 2011). The short cycle leads to 
a mild recession while a long wave results in a deep recession. According to Palley 
(2011), the short cycle is generated from the psychological and financial mechanisms 
described in Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’. The long wave is the chain of 
short cycles and should be seen as a long-run evolutionary process. During the long 
wave the financial structures become more and more fragile (even if there are some 
passing reductions in their fragility during the short cycles) and the thwarting 
mechanisms relax, weakening the floors and ceilings in the macroeconomic system. 
Financial innovation, cultural changes and memory loss have a central role to play in 
the mechanisms of the long wave.
6
 The more the economy is close to the end of a 
long wave the more likely it is that the financial instability phase described in 
Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ will be severe. 
 
From the above it becomes clear that in the Post Keynesian/Minskyan framework 
cycles and instability are the natural outcome of complex macroeconomic systems in 
which sophisticated financial institutions and relationships have a prominent role to 
play in the determination of investment and aggregate demand. The cyclical and the 
secular movements in the economic activity are the result of the interplay between the 
financial and the real spheres of the economy. Financial fragility and instability 
emerge from evolutionary processes that include complex interactions between 
financial structures, institutions and economic behaviours in a world of fundamental 
uncertainty. Certain types of institutional arrangements and of government 
intervention are necessary in order to prevent the natural tendency of capitalist 
economies towards instability and reduce economic fluctuations. 
                                            
6
 Ryoo (2010) provides a different interpretation of Minsky’s distinction between short cycles and long 
waves. According to him, the short cycle is not linked with the mechanics of the ‘financial instability 
hypothesis’; this cycle stems from the interaction between effective demand and the labour market. The 
mechanics of the ‘financial instability hypothesis’ are exclusively related with the long wave. 
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2.2.2 The mainstream approach 
 
As mentioned before, finance is not at the core of the basic mainstream 
macroeconomic analysis. However, over the last two decades or so there have been 
various attempts to integrate financial factors into the mainstream theoretical macro 
framework; remarkably, these attempts have been especially intense since the onset of 
the financial crisis. In the context of this literature, the concepts of financial fragility 
and instability have often been analysed in terms of their meaning and implications. 
Two points are, though, of particular importance. First, there is not a common 
definition of financial fragility and instability in the mainstream approach. Second, no 
clear distinction is made between financial fragility and financial instability; in many 
cases these concepts are used interchangeably. This is in contrast with the Post 
Keynesian/Minskyan approach described above in which financial fragility is clearly 
portrayed as the cause of financial instability (see Tymoigne, 2010). 
 
The currently dominant approach in mainstream macroeconomics is the so-called 
‘new consensus’ view which constitutes a synthesis of the real business cycle theories 
and the most important features of New Keynesian economics (for a detailed 
presentation of this synthesis see e.g. Goodfriend, 2007; Galí and Gertler, 2007; Galí, 
2008; Woodford, 2009). The ‘new consensus’ view is encapsulated in the Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. In the baseline DGSE models 
financial factors have a limited role to play in the short run; they are also neutral in the 
long run.
7
 The role of finance can only be found in the extensions of the baseline 
analysis. In these extensions two views on financial fragility/instability can be traced. 
 
The first, more traditional, view draws on the problems arising from asymmetric 
information. The asymmetric information in financial relationships refers to the 
situation in which the borrowers have more information than the lenders about the 
quality of the investment projects that they intend to undertake. This creates the well-
known problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that induce the lenders to 
                                            
7
 For a critical appraisal of the ‘new consensus macroeconomics’ from a Minskyan perspective see 
Argitis (2013B). For a more general critique see e.g. Arestis and Sawyer (2008) and Hein and 
Stockhammer (2010). 
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increase the cost of external finance (in order to cover their agency costs) reducing the 
efficiency of investment and the amount of loans that they might otherwise provide. 
Importantly, the cost of external finance becomes higher when the net worth of the 
financial and the nonfinancial sector reduces or when uncertainty in the financial 
markets increases. 
 
Within this context, Bernanke and Gertler (1990) state that the situation in the 
economy is financially fragile when the potential borrowers have low wealth in 
comparison with the size of their investment project; this results in high agency costs 
and thus in low and inefficient investment. The likelihood of such a situation is 
considered to be higher in the early stages of economic development or after a 
prolonged recession. Similarly, Mishkin (1999) argues that financial instability takes 
place when an adverse shock in the financial system reinforces the problems arising 
from asymmetric information and causes thereby a severe disruption of the channeling 
of funds to those that desire to undertake investment projects. These asymmetric 
information-based definitions of financial fragility/instability have been implicitly 
used in the DSGE model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and all the subsequent models that 
have extended their approach. 
 
The second, more recent, approach to the concept of financial fragility/instability has 
been developed by Tsomocos (2003A, 2003B), Goodhart et al. (2004, 2005, 2006A, 
2006B), Aspachs et al. (2007) and Goodhart and Tsomocos (2011). According to this 
approach, financial fragility/instability is defined as a situation in which there is a 
substantial increase in the default of economic agents in conjunction with a significant 
decline in the aggregate profitability of the banking sector. Default is considered an 
equilibrium phenomenon that stems from the utility optimisation of economics agents. 
Moreover, the view advocated by these authors is that the analysis of the interbank 
market and of bank heterogeneity is essential for an integrated consideration of 
financial fragility/instability issues. Goodhart et al. (2009) have incorporated this 
perception of financial fragility/instability in the baseline ‘new consensus’ framework. 
 
Since both of the above-mentioned approaches have been analysed within DGSE 
models, it is crucial to highlight that in these models the economy has the tendency to 
converge towards the steady-state equilibrium. As Hume and Sentence (2009) 
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explain, this is due to the efficient market hypothesis, the rational expectations 
hypothesis and the optimising behaviour of the agents. Out of equilibrium fluctuations 
take place due to shocks and not due to endogenous forces in the economic system. 
Thus, in contrast to Minsky’s framework, stability, and not instability, is the natural 
outcome of free market economies. 
 
However, it should be pointed out that within the mainstream macroeconomic 
paradigm there have recently been various attempts to develop new theoretical 
frameworks in which endogenous instability is more seriously taken into account. 
These frameworks draw on some Minskyan insights and to some extent depart from 
the ‘new consensus’ approach. Furthermore, in these frameworks some new 
perspectives on the definition of financial fragility/instability are traced, although it is 
clear that no consensus exists about the definition of these concepts. In section 2.3.2 
some features of these recent approaches will be decribed. 
 
2.3 Theoretical macroeconomic models of financial fragility and instability 
 
2.3.1 Post Keynesian/Minskyan models 
 
The Post Keynesian literature that has formalised various aspects of the Minskyan 
theoretical framework is quite extensive. Early contributions include the models of 
Taylor and O’ Connell (1985), Downe (1987), Foley (1987), Semmler (1987), Lavoie 
(1986-7), Franke and Semmler (1989), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990), Jarsulic 
(1990), Delli Gatti et al. (1994), Palley (1994), Keen (1995) and Skott (1995). 
 
Taylor and O’ Connell (1985) were the first who attempted to formalise some 
Minskyan arguments. Drawing on Minsky’s ‘two price’ theory the investment 
demand in their model relies on the difference between the demand and the supply 
price of capital, which ultimately makes investment a positive function of the current 
rate of profit and a confidence variable, as well as a negative function of the interest 
rate. The confidence variable reflects the anticipated rate of return on capital relative 
to the current rate and is assumed to increase when the interest rate becomes lower 
than a ‘normal’ long-run level. In the model workers do not save and rentiers hold 
money, bonds and equity. The portfolio choice of rentiers depends on the interest rate, 
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the rate of profit and the confidence variable. When the confidence variable increases 
rentiers allocate their wealth from money and bonds towards equities. In the dynamic 
system that has been developed the two endogenous variables are the confidence 
indicator and the ratio of money to the public debt (the latter is equal to money plus 
bonds). This dynamic system has been used to examine under what conditions a debt-
deflation process is likely to emerge. 
 
Downe (1987) has incorporated a wage determination process into the model of 
Taylor and O’ Connell (1985). This has allowed him to examine how the analysis of 
Taylor and O’ Connell (1985) is modified when the effects of the business cycle on 
unit labour costs and inflation are taken into account. The model of Taylor and O’ 
Connell (1985) has also been extended by Franke and Semmler (1989) who have 
explicitly incorporated the debt-financing of firms from banks. 
 
Foley (1987) has developed a model that places emphasis on the potential 
destabilising role of firms’ financial decisions. In the model of particular importance 
is the decision of firms about their level of borrowing. Their borrowing to capital ratio 
is assumed to be a positive function of the difference between the rate of profit and 
the interest rate. According to the dynamic analysis, an increase in the elasticity of 
borrowing with respect to the profit rate-interest rate differential can transform a 
stable economic system into a system that exhibits a limit cycle. 
 
Semmler (1987) has examined how financial variables can change the dynamic 
properties of a simple system that has only real variables and relies on the interaction 
between profits and capital accumulation. He has shown that the introduction of 
financial variables in such a system can affect not only the dynamic properties of the 
equilibrium point but also the dynamics of outer boundaries. With the use of 
simulations, he has also indicated the conditions under which financial instability is 
likely to emerge. 
 
Lavoie (1986-7) has developed a simple model in which the leverage ratio of firms 
has been utilised to capture their financial fragility. By using a neo-Passinetti 
investment equation and a wage-cost mark-up equation, and by postulating a positive 
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impact of inflation on the interest rate, he has shown how an investment boom can 
lead to higher leverage ratios and higher interest rates. 
 
Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990) have put forward an IS-LM model in which the IS 
curve is based on Minsky’s ‘two price’ theory and the LM curve is derived from a 
formulation of Keynes’s liquidity preference theory. As in Lavoie (1986-7), the 
financial fragility is captured by the leverage of firms. It is assumed that the leverage 
ratio increases as profits rise. The model has been used to indicate how an economy 
can shift from tranquillity into instability. Delli Gatti et al. (1994) have developed a 
similar model in which the demand for investment depends positively on the price of 
capital assets and the internal finance while the leverage of firms is a concave 
function of the profits. The authors have set up a dynamic system in which profits and 
debt are the endogenous variables. They have used this system to illustrate the 
possibility of cycles and to stress the stabilsing role of a fiscal policy. 
 
Jarsulic (1990) has developed a non-linear dynamic system with the rate of capital 
accumulation and the debt to capital ratio as endogenous variables. The system 
exhibits two equilibrium points with different stability properties. The author has 
explored how the fragility of the system is affected by changes in the distribution of 
income and the long-run expectations as well as by alternative specifications of the 
interest rate and the profit rate. 
 
Palley (1994) has paid attention to household debt. In his model creditor households 
lend to debtor households. The latter have a higher propensity to consume than the 
former. Of particular importance in Palley’s model is the allowable debt to income 
ratio. In one of the versions of the model this ratio has been allowed to be positively 
affected by the change in income. This, according to the author, captures the argument 
of Minsky that in periods of economic expansion borrowers and lenders become more 
optimistic and are therefore more willing to accept higher debt to income ratios. 
Palley has shown that the introduction of a positive link between the allowable debt to 
income ratio and economic expansion makes the model more unstable. 
 
Keen (1995) has introduced finance into Goodwin’s limit cycle model. He has shown 
that the introduction of finance eliminates the limit cycle and leads the system either 
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to stability or instability. According to numerical simulations, instability is more 
likely when the base interest rate is high and when the sensitivity of the interest rate to 
the debt to income ratio is large. Importantly, instability in the model emerges after a 
period of apparent stability, which is broadly in line with Minsky’s theory. The model 
constructed by Keen has also been used to show how government intervention can 
reduce the possibility of a breakdown of the economic system. 
 
Skott (1995) has developed a model in which the interaction between fragility and 
tranquillity plays a central role. Fragility is captured by a variable that describes the 
degree of laxity in financial behaviour. Tranquillity is inversely related to a variable 
that describes the degree of trouble in financial markets. The change in the degree of 
laxity is a negative function of the degree of trouble in financial markets. The degree 
of trouble depends positively on the degree of laxity and negatively on the output to 
capital ratio. The rate of capital accumulation is a positive function of the degree of 
laxity and a negative function of the degree of trouble. The constructed model has 
been employed to show how tranquillity is likely to cause risky financial behaviour 
that renders the system more fragile and, thus, more prone to instability. Hence, the 
model provides some support to Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’. 
 
More recently, attention has been paid to the development of models in which 
particular emphasis is placed on the formulation of Minsky’s classification between 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes. Foley (2003) was the first who 
incorporated this Minskyan categorisation in a Kaleckian model. In his framework 
firms are deemed as hedge when their profits are higher than the sum of investment 
and interest payments. If profits are lower than the sum of investment and interest 
payments, but higher than interest payments, firms are classified as speculative. Ponzi 
firms are those in which profits fall below the interest payments. In his model this 
categorisation of firms has been applied to a national economy that consists of many 
firms. This has been done by assuming that the firms of a nation can be averaged into 
one representative firm. The constructed model has been used to analyse the dynamic 
relationship between the growth rate of capital stock and the interest rate and examine 
the conditions under which an economy is more likely to be in each of the above-
mentioned finance regimes. 
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Drawing on Foley’s (2003) categorisation of finance regimes, Lima and Meirelles 
(2007) have developed a Kaleckian model from which they have derived a dynamic 
system with the debt to capital ratio of firms and the interest rate as state variables. In 
this system they have examined the stability properties of the equilibrium points that 
are located in the hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance areas. They have shown that 
the system becomes more prone to instability as the firms become more financially 
fragile. 
 
In Charles (2008) the classification of firms between hedge, speculative and Ponzi is 
based on the interest payments to profits ratio. When this ratio is lower than one the 
firms are hedge, when it is equal to one the firms are speculative and when it is higher 
than one the firms are Ponzi. Charles has developed a dynamic model with the rate of 
capital accumulation and the interest to profits ratio as endogenous variables. He has 
analysed the conditions under which stability and instability are more likely to occur. 
 
Nishi (2012) has combined the Post Keynesian literature on debt-led and debt-
burdened debt growth regimes with Minsky’s finance regimes. He has developed a 
Kaleckian model in which the debt to capital ratio of firms is allowed to have either a 
positive or a negative effect on growth, depending on the values of specific 
parameters. Firms are classified as hedge when their profits cover the sum of the 
interest payments and the change in debt. When this is not the case but the interest 
payments are lower than the profits, firms are speculative. Finally, when the interest 
payments exceed profits, firms are classified as Ponzi. Nishi has examined the 
conditions under which the various finance regimes arise as well as the conditions 
under which stability or instability emerges. 
 
Vercelli (2011) has developed a version of Minsky’s finance regimes that relies on the 
utilisation of both liquidity and solvency indices. The liquidity index is given by the 
ratio of the economic units’ current realised outflows to their current realised inflows. 
The solvency index is equal to the ratio of the expected outflows to the expected 
inflows. Vercelli has assumed that economic units choose a maximum value for their 
solvency ratio (which is their desired margin of safety) beyond which they do not 
desire to place themselves. Using the liquidity and solvency indices, Vercelli has 
defined six finance regimes and has explored how a change in the desired margins of 
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safety, induced by increasing euphoria, can render the economic system more 
financially fragile. 
 
There are various other recent formal papers that have examined Minsky’s arguments 
without paying explicit attention to his finance regimes classifications. Setterfield 
(2004) has incorporated the financial fragility of both households and firms in a 
shifting equilibrium model of effective demand. The financial fragility of firms and 
households equals their outstanding debt minus their accumulated savings. Both the 
actual financial fragility and the acceptable financial fragility by commercial banks 
are a positive function of nominal income. Setterfield has shown how the endogenous 
response of interest rates and credit rationing to financial fragility can contribute to 
income fluctuations. 
 
Nasica and Raybaut (2005) have developed a model with Minskyan features that pays 
particular attention to the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic stability. In the 
model the ratio of fiscal deficit to private spending is inversely related to private 
investment. The postulated economy becomes more stable the higher is the sensitivity 
of this ratio to private investment. Thus, the analysis provides support to the view that 
countercyclical fiscal policy has a stabilising role. 
 
Fazzari et al. (2008) have constructed a model that can reproduce Minsky cycles. In 
the model the level of investment depends on the change in real output as well as on 
cash inflows. Consumption is determined by a combination of forward-looking and 
‘rule of thumb’ behaviour. The rate of inflation is specified via a Phillips curve. In the 
simulations conducted the responsiveness of investment to cash flows plays a critical 
role in the (in)stability of the model. As this responsiveness increases the model 
becomes more unstable. When it is equal to a benchmark value, a cyclical behaviour 
emerges. The resulting cycles are driven by the interaction between capital 
accumulation, debt, interest rates and inflation. 
 
Bhaduri (2011) has examined the passage from financial fragility to crisis via a model 
in which special emphasis is given to the interaction between the debt-financed 
consumption boom and asset price inflation and to the explicit distinction between the 
positive and the negative effects of debt on output. Bhaduri has first presented a 
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version of the model in which a debt ceiling imposed by the lenders is the reason 
behind the stop of an economic boom. He has then modified the model to consider a 
more realistic, according to him, possibility for the end of the boom: the imprudent 
bahaviour of financial institutions which ignore systemic illiquidity. In this modified 
version the financial sector not only accommodates fully the demand for credit but it 
may also stimulate it. This behaviour is considered to stem from the innovative credit 
instruments and the financial arrangements that enhance the supply of credit. 
 
Ryoo (2010) has constructed a stock-flow consistent model of endogenous financial 
fragility which places emphasis on the dynamics of firms’ leverage and on 
households’ portfolio decisions. In the model the change in the leverage of firms is a 
positive function of the ratio of their profits to their interest payments; this is 
explained by the optimism of firms and banks when firms’ financial position is 
favourable. Moreover, households are presumed to reallocate wealth from deposits to 
equities when the rate of return on equities increases relative to the deposit interest 
rate. Ryoo has shown that the interaction between firms’ leverage and households’ 
portfolio decisions can produce a long cycle that is in line with Minsky’s ‘financial 
instability hypothesis’. Ryoo (2013A) has used the previous model to examine the 
extent to which Minsky’s ‘financial ‘instability hypothesis’ is invalidated by the 
‘paradox of debt’.8 Moreover, Ryoo (2013B) has developed a similar model in which 
special attention is given to the behaviour of banks’ credit supply, which is assumed 
to rely on bank profitability and firms’ profits to interest ratio. The model has been 
used to examine the potential destabilising effects of the behaviour of the banking 
sector. 
 
Charpe et al. (2009) have explored the macroeconomic (in)stability in a Keynes-
Goodwin model with workers’ loans and debt default. In their setup workers take on 
debt from asset holders to finance their consumption and the purchase of houses. It 
has been shown that the credit rationing increases the possibility of instability and that 
a monetary policy that decreases the loan interest rate and purchases defaulted loans 
can stabilise an otherwise unstable economy. Charpe et al. (2012) have developed a 
similar model where the loans to workers are provided by banks instead of asset 
                                            
8
 For a brief description of the ‘paradox of debt’ see section 2.2.1. 
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holders. Credit rationing depends on bank profitability. The model has been used to 
identify various mechanisms through which financial fragility is likely to emerge. 
Charpe and Flaschel (2013) have put forward a similar model that pays particular 
attention to the simultaneous examination of the demand-side and the supply-side 
explanations of household debt dynamics. The capital adequacy ratio of banks 
determines the degree of credit rationing. In their dynamic analysis they have, among 
others, explored the effects of debt default and capital adequacy ratio on financial 
instability. 
 
Keen (2013) has extended the model of Keen (1995) by explicitly considering the 
endogenous creation of money by the banking sector, the monetary flows between the 
sectors of the economy and the price dynamics. According to his simulation analysis, 
the dynamics of this extended model are broadly in line with Minsky’s ‘financial 
instability hypothesis’. Moreover, the model can generate some monetary and real 
phenomena of the Great Moderation and of the recent financial distress. 
 
Lastly, it is worthy to mention some recent agent-based models with Post Keynesian 
features in which various aspects of Minsky’s analytical framework have been 
incorporated. Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011) have developed a model that associates 
the aggregate performance of the economy with microeconomic financial variables. In 
the model a distinction is made between the speculative firms that need to take on 
debt or issue new equity in order to finance their investment and the hedge firms 
whose investment is entirely financed with retained profits. The formulation of the 
investment behaviour is based on Taylor and O’Connell (1985) whose specification 
has been extended by linking the confidence variable with the developments in the 
stock market. Investors, who keep their wealth in the form of equities, firms’ bonds 
and liquid assets, are categorised into two groups: the chartists and the 
fundamentalists. The constructed model has been solved by using both a stochastic 
aggregation method and numerical simulations. It has been shown that the model can 
replicate some dynamics that are in line with Minsky’s propositions. Chiarella and Di 
Guilmi (2012) have extended the aforementioned model to examine the effects of a 
countercyclical fiscal policy in a financially fragile economy. They have shown that, 
in line with Minsky’s arguments, countercyclical fiscal policy can reduce the 
volatility of output and prevent deep recessions. 
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De Carvalho and Di Guilmi (2013) have constructed a macro stock-flow consistent 
model with heterogeneous firms. Similarly with Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011), the 
firms are categorised into the borrowing ones that finance part or all their investment 
with bonds and/or stocks and the hedge ones that use only internal funds in order to 
finance their investment. The investment expenditures in the model rely positively on 
the valuation ratio, the capacity utilisation and the retained profits. Importantly, the 
investment of borrowing firms is more sensitive to internal funds than the investment 
of hedge firms. The rationale is that the borrowing firms face a higher risk of 
bankruptcy and thus they take more seriously into account their internal funds when 
they decide their level of investment. With the use of numerical simulations the 
authors have explored how changes in the propensity to save, the distribution of 
income and the liquidity preference are likely to affect the dynamics of leverage and 
the instability in the economy. 
 
Dosi et al. (2013) have developed an agent-based model that pays particular attention 
to the credit rationing of firms’ demand for loans. Banks decide about their credit 
availability by taking into account firms’ stock of liquid assets relative to their sales. 
The simulation analysis reproduces some Minskyan dynamics: there are regimes in 
which higher investment and production gradually increase the level of firms’ debt 
and thus the degree of credit rationing; this in turn decreases credit availability 
causing a recession in the economy. 
 
2.3.2 Mainstream models 
 
The most characteristic macro models in which the asymmetric information approach 
to financial fragility/instability (see section 2.2.2) was first analysed are those of 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) have constructed a simple overlapping 
generations model in which firms need to borrow in order to finance a part of their 
investment expenditures. Due to the existence of asymmetric information the agency 
costs of lenders (and thus the cost of external finance) are higher the lower is the net 
worth of borrowers. Accordingly, the shocks that affect the net worth of borrowers 
influence the financial relationships and the finance of investment. The implication of 
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this analytical framework is that the financial contracts propagate the shocks to the 
economy: in the case of favourable shocks the positive effects on investment are 
reinforced due to the rise in the net worth of firms; in the case of adverse shocks the 
decline in the net worth of firms enhances the recessionary effects. 
 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) have developed a similar model in which debt is the 
only external source of fund for firms, asymmetric information affects the decisions in 
the financial markets and firms are inclined to the possibility of bankruptcy. Financial 
factors affect not only the level of investment (as in the model of Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989) but also the level of inputs in the production process. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz have used their model in order to investigate various aspects of the actual 
business cycles, such as the fluctuations in real wages and the high sensitivity of the 
economy to small shocks. 
 
The model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) has paid particular attention to the role of 
durable assets (in particular land) as collateral for loans. Changes in the price of land 
produce fluctuations in the net worth of borrowers and therefore in the provision of 
credit. At the same time, fluctuations in the provision of credit affect the investment in 
land, producing changes in the price of land. This interdependency between asset 
prices and the provision of credit is the reason that a small adverse shock (e.g. to 
productivity) has in their model important negative effects on economic activity. 
 
The above-mentioned papers have been used as a basis for the ‘financial accelerator’ 
DSGE model developed by Bernanke et al. (1999).
 The ‘financial accelerator’ term 
refers to the fact that the financial frictions related to asymmetric information amplify 
the production effects of shocks that influence the net worth of borrowers (see also 
Bernanke et al., 1996). The economy in the model of Bernanke et al. (1999) 
comprises households, entrepreneurs, retailers, a government and a financial 
intermediary (that plays a passive role). The authors impose various shocks to their 
model (e.g. a monetary policy shock, a technology shock and a government 
expenditure shock) and examine how the ‘financial accelerator’ influences the 
business cycles dynamics. 
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Recent DSGE models, motivated by the 2007-8 crisis events, have extended the 
analytical framework of Bernanke et al. (1999) by introducing the agency problem of 
asymmetric information into the procedures through which financial intermediaries 
(banks) obtain their funding. For instance, Gertler and Karadi (2011) have formulated 
an agency problem between banks and depositors. In their model banks acquire funds 
from households in order to lend them to firms. Bankers have an incentive to transfer 
a part of banks’ assets to their families which leads to default. This possibility of 
default restricts the amount that the depositors are willing to lend to banks, implying 
that a borrowing constraint may arise. In turn, this borrowing constraint may increase 
the cost of credit for firms with negative effects on economic activity. Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2011) have introduced in their model a similar agency problem in the 
interbank market (which in their setup coexists with the agency problem in the banks-
depositors relationship). This agency problem may disrupt the borrowing and lending 
in the interbank market, leading to higher loan rates. Moreover, Gertler et al. (2012) 
have developed a DSGE model in which the agency problem between banks and 
depositors is extended by allowing banks to use both deposits and external equity to 
finance their asset position. Banks’ decision about their balance sheet structure relies 
on their perception of risk. In the aforementioned models calibration exercises have 
been used to investigate how a financial crisis can be created and how the central 
bank’s interventions are likely to mitigate crisis’ adverse effects on the 
macroeconomy. 
 
We now turn to the models that have used the second approach to financial 
fragility/instability which, as mentioned in section 2.2.2, emphasises the role of 
default and bank profitability. This approach was first developed and analysed in the 
works of Tsomocos (2003A, 2003B) and Goodhart et al. (2004, 2005, 2006A, 
2006B). Tsomocos (2003A, 2003B) has constructed a two-period general equilibrium 
model in which markets are incomplete, heterogeneous banks maximise their 
expected profitability (subject to capital requirements) and the default of both 
households and banks emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon. The heterogeneity of 
banks stems from their different initial capital endowments, risk preferences and 
assessments of future scenarios. Banks borrow from households and from the central 
bank in the interbank market. They also have equity held by their shareholders. It is 
assumed that in the first period the agents in the model are uncertain about the state of 
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the economy; the latter is revealed in the second period. In this context, the agents, 
who have rational expectations, make choices using their subjective probabilities. The 
model has been used to derive the analytical conditions under which financial fragility 
emerges. Moreover, various comparative static exercises have been conducted to 
examine the effects of shocks to the economy. 
 
Goodhart et al. (2004, 2005, 2006A, 2006B) have extended the model of Tsomocos 
(2003A, 2003B) by considering the possibility of capital requirements’ violation, 
introducing a secondary market for the equity of banks and allowing for different loan 
interest rates among banks as well as for endogenous credit spreads between loan and 
deposit rates. They have also explored how various policy responses and shocks (e.g. 
expansionary monetary policy, restrictive regulatory policy, changes in the loan risk 
weights applied to capital requirements etc.) are likely to affect the fragility and the 
welfare in the economy. 
 
The analytical framework developed in the above-mentioned papers has been 
incorporated in a DSGE model by Goodhart et al. (2009).
9
 The model consists of two 
heterogeneous households, two heterogeneous banks and a central bank. Default is 
endogenous and affects individuals’ ability to borrow in the future. A distinction is 
made between outside money and inside money. Outside money refers to injections of 
liquidity from the government or the external sector. Inside money has to do with the 
liquidity injections of the central bank in the interbank market. The simulation 
analysis conducted by the authors compares their model with the standard New 
Keynesian one. The results suggest that the inclusion of an active banking sector, 
agent heterogeneity, liquidity and default in the standard New Keynesian model 
permits a more comprehensive analysis of the issues related to monetary and financial 
stability policy. 
 
Very recently, the growing popularity of Minsky’s economic analysis has induced 
various economists to construct mainstream models in which certain Minskyan 
perceptions are incorporated or a type of a ‘Minsky moment’ is reproduced. In 
particular, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) have put forward a simple new 
                                            
9
 Note that this framework has also been recently extended by Goodhart et al. (2010) to analyse the 
market for mortgages but not within the context of a DSGE model. 
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Keynesian-style model which pays particular attention to the macroeconomic role of 
private debt. In their analytical framework ‘impatient’ agents borrow from ‘patient’ 
ones. Borrowing is restricted by a debt limit which can be set exogenously or in 
relation to borrowers’ income. A ‘Minsky moment’ is regarded to occur when the 
debt limit falls suddenly as a result of a change in expectations and in the evaluation 
of assets. In this case deleveraging and debt deflation takes place putting the economy 
into a liquidity trap. The adverse effect of price deflation on the real burden of debt 
creates the possibility for a positively-sloped aggregate demand curve, which gives 
rise to three macroeconomic paradoxes: (i) the collective attempt to save more 
depresses the economy; (ii) higher productivity reduces output; (iii) wage flexibility 
increases unemployment. Furthermore, it has been shown that expansionary fiscal 
policy can be effective when the economy has been pushed to a debt-induced 
recession. 
 
Farmer (2013) has developed a rational expectations model in which asset prices can 
increase forever due to the absence of physical or behavioural constraints that may 
prevent their rise. Thus, the expansion is considered to be fully rational. Within this 
framework multiple equilibrium unemployment rates exist and financial crises occur 
as a result of changing expectations in the financial markets. 
 
The model of Gorton and Ordoñez (2013) explains financial fragility by concentrating 
on the role of information in short-term debt markets. Short-term debt is issued by 
firms to fund their projects. It is assumed that the information about the underlying 
collateral is costly and it is not optimal for lenders to produce information every 
period. Therefore, information depreciates over time. If information-insensitive 
lending occurs for a long time, only a small fraction of the actual collateral’s quality is 
known. Within this framework, the authors introduce aggregate shocks that are likely 
to decrease the perceived value of the collateral and, thus, to remove the economy 
from a regime without the fear of asymmetric information to a regime in which 
asymmetric information plays a crucial role; this can lead to a credit crunch. In the 
model the fragility is defined as the probability that aggregate consumption decreases 
more than a specific level. Systemic fragility is considered to increase during credit 
booms. 
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Bhattacharya et al. (2011) have developed a model that attempts to capture a specific 
aspect of Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’: that over periods of prolonged 
prosperity the optimism about the future prompts economic agents to invest more in 
risky assets rendering the economic system more prone to crisis. In their setup 
financial agents are Bayesian learners with incomplete information who form their 
expectations about the future outcomes taking into account the previous experience. 
When good news prevail in the economy for a long period of time the improvement in 
the expectations leads financial agents to invest in riskier assets. This results in higher 
leverage and riskier financial structures. After such a period, the realisation of bad 
news leads to high default and has significant adverse effects on financial stability. 
The model has been used to examine the extent to which specific regulatory policies 
are capable of attenuating the excess risk-taking and controlling the leverage cycle. 
 
Lastly, LeBaron (2012) has incorporated some ‘Minsky like effects’ in an agent-based 
model. In his postulated economy there are both adaptive and fundamental traders. 
The adaptive traders use recent returns as a basis for their expectations of future 
returns. The fundamental traders form expectations using the deviations of asset price 
from the level of dividends. There are two assets: a risky and a risk free one. The 
portfolio choice of traders relies on the conditional expected return and the variance of 
future stock returns. The model produces irregular cycles around fundamentals. 
Instability is generated by the movement of traders toward extreme portfolio 
positions. 
 
2.4 Empirical research 
 
The empirical research on the measurement and the determinants of financial 
fragility/instability include both contributions that directly rely on the Minskyan 
theoretical framework and works that concentrate on the issues of financial distress 
without a direct link with Minsky. We first pay attention to the first strand of the 
literature. Minsky and Meyer (1972) have utilised various indicators to measure the 
illiquidity and insolvency risks of the private sector. The risks of the non-financial 
sector are captured by indices like the ratio of corporations’ fixed investment to their 
cash flow and the corporations’ liabilities to their cash flows or to their liquid and safe 
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assets. The risks of households are measured, inter alia, by the ratio of their liabilities 
to their disposable personal income and to their total or more liquid assets. Lastly, the 
financial structure of the commercial banks is represented by the loans to deposits 
ratio, the ratio of various assets (with high or low risk) to total financial assets and the 
ratio of less stable liabilities to total liabilities. The authors have applied these 
illiquidity and insolvency indices to the US economy over the period 1946 to 1971. 
They have found that in the period under consideration most of the indices followed 
un upward trend, revealing higher illiquidity and insolvency risks in the private sector 
of the US economy in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s relative to the early post-war 
period. 
 
Arza and Español (2008) have employed the Minskyan taxonomy between hedge, 
speculative and finance regimes to measure the financial fragility of firms in 
Argentina over the period 1992-2001. With the use of a micro panel data set they have 
estimated the number of firms in each financial category and have found that over the 
period under study the speculative and Ponzi firms had a higher leverage, a higher 
proportion of debt from financial institutions and a higher proportion of short-term 
debt. They have also found that the hedge firms were financially unconstrained while 
the speculative and Ponzi firms used internal funds in order to finance their 
investment. The interpretation that have made to the latter finding is that the financial 
structure of firms plays a significant role in the decision of the financial system to 
provide funds for long-term investment. 
 
The Minskyan categorisation of firms has also been used by Mulligan (2013) to 
explore the financial structure of various North American industries over the period 
2002-2009. The categorisation of firms is based on value of the interest coverage 
which is defined as the ratio: (net income plus interest)/interest. Hedge finance occurs 
when this ratio is higher than 4, speculative finance is the case in which this ratio lies 
between 0 and 4, and Ponzi finance is considered to exist when interest coverage ratio 
takes negative values. Mulligan (2013) has examined whether, in line with the 
‘financial instability hypothesis’, speculative and Ponzi firms increased over the 
expansion phase and decreased in the recession phase. His results suggest that this 
was the case in the most sectors under investigation. 
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Tymoigne (2010) has focused on the measurement of the financial fragility in the 
household sector, and in particular in the housing activities of this sector. Ponzi 
finance is considered to exist when financial obligations are increasing relative to cash 
inflows and, at the same time, refinancing needs are growing and liquidity ratios are 
declining. Based on this definition, Tymoigne has constructed three categorical 
indices of Ponzi finance. The first is equal to one (which implies that Ponzi finance 
exists) when the growth rate of home prices, the growth rate of mortgage debt and the 
growth rate of the mortgage financial obligation ratio are all positive. The second 
index is equal to one when the first index equals one and, at the same time, the ratio of 
households’ monetary assets to mortgage debts increases. The third index is the same 
as the second one with the only difference being that it also takes into account the 
trends in refinancing. The suggested indices have been applied to the US economy 
over the period 1987:Q1 to 2009:Q1 and have identified the time points in which the 
financial practices can be considered as unsustainable. 
 
Tymoigne (2011) has constructed financial fragility indices for the whole private 
sector, namely households, the non financial corporate sector and the financial 
business sector. The financial fragility of the household sector is represented by two 
indices: (i) a general index that refers to the funding practices of households and 
includes variables such as households’ net worth, their debt-service ratio and their 
monetary instruments as a proportion of outstanding liabilities; (ii) an index that 
concentrates on households’ financial practices associated with the acquisition of a 
house and contains variables such as the mortgages of households, the price of houses 
and the mortgage financial obligation ratio. Similar variables have been used for the 
development of the indices of the other two sectors. In the construction of all indices 
weights are assigned to the various variables and financial fragility is assumed to 
increase when the growth rate of the variables under investigation is positive. The 
application of the indices to the US economy over the last decades shows that the 
financial fragility of the households sector increased the years before the financial 
crisis, the fragility of the financial sector was high at the end of 1980’s, at the end of 
1990s and in the period 2004-2007, while the fragility of the non-financial corporate 
sector was high at the end of 1980’s and at the end of 1990s. 
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Tymoigne (2012) has used a similar approach with the previous paper to estimate the 
fragility of household finance in the US, the UK and France. He has constructed an 
index that is a weighted average of various variables that capture financial fragility 
issues. The index has been utilised both to measure the change in financial fragility in 
a given country and to compare financial fragility across countries. The analysis of the 
data shows that the financial fragility in housing increased substantially in the early 
2000s in all countries under investigation. Remarkably, the rise in the US and the UK 
was much more important than the rise in France. Furthermore, the cross-country 
comparison indicates that the fragility in the US was much higher than the fragility in 
France over the last two decades. 
 
De Paula and Alves (2000) have examined Brazil’s external financial fragility in the 
1990s. In their framework the external financial fragility is defined as the degree to 
which an economy is vulnerable to changes in external interest rates or in exchange 
rates. The authors have developed an index that compares a country’s actual and 
potential foreign currency liabilities with its current revenues and sources of longer-
term refinancing. The external financial fragility of an economy is higher the greater 
is its reliance on refinancing or the use of reserves in order to meet its external 
obligations. The use of this index in the case of Brazil illustrates the growing external 
fragility of the Brazilian economy before the 1998-1999 currency crisis. 
 
Arestis and Glickman (2002) also have applied Minsky’s theoretical framework to the 
open economy. They have put forward a distinction between four finance regimes: (i) 
a hedge regime in which the economy seems to be able to meet its financial 
obligations without being vulnerable to exchange rate movements; (ii) a speculative 
regime in which the fulfillment of financial obligations is prone to exchange rate 
movements; (iii) a super-speculative regime in which the economy is vulnerable to 
exchange rate movements but it is also prone to changes in the interest rates due to the 
fact that it has borrowed short-term in foreign currency to finance domestic long-term 
assets; (iv) a Ponzi regime in which the economy increases its debt to fulfill its 
financial commitments. They have also used Minsky’s ‘financial instability 
hypothesis’ to explain how financial innovation and euphoria can lead to higher 
financial fragility in an open economy without capital controls. Their analytical 
framework has been utilised to explain the Southeast Asia financial crisis in the late 
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1990s. In their analysis particular emphasis has been placed on the role of financial 
liberalisation as a major euphoria-inducing factor. 
 
Schroeder (2002, 2009) has used Foley’s (2003) distinction between hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi economies (see section 2.2.1). A national economy is hedge 
when the rate of profit is larger than the rate of accumulation or the rate of interest. 
When the rate of accumulation is greater than the profit rate, the economy is 
considered to be speculative. Ponzi finance corresponds to the situation in which the 
interest rate is higher than the profit rate. Schroeder (2002) has applied this 
categorisation to the Thailand economy. According to her analysis, this economy was 
in the hedge regime in the period 1986-1990, in the speculative regime in the period 
1991-1994 and in the Ponzi regime in the 1995-1998 time span. Schroeder (2009) has 
also explored the finance regimes of New Zealand and Australia. Her analysis 
indicates that the New Zealand was hedge from 1993 to 2003, speculative in 2004 and 
Ponzi over the period 2005-2007. Australia was in the hedge position for most of the 
period 1990-2007. 
 
Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010) have extended Minsky’s financial classification to the 
public sector. According to their definition, the public sector is deemed as hedge when 
it runs a primary surplus that covers both the interest and the principal repayment. If 
there is a primary surplus that is not enough to cover these financial obligations the 
public sector is considered to be speculative. The Ponzi finance regime exists when 
the public sector runs a deficit. The application of their classification to the Brazilian 
economy shows that the public sector of Brazil was speculative over the period 2000-
2008. 
 
Wolfson (1990) has explored empirically the determinants of financial instability. In 
his framework financial instability is represented by a dummy variable that equals 1 in 
the years in which financial crises occur and 0 otherwise. In the econometric analysis 
the main explanatory variables of financial instability (which capture both cyclical 
and secular forces) are the following: (i) the ratio of non-financial corporate sector’s 
net interest payments to its gross capital income; (ii) the ratio of net loan losses to 
average total loans; (iii) the bank credit availability; (iv) various indices that capture 
the impact of the regulatory structure on financial instability. The empirical evidence 
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that refers to the US economy for the period 1946-1987 suggests that his independent 
variables have the expected sign and can explain to a great extent the financial 
instability episodes. In a later paper Wolfson (1995) used a similar framework to 
explain the financial crisis in the US economy in 1990-91. 
 
Knutsen and Lie (2002) have used Minsky’s framework to explain the banking crisis 
in Norway in the period 1987-1992. The banking crisis is most notably captured by 
the significant loan losses reported in Norwegian banks over this period. Their 
analysis has placed emphasis on increasing credit availability, asset price inflation, 
expansionary monetary policy, financial deregulation and euphoric bank management 
behaviour in the years before the emergence of the crisis. 
 
We now proceed to present some other empirical contributions that are not directly 
linked with the Minskyan framework. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) have employed 
various financial and macroeconomic indicators to examine banking and currency 
crises in a sample of both developed and emerging countries over the period 1970 to 
mid 1995. Their empirical investigation illustrates that banking and currency crises 
were interlinked and that, typically, a banking crisis preceded a currency crisis. 
Importantly, their analysis shows that the root cause of both crises was a financial 
shock (such as financial liberalisation or easier access to international financial 
markets) which facilitated a credit boom and increased financial vulnerability. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) have employed a multivariate logit 
econometric model to scrutinise the factors that explain the emergence of banking 
crises. This model has been applied to a sample of both developed and developing 
countries over the period 1980 to 1994. In their empirical investigation the banking 
crises are captured by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when at least one of the 
following conditions is satisfied in the year under investigation: (i) the non-
performing loans to total assets ratio was above 10 percent, (ii) the cost of the rescue 
operation was over 2 percent of GDP, (iii) there was a large nationalisation of banks 
as a result of banking problems and (iv) bank runs or emergency measures (e.g. 
deposit freezes) occurred. Their results suggest that a low GDP growth, a high real 
interest rate, a high inflation rate and the presence of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme are associated with a higher probability of a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt 
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and Detragiache (2005) have applied the same econometric method for an extended 
sample of countries and for the period 1980 to 2002. Their results are largely 
consistent with those of their previous work. 
 
González-Hermosillo (1999) has examined some episodes of banking system distress 
and, based on data for about 4,000 banks, she has been led to the conclusion that 
increasing non-performing loans and declining capital ratios are good signals of a 
high probability of a near-term bank failure. She has also proposed an indicator of 
bank fragility, which is given by the ratio of capital equity plus loan reserves minus 
non-performing loans to total assets (the coverage ratio). When this ratio is below a 
specific threshold banks are considered to be in distress. 
 
Lewis (2006) has applied a semi-parametric technique to estimate the impact of bank-
specific features (e.g. the ratio of non-performing loans, the loans to deposits ratio, the 
asset growth and the regulatory capital to risk-weighted asset) as well as of 
macroeconomic variables on the probability of a banking crisis. The analysis refers to 
the commercial banks of Jamaica over the period 1996:Q1-2006:Q3. The results 
pinpoint the importance of macroeconomic volatility in the assessment of banks’ 
financial fragility. 
 
A more recent literature has paid attention to the development of financial stress 
indices that are continuous and rely on the composition of various financial and 
macroeconomic variables of a country. These indices have the role of supporting an 
early warning system by identifying time points in which the financial system is more 
prone to adverse shocks. There are various alternative methods that have been used in 
the procedure of the composition. The most common of them are the variance-equal 
weight method, the state space representation of the financial stress, the logit 
modelling, the factor analysis and the portfolio theory-based approach. Illing and Liu 
(2006), van den End (2006), Albulescu (2010), Brave and Butters (2010), Morris 
(2010) and Louzis and Vouldis (2012), inter alia, have developed such indices and 
have applied them to specific countries. 
 
Finally, particular attention should be paid to the empirical works of Goodhart et al. 
(2005), Goodhart et al. (2006B) and Aspachs et al. (2007) who have used a version of 
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the concept of financial fragility/instability that is based on the role of default and the 
profitability of the banking sector (see section 2.1.2). Goodhart et al. (2005) and 
Goodhart et al. (2006B) have shown that their model (see section 2.2.2) can replicate 
satisfactorily the time series properties of the UK banking data and have argued that it 
can thereby be used as a risk assessment tool for the UK banking sector. Furthermore, 
Aspachs et al. (2007) have investigated empirically the effect of bank default and 
profitability (which are used as proxies for fragility/instability) on GDP (a proxy for 
economic agents’ welfare). They have applied panel VAR techniques to a sample 
consisted of data for Finland, Norway Sweden, Korea, UK, Germany and Japan over 
the period 1990-2004. Their results show that an adverse shock to banks’ probability 
of default and equity values reduces GDP. 
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3. Margins of safety and instability in a macrodynamic 
model with Minskyan insights 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007-8 has brought to the fore the 
crucial role of economic agents’ desired margins of safety in the emergence of 
financial fragility and macroeconomic instability. The prolonged period of stable and 
high growth witnessed by many developed countries during the last decades, in 
conjunction with the absence of important financial episodes, boosted the euphoria of 
economic agents inducing them to accept lower margins of safety. This provided the 
ground for increasing financial fragility, which was not confined to the production 
sector, but was also remarkably associated with the banking sector. The growing 
financial fragility rendered the macro systems prone to instability and crisis. 
 
The financial crisis has also put at the centre of the stage the potential stabilising role 
of fiscal policy. Scholars who draw on Minsky’s macroeconomic analysis have 
pointed out that fiscal policy is a major vehicle for ensuring the stability of the 
macroeconomic system when private consumption and investment are weak (see e.g. 
Papadimitriou and Wray, 1998; Tymoigne, 2009A). It has been argued that 
government expenditures can place a floor to incomes and economic activity, reducing 
the possibility of financial breakdown. Although expansionary fiscal policy was 
initially used by many governments as a response to the crisis (see Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2010), concerns about fiscal deficits and rising public indebtedness quickly 
produced a change in attitude toward the implementation of austerity measures.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to formalise some theoretical aspects of the above-
mentioned developments and considerations within a macrodynamic model with 
Minskyan insights. The chapter draws on the extensive literature that has modelled 
various dimensions of Minsky’s (1975, 1982, 2008) macroeconomic analysis.1 The 
                                            
1
 See e.g. Ryoo (2010) and the references therein. 
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contribution of the chapter, compared to this literature, lies on the explicit examination 
of the following two issues within a stock-flow consistent framework.
2
 
 
First, the constructed model allows the desired margins of safety of firms and banks to 
change endogenously during the investment cycle. Although the role of economic 
agents’ desired margins of safety is critical to Minsky’s analysis for the emergence of 
financial fragility and instability,
3
 the formal literature has so far paid little attention to 
the distinction between the actual and the desired margins of safety.
4
 Most 
importantly, this literature has not sufficiently analysed the endogenous character of 
these margins of safety and the exact mechanisms through which the change in the 
desired margins of safety is conducive to macroeconomic instability.
5
 The current 
chapter shows both analytically and via simulations the destabilising role of 
endogenous movements in the desired margins of safety. In our framework the 
margins of safety of firms and banks are captured by their leverage ratios.
6
 
 
The analysis of this chapter focuses on the case of a debt-burdened regime. In our 
debt-burdened regime the capacity utilisation and the investment rate are both 
negatively affected by the leverage of firms.
7
 Nishi (2012) argues that in the Minskyan 
analytical framework the debt-burdened regime corresponds to the downturn phases, 
when the leverage ratio affects negatively investment, while the debt-led regime is 
consistent with the boom phase, in which leverage and capital accumulation both 
increase. This chapter indicates that the incorporation of endogenous desired margins 
of safety in an economy characterised by a debt-burdened regime can produce cycles 
during which investment and leverage move both in the same and in the opposite 
direction. This implies that the Minskyan boom and downturn phases can be 
                                            
2
 For the stock-flow consistent approach to macro modelling see Godley and Lavoie (2007). 
3
 See e.g. Kregel (1997), Tymoigne (2009A) and Vercelli (2011).  
4
 For some exceptions see Dafermos (2012), Le Heron (2008, 2011, 2012, 2013) and Le Heron and 
Mouakil (2008).  
5
 Some recent attempts to endogenise the desired margins of safety can be found in Le Heron (2011, 
2013) where the conventional leverage ratio is a function of the state of confidence or the growth rate. 
Ryoo (2010) has investigated some macro effects of the endogenous change in the desired margins of 
safety. However, in his model the desired margins of safety are basically driven by households’ 
behaviour in the stock market and not by the endogenous changes in the euphoria of firms and banks 
during the investment cycle, as is the case in this chapter. 
6
 As Minsky (2008, p. 266) points out, ‘increased leverage by banks and ordinary firms decreases the 
margins of safety’.  
7
 For the distinction between the debt-burdened and debt-led regimes see Hein (2013), Nishi (2012) and 
Sasaki and Fujita (2012). 
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reproduced without being necessary to switch from a debt-burdened to a debt-led 
regime. Furthermore, the chapter shows that the endogeneity of the desired margins of 
safety can generate instability in an otherwise stable debt-burdened economy.  
 
Second, the model of this chapter examines the extent to which fiscal policy is capable 
of preventing in a debt-burdened economy the instability that stems from the 
endogenous changes in firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety. In particular, it 
sets forth a fiscal rule according to which the government expenditures increase 
(decrease) when the desired margins of safety tend to rise (fall) relative to the actual 
ones. Numerical simulations show that this rule has a stabilising role which is broadly 
in line with Minsky’s arguments about the capacity of the government to reduce 
destabilising forces in the macro system. Although the stabilising effects of fiscal 
policy have been examined within similar frameworks (see e.g. Charpe et al., 2011, 
ch. 9; Keen, 1995; Yoshida and Asada, 2007), our model provides a new perspective 
on this issue by linking fiscal policy with the desired margins of safety and the 
leverage of firms and banks. 
 
Importantly, the above-mentioned issues are examined within a framework that 
incorporates an active banking sector. Following various recent contributions in macro 
modelling (see e.g. Charpe and Flaschel, 2013; Dafermos, 2012; Le Heron, 2008, 
2011, 2012, 2013; Le Heron and Mouakil, 2008; Ryoo, 2013B), it is assumed that 
banks impose credit rationing when they provide loans to firms. In our setup, the 
degree of credit rationing depends upon the financial position of both firms and banks.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the structure of the model. 
Section 3.3 presents the main properties, the dynamic equations and the steady state of 
the macro system. Section 3.4 explores analytically and via simulations the 
destabilising effects of the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety of 
firms and banks. It also illustrates how fiscal policy can stabilise an otherwise unstable 
debt-burdened economy. Section 3.5 summarises and concludes. 
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3.2 Structure of the model 
 
The economy of the model is composed of households, firms, banks, the central bank 
and the government. Table 1 displays the balance sheet matrix. Table 2 depicts the 
transactions matrix. Households receive wage income, interest income and the 
distributed profits of firms and banks.
8
 They keep their wealth only in the form of 
bank deposits. They do not take out loans from banks. Firms finance their investment 
expenditures using loans and retained profits. Banks provide loans to firms, hold 
treasury bills and high-powered money; their liabilities comprise household deposits 
and advances from the central bank. Banks’ undistributed profits are used to build 
capital. Central bank holds treasury bills and advances on the asset side of its balance 
sheet and high-powered money on the liability side. Its profits are distributed to the 
government. Government issues treasury bills to finance its expenditures.
9
 Inflation is 
assumed away and the level of prices is set, for simplicity, equal to unity. There is 
only one type of product which can be used for both consumption and investment 
purposes. 
 
Table 1. Balance sheet matrix 
Deposits +D -D 0
Loans -L +L 0
Treasury bills +B b -B +B cb 0
High-powered money +HPM -HPM 0
Advances -A +A 0
Capital +K +K
Total (net worth) +D +V f +K b -B 0 +K
Central bankHouseholds GovernmentCommercial 
banks
Firms Total
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8
 Households are the owners of firms and banks. To avoid complications, it is assumed that firms and 
banks do not issue shares.   
9
 For simplicity, there are no taxes in the model. Thus, fiscal policy is implemented via changes only in 
the government expenditures. 
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Table 2. Transactions matrix 
Households Government Central bank Total
Current Capital Current Capital
Investment +I -I 0
Consumption -C +C 0
Government expenditures +GOV -GOV 0
Wage bill +W -W 0
Interest on loans -i l L +i l L 0
Interest on treasury bills +i b B b -i b B +i b B cb 0
Interest on deposits +i d D -i d D 0
Interest on advances -i a A +i a A 0
Commercial banks' profits +PB d -PB +PB u 0
Central bank's profits +PCB -PCB 0
Firms' profits +PF d -PF +PF u 0
Change in deposits 0
Change in loans 0
Change in treasury bills 0
Change in advances 0
Change in high-powered money 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firms Commercial banks
AA
MPH  MPH 
D D
L L
B
bB
 cb
B
 
Equation (1) gives the disposable income of households  dY : 
 
dddd PBPFDiWY   (1) 
 
where W  is the wage bill, di  is the interest rate on deposits, D  is the amount of 
deposits, dPF  denotes the distributed profits of firms and dPB  denotes the distributed 
profits of banks. 
 
The wage bill of households is written as: 
 
YsW w  (2) 
 
where ws  is the income share of wages and Y  is the level of output.  
 
Households’ consumption  C  depends on their disposable income and deposits: 
 
DcYcC d 21   (3) 
 
where 10 12  cc . 
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The change in deposits is determined by the following equation: 
 
CYD d 
  (4) 
 
Equation (5) shows the profits of firms  PF : 
 
LiWYPF l  (5) 
 
where li  is the lending interest rate and L  is the amount of firms’ loans. 
 
The undistributed profits of firms  uPF  are determined as a proportion  fs  of their 
total profits: 
 
PFsPF fu   (6) 
 
Equation (7) gives the distributed profits of firms  dPF : 
 
ud PFPFPF   (7) 
 
In the formulation of investment expenditures, the distinction between the desired 
investment of firms  dI  and the effective one  I  is adopted (Dafermos, 2012; Le 
Heron and Mouakil, 2008). The effective investment is equal to the desired one minus 
the amount of new loans that are credit rationed by banks  crNL . In particular, it holds 
that: 
 
crd NLII   (8) 
 
From Equation (8) it is straightforward that credit rationing exerts a negative impact 
on effective investment. The desired investment scaled by capital stock  dg  is given 
by: 
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 T
d
d lflfu
K
I
g  210   (9) 
 
where 0,, 210  , K  is the capital stock, 0  denotes the ‘animal spirits’ of 
entrepreneurs and u  is the rate of capacity utilisation. The utilisation rate is written as 
)( KvYu  , where v  is the exogenously given full-capacity output-to-capital ratio. 
Equation (9) shows that the desired investment rate is affected by endogenous changes 
in capacity utilisation and in the leverage ratio relative to the target one.
10
 It is 
postulated that the leverage ratio (i.e. the loans to capital ratio, KLlf  ) is used by 
firms as a proxy for their actual margins of safety: a high (low) leverage ratio implies 
low (high) margins of safety. The desired margins of safety are reflected in the value 
of firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf . Equation (9) suggests that the lower the actual 
leverage ratio relative to the target one, the higher the investment rate (and vice 
versa).
11
 This formulation is broadly in line with Minsky’s (2008) emphasis on the role 
of leverage and desired margins of safety in the capital accumulation process (see, 
e.g., Minsky, 2008, p. 209). 
 
It is important to point out that our formulation does not imply that a rise in the target 
leverage ratio of firms always leads to a higher actual leverage ratio. The induced 
increase in desired investment, which tends to make lf  higher, might be 
overcompensated by the increase in undistributed profits (due to higher economic 
activity) and the rise in capital stock (due to higher investment), both of which tend to 
reduce lf . If this happens, a ‘paradox of debt’ occurs: although firms try to increase 
their leverage ratio by increasing investment they end up with a lower leverage ratio.
12
 
Interestingly, the overall result on lf  is also affected by the credit rationing behaviour 
of banks. 
 
                                            
10
 Obviously, capital accumulation may also rely on other variables, such as the rate of profit, the 
interest rate or the Tobin’s q. In this chapter, we use a simple specification to focus on the effects of 
firms’ margins of safety. 
11
 For some similar formulations that capture the impact of desired and actual margins of safety on 
investment see Dafermos (2012) and Le Heron (2008, 2011, 2013). 
12
 For a detailed discussion of the ‘paradox of debt’ in formal models see Hein (2007, 2013), Lavoie 
(1995) and Ryoo (2013A). 
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The change in loans  L  is given by the following formula: 
 
repLNLNLL crd   (10) 
 
where dNL  stands for the demanded amount of new loans and rep  for the loan 
repayment ratio. Since the amount of credit rationed loans are always a fraction of 
demanded loans it invariably holds that dcr NLNL  . 
 
The demanded amount of new loans are determined as follows: 
 
repLPFINL u
dd   (11) 
 
The amount of new loans that are credit rationed, scaled by capital stock, are given by 
the following formula: 
 
 T
cr
lblbblfbb
K
NL
 210  (12) 
 
where 0,, 210 bbb . The term 0b  captures exogenous factors that affect credit 
rationing (such as the ‘animal spirits’ of banks, the degree of securitisation etc.). The 
second term illustrates that a higher leverage of firms reduces the willingness of banks 
to provide credit: when the leverage of firms increases banks conceive the risk of 
borrowers’ default to increase.13 Equation (12) also suggests that the bank leverage 
plays a crucial role in the determination of credit availability. The leverage of banks 
 lb  is given by their assets-to-capital ratio: 
 
adhpmblf
hpmblf
lb
b
b


  (13) 
 
where KBb bb   is the banks’ treasury bills  bB -to-capital ratio, KHPMhpm   is 
the high-powered money  HPM -to-capital ratio, KDd   is the deposits-to-capital 
                                            
13
 See Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) for a similar assumption. 
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ratio and KAa   is the advances  A -to-capital ratio. Note that according to the 
balance sheet matrix (see Table 1) the bank capital  bK  is equal to 
ADHPMBL b  . Minsky (2008, ch. 10) emphasises the importance of banks’ 
leverage in the processes that lead the macroeconomy toward higher financial fragility. 
In Minsky’s analysis, the inducement of banks to increase their leverage as a means to 
heighten the return on equity is one of the principal factors that increase the supply of 
financing by banks. In our framework, a higher bank leverage increases, ceteris 
paribus, banks’ concerns about their own financial position. Thus, credit rationing is 
positively affected by bank leverage. However, any rise in the target bank leverage 
ratio  Tlb , which as will be shown below changes endogenously during the 
investment cycle, decreases credit rationing. This implies that, in broad line with 
Minsky’s arguments, any inducement of banks to accept higher leverage ratios pushes 
up the accumulation of firm debt.
14
  
 
Equations (8)-(12) suggest that the undistributed profits of firms have both first-round 
and second-round effects on the leverage of firms. The first-round effects stem from 
the fact that higher retained profits reduce, ceteris paribus, firms’ demand for new 
loans driving down their leverage. This fall in leverage produces, however, some 
second-round feedback effects because it boosts the desired investment of firms and 
decreases credit rationing. These second-round effects tend to increase both the 
numerator and the denominator in the leverage ratio with the overall result being 
ambiguous.  
 
Banks’ profits  PB  are given by: 
 
AiDiBiLiPB adbbl   (14) 
 
where bi  is the interest rate on treasury bills and ai  is the interest rate on advances; ai  
is determined by the central bank. For simplicity, it is assumed that ab ii  .  
 
                                            
14
 Charpe and Flaschel (2013) use a similar formulation in which credit rationing is connected with 
banks’ net wealth. Ryoo (2013B), who also relies on Minsky’s framework, postulates a positive effect 
of bank leverage on credit availability. 
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Banks retain a proportion  bs  of their profits: 
 
PBsPB bu   (15) 
 
The distributed profits of banks  dPB  are equal to: 
 
ud PBPBPB   (16) 
 
The interest rates on deposits and loans are determined as follows: 
 
add ihi   (17) 
 
all ihi   (18) 
 
where 1dh  is the mark-down and 1lh  is the mark-up over the interest rate on 
advances. Note that dh  and lh  are exogenously given in our analysis. 
 
Banks hold reserves, which are a fixed proportion  1h  of deposits: 
 
DhHPM 1  (19) 
 
Banks also hold treasury bills as a fixed proportion  2h  of deposits: 
 
DhBb 2  (20) 
 
The advances act as a residual in the balance sheet of banks :
15
 
 
ub PBDLBMPHA 
  (21) 
 
                                            
15
 Note that 
ub PBK 
 . 
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The change in government’s treasury bills  B  is determined by its budget constraint: 
 
PCBBiGOVB b 
  (22) 
 
where PCB  denotes the profits of the central bank (recall that these profits are 
distributed to the government) and govKGOV   denotes the government 
expenditures. 
 
The profits of the central bank are equal to the sum of the interest on treasury bills 
 cbB  and the interest on advances: 
 
AiBiPCB acbb   (23) 
 
The treasury bills held by the central bank are given by Equation (24): 
 
AHPMBcb   (24) 
 
Equation (25) gives the output of the economy: 
 
GOVICY   (25) 
 
Note that the redundant equation of the model is: 
 
bredcb BBB   (26) 
 
This equation should be verified in our simulations so as to ensure that the model is 
stock-flow consistent.  
 
Having presented the main structure of the model, we are now in a position to describe 
the law of motion of the target leverage ratios (desired margins of safety) of firms and 
banks. As shown above, the target leverage ratios play a central role in the behaviour 
of the macroeconomy since they influence the investment and lending decisions. 
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The law of motion of firms’ target leverage ratio is captured by the following formula: 
 
   TTnT lflfggfl  021   (27) 
 
where 0, 21  . Equation (27) suggests that the change in the target leverage ratio of 
firms relies on the difference between the effective investment rate  KIg   and 
what is conceived as a normal rate of investment  ng , which is used as a reference 
point. When the rate of effective investment in the economy is higher than ng , there is 
a rise in the euphoric expectations of firms, since the economy appears to perform 
much better than what is normally expected. With everything else given, this leads 
firms to relax their desired margins of safety or, equivalently stated, to increase their 
target leverage ratio: what before was conceived as a risky project may now be 
evaluated as a safe investment due to the general good performance of the economy. 
The parameter 1  reflects the sensitivity of firms’ target leverage ratio to differences 
between the effective and the normal investment rate. The higher this parameter the 
more prone the expectations of firms to the investment cycle.  
 
The second term in equation (27) implies that firms do not allow their target leverage 
ratio to deviate significantly from a reference value  Tlf 0 . When the target leverage 
ratio increases (decreases) relative to the reference value, firms are prompted to reduce 
(increase) their target leverage ratio. 
 
Minsky (2008, p. 255) points out that in an environment of favourable expectations, 
the higher willingness of firms to invest is accompanied by a higher willingness of 
bankers to finance investment projects: ‘[b]ecause bankers live in the same 
expectational climate as businessmen, profit-seeking bankers will find ways of 
accommodating their customers; this behavior by bankers reinforces the 
disequilibrating pressures’. In order to capture this Minskyan idea we allow the target 
leverage ratio of banks to co-move with the target leverage ratio of firms: 
 
TT lflb   (28) 
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where   is a positive parameter. Equations (27)-(28) imply that both firms’ and 
banks’ desired margins of safety change during the investment cycle. When, for 
instance, the effective investment rate is higher than the normal one, not only firms 
increase their target leverage ratio, placing upward pressures on investment, but also 
banks become more willing to target a higher leverage ratio and increase thereby 
credit availability. The reason is that the expansionary environment improves the 
repayment history of borrowers and, hence, banks become less concerned about the 
repercussions of an increase in their own leverage ratios.
16
 
 
Overall, equations (27) and (28) are consistent with Minsky’s (2008, p. 209) argument 
that ‘[a] history of success will tend to diminish the margin of safety that business and 
bankers require…a history of failure will do the opposite’. It will be shown below that 
this endogenous change in the desired margins of safety of both firms and banks is 
likely to transform an otherwise stable debt-burdened economy into an unstable one. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the additional purposes of this chapter is to 
examine whether fiscal policy can play a stabilising role in our macrodynamic system.  
In an economy in which the desired margins of safety change endogenously, this 
stabilising role could be attained if the government expenditures adjust adequately to 
variations in the divergence between the actual and the desired margins of safety. The 
fiscal rule described in equation (29) captures this idea:  
 
           govgovelblblblbelflflflfevog rToTToT  30201  (29) 
 
Note that 0,, 321 eee . Equation (29) states that, other things equal, the government 
expenditures-to-capital ratio increases (decreases) when the difference between the 
actual and the target leverage ratio of firms and banks becomes higher (lower) than 
their difference in the steady state. The economic intuition of this rule is the following: 
when the actual leverage ratios are much higher than the target leverage ratios there is 
                                            
16
 For the endogenous change in the desired margins of safety of banks during the economic cycle see 
also Kregel (1997) and Tymoigne (2009A). Moreover, for macro models in which the endogenous 
changes in the lender’s risk play a crucial role in the credit rationing procedure see Le Heron (2011, 
2013). 
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a tendency for investment to decrease since firms and banks are less willing to 
participate in new debt contracts; this produces contractionary forces in the economy. 
By increasing its expenditures the government can counteract theses forces, stabilising 
economic activity and thereby the leverage ratios. The same stabilising role can be 
played when government expenditures are driven down in response to a decline in the 
difference between the actual and the target leverage ratios. 
 
The third term in Equation (29) has been introduced to capture the fact that the 
government attempts to avoid excessive expenditures; rgov  is a reference value. When 
rgovgov  , the government expenditures-to-capital ratio tends to decrease, and vice 
versa (see Charpe et al. 2011, ch. 9 for a similar assumption).  
 
3.3 The 5D macroeconomic system 
 
The equilibrium in the product market is brought about by changes in the rate of 
capacity utilisation.
17
 We insert equations (3) and (8) into (25) and divide through by 
capital stock. Making the necessary substitutions and solving for the equilibrium rate 
of capacity utilisation  *u  we obtain: 
 
     



lbbaclfbcdccgovlfbb
u
T
23112212112200*   (30) 
 
where     011 21  dbabd ishisi ,     lflb isis  112 ,   013  ab is  and 
   11 11  wf ssvcv . The product market equilibrium requires that the 
denominator of (30) be positive (i.e. 0 ). We also assume that the numerator in 
equation (30) is positive to obtain a positive *u . 
 
Substituting equation (30) into equation (8) we get the equilibrium rate of effective 
investment  *g : 
 
                                            
17
 In the current chapter the rate of capacity utilisation is endogenously determined both in the short run 
and the long run. For the debate over the long-run endogeneity of capacity utilisation see Hein et al. 
(2012) and Skott (2012).  
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    lbblfbulfbbg T 212
*
12200
*    (31) 
 
Differentiating equations (30) and (31) with respect to lf , d , a , Tlf  and gov  
yields:
18
 
 


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lf
lf
lbbbc
ulfu
21221**

 (32) 


 dd
lbbcc
udu 2211**  (33) 
0231** 


 aa
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022** 
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
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ulfu Tlf
T  (35) 
0
1** 

 govugovu  (36) 
lflflf lbbbuglfg 212
*
1
**    (37) 
ddd lbbugdg 2
*
1
**    (38) 
02
*
1
**  aaa lbbugag   (39) 
0*122
**  TT lflf
T ubglfg   (40) 
0*1
**  govgov uggovg   (41) 
 
where
19
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0
2
21
2 



dhhlf
da
lblblflb lf  (42) 
 
  221
212
dhhlf
ahhlf
lblbdlb d


  (43) 
 
0
21
2



dhhlf
lb
lbalb a  (44) 
 
                                            
18
 It can be easily shown that the economic activity in the model is wage-led (i.e. 0*  Wsu ).  
19
 Scaling equations (19) and (20) by capital stock and substituting into (13), yields: 
     adhhlfdhhlflb  2121 1 . 
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The impact of firms’ leverage on capacity utilisation and effective investment cannot 
be unambiguously determined (see equations (32) and (37)). In the model there are 
three unfavourable and two favourable effects of a higher firms’ leverage on economic 
activity (see Table 3). An increase in the leverage of firms tends to depress investment 
due to the direct adverse impact on desired investment and credit rationing. Moreover, 
it places downward pressures on consumption because it affects negatively firms’ 
distributed profits. These are the unfavourable effects. The favourable effects are 
associated with the expansionary impact of banks’ distributed profits on consumption 
as well as with the inverse link between the leverage of firms and the leverage of 
banks (see equation (42)); the latter implies that, other things equal, when the firm 
leverage increases (decreases) the bank leverage falls (rises), increasing (reducing) 
thereby credit availability. 
 
Table 3. Effects of firms’ leverage ratio and deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity 
Effect Parameter(s) that 
capture the effect
Direct negative effect on desired investment δ 2
Direct negative effect on credit availability b 1
Indirect negative effect on consumption via the distributed profits of firms c 1 (1-s f )i l
Indirect positive effect on consumption via the distributed  profits of banks c 1 (1-s b )i l
Indirect positive effect on credit availability via the leverage of banks b 2
Indirect positive or negative effect on consumption via the distributed profits of banks c 1 (1-s b )(i a h 2 -i d )
Direct positive effect on consumption via wealth c 2
Direct positive effect on consumption via interest payments c 1 i d
Indirect negative effect on credit availability via the leverage of banks b 2
Effects of firms' leverage ratio on economic activity
Effects of deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity
 
As mentioned at the outset, this chapter focuses on the case of a debt-burdened regime 
in which, according to the definition adopted, the partial derivatives of capacity 
utilisation and effective investment with respect to the leverage of firms are both 
negative. This is ensured by assuming that 2 , bs  and 1b  are sufficiently large and fs  
and 2b  are sufficiently small (and, hence, 2  is small) so as for the negative effects of 
the firm leverage on aggregate demand to outweigh the positive ones; this implies that 
(32) and (37) are postulated to be negative. 
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Table 3 shows that an increase in the deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity has 
both favourable and unfavourable effects on economic activity. Therefore, the sign of 
equations (33) and (38) is ambiguous. On the one hand, a rise in d  tends to boost 
consumption via the wealth effect and the induced increase in the interest income of 
households. On the other hand, a higher d  increases, ceteris paribus, the leverage of 
banks and hence credit rationing (throughout the chapter we adopt the plausible 
assumption that 1h  and 2h  are sufficiently small so as for 0dlb ; see equation (43)). 
Moreover, there is an ambiguous impact on consumption from the distributed profits 
of banks: a higher d  increases the interest paid by banks on deposits but it also 
increases the interest received on treasury bills (recall that treasury bills are a 
proportion of deposits).  
 
Equations (34) and (39) show that an increase in the advances-to-capital ratio produces 
unambiguously a decrease in capacity utilisation and effective investment rate: a rise 
in advances-to-capital ratio leads, other things equal, to more liabilities and to a higher 
bank leverage (see equation (42)), enhancing thereby credit rationing; it also reduces 
the distributed profits of banks with negative effects on consumption. Equations (35) 
and (40) show that a higher target leverage ratio of firms increases the rate of capacity 
utilisation and the effective investment rate; the same holds for the target leverage 
ratio of banks which is a linear function of Tlf  (see equation (28)). Lastly, equations 
(36) and (41) show that, when government expenditures-to-capital ratio increases, *u  
and *g  become higher. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, attention is confined to the system of the five 
dynamic equations for the leverage of firms  fl , the deposits-to-capital ratio  d , the 
advances-to-capital ratio  a , the target leverage of firms  Tfl , and the government 
expenditures-to-capital ratio  vog  .20 It is assumed that in the dynamic evolution of 
the system the equilibrium values of u  and g  are always attained. We have that: 
 
                                            
20
 Note that this 5D system is independent of the treasury bills held by the commercial banks, the central 
bank and the government. The treasury bills are determined as a residual, without having feedback 
effects on the 5D system (see equations (20), (22) and (24)). 
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   TTnT lflfggfl  021   (48) 
           govgovelblblblbelflflflfevog rToTToT  30201  (49) 
TT lflb   (50) 
 
The steady-state values of the variables are estimated by setting the above differential 
equations equal to zero.
21
 The unique steady state of the system denoted by a subscript 
0 is the following: 
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where  dab ihis  24 ,   wf ssvcv  1110 ,       00 11  rnwf govgvss ,  
          021430211 111  nabnwf gisghhvvcssv  and 
       03022  nabnlb gisgisvv . 
 
 
 
                                            
21
 In the mathematical analysis and the simulation exercises presented in section 4 it is assumed that 
  020120100 lbblfbubgn   , nab gis  ,      01 02140  dhhlfgis nlb , nlf gis   and 
  nwf gvuss  01 . These conditions ensure that the values of the variables at the steady state are always 
positive. 
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3.4 Instability, cycles and the stabilising role of fiscal policy 
 
3.4.1 The macro system with exogenous desired margins of safety and 
government expenditures 
 
We initially focus on the 3D subsystem given by the laws of motion for lf , d  and a ; 
Tlf  and gov  are kept at their steady-state values. The interactions between the 
endogenous variables in this subsystem are quite complex. As described in section 3.3, 
lf , d  and a  affect the investment rate and the capacity utilisation rate. 
Simultaneously, any change in investment and capacity utilisation influences lf , d  
and a  through various channels. This implies that the three endogenous variables are 
all interconnected in a complex way.  
 
It is worth mentioning briefly the channels through which investment and capacity 
utilisation influence lf , d  and a . A common effect of investment on the loans-to-
capital ratio, the deposits-to-capital ratio and the advances-to-capital ratio is the impact 
on the denominator of these ratios though the resulting changes in capital stock. 
Remarkably, the higher these ratios the more important the impact of capital stock 
variations.  
 
Regarding the law of motion of lf , an increase in capacity utilisation exerts 
counteracting effects on new loans (and therefore on the numerator of the leverage 
ratio). On the one hand, there is a tendency of new loans to increase since desired 
investment is positively affected by a higher capacity utilisation rate. On the other 
hand, new loans tend to decline because higher economic activity increases the sales 
of firms and, thus, their undistributed profits. The deposits-to-capital ratio is positively 
influenced by a rise in capacity utilisation and investment: higher economic activity 
tends to increase the income of households and, therefore, their saving and deposits. 
The advances-to-capital ratio is not directly affected by economic activity; however, 
the balance sheet of banks implies that there are indirect effects through the change in 
loans and deposits.  
 
The stability properties of the 3D subsystem are summarised in Proposition 1.  
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Proposition 1. Consider the 3D subsystem of equations (45)-(47). Suppose that 
economic activity is debt-burdened (i.e. 2 , bs  and 1b  are sufficiently large and fs , 
2b  and 2  are sufficiently small). If 0lf , 0d , 0a , 1  and 3  are sufficiently small, the 
steady state of the 3D subsystem is locally stable (see Appendix A for the proof).  
 
The economic rationale behind Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. Sufficiently 
low values of fs  and 0lf  ensure that any increase (decrease) in investment and 
capacity utilisation translates into a higher (lower) lf : the new loans created by the 
inducement of firms to invest more (less) outweigh the increase (decline) in 
undistributed profits and the increase (decrease) in capital stock. Therefore, the 
existence of a debt-burdened regime in conjunction with a low 0lf  ensures a stabilising 
relationship between the investment rate and the leverage of firms: a rise in lf  reduces 
investment, lower investment decreases lf  and the decline in lf  brings the investment 
rate back to its steady-state value (and vice versa). Moreover, sufficiently low values 
of 0d  and 0a , 1  and 3  ensure that there is a similar stabilising relationship between 
economic activity, the deposits-to-capital ratio and the advances-to-capital ratio. 
Recall that 1  and 3  are related with the impact of d  and a  on capacity utilisation: 
the lower they are the lower this impact. Hence, if the conditions described in 
Proposition 1 are satisfied, the system becomes overall stable. 
 
3.4.2 Making the desired margins of safety endogenous 
 
We now turn to analyse the stability properties of the subsystem in which the target 
leverage ratios change endogenously. This is the 4D subsystem consisting of equations 
(45)-(48); gov  is kept at its steady-state value. Its stability properties are described in 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider the 4D subsystem of equations (45)-(48). Suppose that the 
conditions described in Proposition 1 hold (i.e. the 3D subsystem is stable). Suppose 
also that the Conditions (51)-(54) hold.  
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Then, the steady state of the 4D subsystem is locally stable, unstable or exhibits a limit 
cycle depending on the value of 1  (the sensitivity of target leverage ratios to the 
investment cycle). In particular, it holds that:  
(I) The system is locally stable for sufficiently small values of 1 . 
(II) The system is locally unstable for sufficiently high values of 1 . 
(III) There is a parameter value b1  at which a simple Hopf bifurcation occurs and the 
subsystem exhibits a limit cycle. 
(See Appendix B for the proof). 
 
The endogenous change in the target leverage ratios can generate destabilising forces 
in an otherwise stable system in which economic activity is debt-burdened. The reason 
is briefly the following: As the effective investment rate increases (decreases) relative 
to the normal rate, the target leverage ratios become higher (lower) (see equations (48) 
and (50)). Consequently, the negative stabilising effect of the leverage of firms and 
banks on desired investment and credit availability becomes less (more) strong due to 
the higher (lower) euphoria of firms and banks and the decline (increase) in perceived 
risk.  
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the stability of the 4D subsystem is guaranteed only if the 
sensitivity of the target leverage ratios to the investment cycle is below a critical value, 
as well as if the partial derivative of effective investment with respect to the firms’ 
target leverage ratio is not high enough (see Conditions (51)-(54)). These conditions 
ensure that the destabilising forces of increasing euphoria and lower perceived risk are 
not sufficiently large. If these conditions are not met instability emerges.  
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In order to analyse in greater detail the destabilising effects of endogenous alterations 
in the target leverage ratio we have conducted some simulations using the parameter 
values reported in Appendix C.
22
 In the simulation analysis 1  has been used as the 
critical parameter for the stability properties of the subsystem.
23
 Moreover, the 
underlying 3D subsystem described in section 3.4.1 is always stable.  
 
Figure 1 shows the effects of an increasing 1  on the stability of the subsystem, in the 
aftermath of an exogenous rise in the target leverage ratios. It can be readily seen that, 
as the sensitivity of the target leverage ratios to the investment cycle rises, the 
subsystem gradually turns from stability to instability.
24
  
                                            
22
 The Matlab codes for the simulation exercises are reported in Appendix D. 
23
 The simulation exercises presented in Figure 1 as well as in Figure 4 have been inspired by Chiarella 
et al. (2012).  
24
 The system turns from stability to instability at 659.01  .  
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Fig. 1. Dynamic adjustments of the 4D subsystem to a 1% increase in the target leverage ratios for 
varying values of target leverage ratios’ sensitivity to the investment cycle  1  
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Capacity utilisation rate  u  
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In order to understand the underlying mechanisms, it is useful first to outline the case 
in which 01  . In this case an exogenous rise in the target leverage ratios leads to 
higher desired investment and greater credit availability. The resulting higher effective 
investment increases firm and bank leverage (in our simulations it also leads to a 
higher level of deposits and advances relative to capital stock). Since economic 
activity is debt-burdened, the increasing firm leverage generates lower investment 
which, in turn, brings loans, deposits and advances to their steady-state values.  
 
On the other hand, when the target leverage ratios are endogenous, an exogenous 
increase in these targets does not only increase effective investment and new loans, but 
also positively affects, via higher accumulation, the euphoria of firms and banks. This 
euphoria combined with the lower perceived risk tends to further increase loan 
accumulation. If 1  is high enough, this new second-round effect is likely to produce 
an excessive increase in the leverage of firms and banks, giving rise to a destabilising 
mechanism. The inverse mechanisms are at work when the effective investment rate 
falls short of the normal one. Overall, the higher the value of 1  the stronger the 
destabilising forces, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that there is a critical value for 1  at which the destabilising 
forces exactly offset the stabilising ones, producing a limit cycle. Figure 2 illustrates 
the trajectories of the main variables of the 4D subsystem in our simulations when a 
limit cycle emerges. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the leverage ratio of 
firms and the effective investment rate under the case of a limit cycle.  
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Fig. 2. Dynamic trajectories under the case of a limit cycle in the 4D subsystem 
 
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Capacity utilisation rate  u  
 
 
57 
 
Fig. 3. Relationship between firms’ leverage ratio and effective investment rate under the case of a limit 
cycle in the 4D subsystem 
 
 
 
The cyclical behaviour of the economy can be described as follows. Initially, the 
effective investment rate is driven up, following the exogenous increase in the target 
leverage ratios; the economy is located at point A in Figure 3. Since the effective 
investment rate becomes higher than the normal one (the latter is equal to 0.04 in our 
simulations), a second-round endogenous increase in the target leverage ratio occurs. 
The firm leverage increases as a result of the higher capital accumulation and the 
greater willingness of both firms and banks to undertake more risky projects. The rise 
in the firm leverage produces in our simulations an increase in bank leverage. 
 
The higher leverage of both firms and banks has negative feedback effects on the 
effective investment rate. Eventually, this rate falls short of the normal one (point B in 
Figure 3), generating a fall in the target leverage ratio of firms and banks. As a 
consequence, the leverage of firms and banks start falling. When these variables reach 
a sufficiently low value (point C in Figure 3), the effective investment rate starts 
increasing. Yet, the economy continues to experience a fall in lf  and lb  for some 
periods: the pessimism of economic agents keeps rising and the effective investment 
rate is still low to cause a sufficient increase in new loans. When the effective 
investment rate passes the ng  threshold (point D in Figure 3), the euphoric 
expectations begin to dominate again, producing a rise in the leverage ratio of firms 
and banks. Simultaneously, the effective investment rate continues to increase until the 
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leverage ratios of firms and banks become high enough to cause a fall in the effective 
investment rate. When this happens, a new cycle begins.  
 
Interestingly enough, during the cycles investment and leverage move both in the 
same and in the opposite direction. In particular, during the investment boom periods, 
in which the investment rate is high and growing, the leverage ratios also increase; in 
the investment bust periods the leverage ratios decline. This movement of leverage 
and investment towards the same direction is caused by the endogenous change in the 
desired margins of safety that weakens the debt-burdened effect. However, there are 
also phases in which the effective investment rate moves inversely with the leverage 
ratios of firms and banks. In particular, when the effective investment rate starts rising 
(declining), the leverage ratios continue to fall (increase) until the effective investment 
rate becomes high (low) enough to trigger a rise (decline) in the target leverage ratios. 
It becomes thereby clear that the relationship between leverage and effective 
investment rate crucially relies on the way that the desired margins of safety change 
during the investment cycle. 
 
3.4.3 The role of fiscal policy 
 
We now turn to investigate whether fiscal policy can reduce the destabilsing forces 
generated by the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety. The 
government expenditures-to-capital ratio is allowed to change endogenously according 
to the fiscal rule described in equation (49). We examine whether, for identical 
parameter values as in Figure 1 and for the same range of values for 1 , the 5D system 
is characterised by higher stability. Figure 4 indicates that this is indeed the case: the 
rise in the sensitivity of target leverage ratios to the investment cycle does not increase 
the fluctuation of the macroeconomic variables, as it is the case in Figure 1.  
59 
 
Fig. 4. Dynamic adjustments of the 5D system to a 1% increase in the target leverage ratios for varying 
values of target leverage ratios’ sensitivity to the investment cycle  1  
 
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Government expenditures-to-capital ratio  gov  
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The economic interpretation is the following. In the 4D subsystem in which gov  is 
exogenous the rise in the target leverage ratio of firms and banks leads to an economic 
expansion that produces second-round destabilising forces in the system due to the 
positive impact of investment on target leverage ratios. In the 5D system the fiscal 
rule mitigates these second-round forces. By generating a reduction in gov  as a 
response to the rise in the target leverage ratios, the induced increase in the investment 
rate is less strong and, hence, the increase in the target leverage ratios is less 
significant. Moreover, in the periods in which the expectations deteriorate and the 
target leverage ratios decline relative to the actual ones the fiscal rule causes a rise in 
gov  preventing a significant reduction in economic activity. Consequently, the fiscal 
rule put forward in this chapter dampens the large oscillations in the macroeconomic 
variables, which are fuelled by the rise in 1 , rendering the macro system more stable. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a stock-flow consistent macrodynamic model in which firms’ 
and banks’ desired margins of safety play a central role in the behaviour of the 
macroeconomy. The model incorporates an active commercial banking sector, 
allowing us to pay particular attention to the evolution of the leverage of both firms 
and banks during the investment cycle. Dynamic analysis illustrated that a higher 
sensitivity of firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety to the investment cycle 
makes the macro system more prone to instability. Therefore, the euphoria and low 
perceived risk of both firms and banks during an investment boom and the excessively 
high desired margins of safety during an investment bust can be important sources of 
instability. Moreover, simulation analysis showed that leverage and investment can 
move both in the same and in the opposite direction during the cycles without being 
necessary to turn from a debt-burdened regime to a debt-led one.   
 
The chapter also analysed the stabilising role of fiscal policy in an economy in which 
desired margins of safety change endogenously. The chapter put forward a fiscal rule 
that produces a rise (decline) in government expenditures when firms and banks have 
excessively high (low) desired margins of safety. Simulation analysis indicated that 
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this rule has stabilising effects. Therefore, a fiscal policy that responds adequately to 
the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety appears to be essential for 
the stability of the macroeconomic system.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 3D subsystem  DJ 3  consisting of equations (45)-(47) 
evaluated at the steady state is written as: 
 











333231
232221
131211
3
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
J D  
 
where 
 









0
01111 1
X
lfbHlflfJ  
  dd lbblfuXdlfJ 20012 1

 
  aa lbblfuXalfJ 20013 1

 










0
0
1221 d
Z
bHlfdJ  
  02211022 1 dlbbgccuZddJ dnd 

 
  aa lbbdcuZadJ 2031023 1 

 











0
105
1331 1 a
a
bHlfaJ
  
        2112140210532 111 cchhalbbuadaJ dd 

  
       31210210533 111 

chhgisalbbuaaaJ nabaa  
 
We have that    vsslfX wf  11 010  ,      1010 111 dvsscZ wf  , 
       vsschhvss wfwf  11111 12115  , 
 









 21000221 1
cXX
lflbbgisH lfnlf  ,  
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    2102100222 1 









 c
Z
cd
Z
lbbH lf  and 
     211050105222121 1113 










 c
a
a
a
lbbchhisisH lflblf

 . 
 
The Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the 3D 
subsystem require that the coefficients )3()3(
3
)3(
2
)3(
1 ,,, baaa  be all positive in the steady 
state (see Gandolfo, 2010). These coefficients are as follows: 
 
  1
0
013
)3(
1 1 b
X
lfJTra D 






  (A.1) 
 
132
3332
2322
3331
1311
2221
1211)3(
2 b
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
a   (A.2) 
 
  1543
)3(
3 bJDeta D   (A.3) 
 
42115
0
0231
2
1
0
03
)3(
3
)3(
2
)3(
1
)3( 11 



















 b
X
lfb
X
lfaaab  (A.4) 
 
where 
332211 JJH  ,   23321223322133332212 JJJHJJJHJJH  , 
  130
105
120
0
3322
0
03 11 Ja
a
Jd
Z
JJ
X
lf 
























 , 
     2312221333213331222332332214 JJJJHJJJJHJJJJH   and 
     231222130
015
321333120
0
23323322
0
05 11 JJJJa
a
JJJJd
Z
JJJJ
X
lf 
























 . 
 
We have 0)3(1 a  since 0,, 332211 JJJ . In particular, 011 J  due to the assumptions 
that 0lf , 2b , fs , and 2  are sufficiently small; 022 J  because of the assumptions 
that 0dlb  and that 0d , 1 , 2b  are sufficiently small; 033 J  due to the assumptions 
that 
nab gis   (see footnote 21) and that 0a , 3  are sufficiently small. 
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It holds that 0)3(2 a  since 0, 32  . We have 02   because the terms 
 33221 JJH  , 3322JJ  are positive and adequately large. In particular,  33221 JJH   
is positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above) and 01 H  due to a sufficiently small 0lf ; 
3322JJ  is positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above). The terms  33221 JJH  , 3322JJ  
are sufficiently large because of the assumption that 
0a  is low enough. Moreover, 
03   since the term  3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is positive and adequately large. 
This term is positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above) and 0lf  is sufficiently small. 
Additionally, the term  3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is adequately large due to a 
sufficiently small 
0a . 
 
We have 0)3(3 a  because 0, 54  . In particular, 04   because the term 
33221 JJH  is positive and adequately large; it is positive since 0,, 13322 HJJ  (see 
above) and it is adequately large due to a sufficiently small 
0a . Moreover, 05   
because the term 
3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is positive and adequately large; it is positive since 
0, 3322 JJ  (see above) and due to a sufficiently small 0lf ; it is adequately large due to 
a sufficiently small 
0a . 
 
Finally, 0)3( b  because a sufficiently small 
0d  and a sufficiently small 0lf  ensure 
that 0421   and 01 5
0
0231 







X
lf .  
 
 
65 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 4D subsystem  DJ 4  consisting of equations (45)-(48) 
evaluated at the steady state is written as: 
 















44434241
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where 
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X
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  







 0
0
2224 d
Z
blfdJ T   
  







 10502234 1


a
ablfaJ T  
lf
T glfflJ 141 
  
d
T gdflJ 142 
  
0143  a
T gaflJ   
2144   Tlf
TT glfflJ   
 
The rest entries of the Jacobian matrix are reported in Appendix A.  
 
The conditions of Proposition 1 suggest that 0,, 342414 JJJ  and 041 J . In particular, 
a sufficient low value of 
0lf  implies that 014 J ; a sufficient low value of 0d  suggests 
that 024 J ; a sufficient low value of 0a  implies that 034 J ; the existence of debt-
burdened regime suggests that 041 J .  
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The Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the 4D 
subsystem require that the coefficients )4()4(
4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 ,,,, baaaa  be all positive in the 
steady state (see Gandolfo, 2010). These coefficients are written as follows: 
 
TlfD
gaJTra 12
)3(
14
)4(
1 )(    (B.1) 
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232221
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  TlfD gaaJDeta )3(31)3(324)4(4 )(   (B.4) 
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2)4(
3
)4(
4
2)4(
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)4(
3
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2
)4(
1
)4(   aaaaaab  (B.5) 
 
where 
dalf gJgJgJ 243414  ,  33143413221424121 JJJJJJJJg lf  , 
 33243423211411242 JJJJJJJJgd  , 
 32243422311434113 JJJJJJJJga  , 
      312232211431243421123224342211 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJga   
              312333211431243421133224342311 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJgd   
              322333221432243422133324342312 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJg lf  , 
    0)3(222)3(1)3()3(22)3(30  babaa   and 
      0)3(32)3(13213  TTTTT lflflflflf gaggagg . 
 
Note that 1  and 2  are independent of 1 .  
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Proof of 2 (I). Differentiating equations (B.1)-(B.4) with respect to 
1 , yields: 
 
01
)4(
1  Tlfga   (B.6) 
  Tlfgaa )3(11)4(2   (B.7) 
 321)3(21)4(3  aga Tlf  (B.8) 
  Tlfgaa )3(31)4(4   (B.9) 
 
Equation (B.6) implies that )4(
1a  is a decreasing function of 1 ; recall that 0Tlfg  
(see equation (40)). The coefficient )4(
1a  becomes equal to zero for 
  Tlf
a
ga 2
)3(
111
1   ; note that 011 
a  because 0)3(1 a  (see Appendix A). 
Therefore, 0)4(1 a  if 
1
11
a   and 0)4(1 a  if 
1
11
a  . Moreover, since 0, )3(3
)3(
2 aa  (see 
Appendix A) and 02  , the coefficients 
)4(
3
)4(
2 ,aa  and 
)4(
4a  are all positive under the 
Conditions (52), (53) and (54).  
 
By setting equation (B.5) equal to zero we obtain:  
 
0011
2
12
3
13
)4(  b  (B.10) 
 
At 01   we have 00
)4( b . At 111
a  , we have   02)4(3)4(  ab . Therefore, 
due to continuity, we obtain that for sufficiently positive low values of 1   all of the 
Routh-Hurwitz conditions are satisfied (i.e. 0,,,, )4()4(4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 baaaa ) and the 
system is thereby stable.   
 
Proof of 2 (II). For sufficiently high values of 
1  we have 0
)4( b  and, therefore, one 
of the Routh-Hurwitz conditions is violated. This implies that the system is unstable.  
 
Proof of 2 (III). At 01   we have 0
)4( b  and at 111
a   we have 0)4( b . Hence, 
the cubic equation 0)( 1
)4( b  has at least one solution, b1 , such that 
1
110
ab    
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with the property that 0)4( b  for all 
1  near but not equal to 
b
1 . Furthermore, at 
b
11    we have 0,,,
)4(
4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 aaaa . According to Asada and Yoshida (2003), 
these properties are sufficient for the existence of a simple Hopf bifurcation at 
b
11   .  
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Appendix C. Parameter values in simulations 
 
δ 0 0.02 b 2 0.01 h 2 0.75
δ 1 0.1 c 1 0.7 ξ 2 0.5
δ 2 0.5 c 2 0.1 e 1 0.8
s f 0.6 h l 4 e 2 0.05
sw 0.6 h d 0.5 e 3 20
v 0.25 i b 0.02 φ 15
b 0 0.01 s b 0.3 gov r 0.005
b 1 0.5 h 1 0.05 g n 0.04
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Appendix D.  
 
The Matlab programme of the simulation analysis is as follows: 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
%------------------------------------- 
%       Model Parametrisation 
%------------------------------------- 
% Goods Markets 
delta0=0.02; delta1 = 0.1; delta2 = 0.5; sf = 0.6; sw = 0.6; v = 0.25;% Desired 
investment 
b0 = 0.01; b1 = 0.5; b2 = 0.01; % Credit rationing 
c1 = 0.7; c2 = 0.1;  %Consumption function 
ia= 0.02; ib=ia; hd=0.5; hl=4; il = hl*ia; id=hd*ia;   %Interest rates 
govr = 0.005; sb= 0.3; h1=0.05; h2 = 0.75; gn=0.04; phi=15; 
xi2=0.5; 
e1=0; e2=0; e3=0; 
% Parameters and steady state 
bita1=v-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita2=ia*h2-sb*(ia*h2-id); 
bita3=c1*(sf-sb)*il-delta2-b1; 
bita4=delta1-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita5=(1-c1)*(sf-sb)*il; 
bita6=sf*il-delta2-b1; 
bita7=sf*(1-sw); 
delta_0=v-c1*bita1; 
delta=v-c1*bita1-delta1; 
alpha0=bita1*(gn+govr)/delta_0; 
alpha1=((v*bita2)/delta_0)+(c2*bita1/delta_0)-(v*(1-sb)*ia*(sb*(ia*h2-id)-(h1+h2-
1)*gn)/(delta_0*(sb*ia-gn))); 
alpha2=v*(sf-sb)*il/delta_0-v*(1-sb)*ia*(sb*il-gn)/((sb*ia-gn)*delta_0); 
lf0nom=gn-bita7*(alpha0+gn+govr)-bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha0/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0den=bita7*alpha2-sf*il+gn+bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha2/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0 =lf0nom/lf0den ; 
d0 =((1-c1)*alpha0+(1-c1)*alpha2*lf0)/(gn+c2-(1-c1)*alpha1); 
a0=((sb*il-gn)*lf0+(sb*(ia*h2-id)-(h1+h2-1)*gn)*d0)/(sb*ia-gn); 
lb0=(lf0+(h1+h2)*d0)/(lf0+(h1+h2-1)*d0-a0); 
lfT0=(delta0-b0+delta1*(gn+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+c1*(sf-sb)*il*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ia*a0)/delta_0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0-gn)/(-delta2-b2*phi); 
lbT0=lfT0*phi; 
u0=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+bita3*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ia*a0-b2*lb0)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+delta1*u0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0; 
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function [ dy ] = Banking(~,y,~, xi1)  
  
Banking_Parameters; 
lb=(y(1)+(h1+h2)*y(2))/(y(1)+(h1+h2-1)*y(2)-y(3)); 
u=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+y(5)+(c1*bita2+c2)*y(2)+bita3*y(1)-c1*(1-
sb)*ib*y(3)-b2*lb)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+delta1*u-(delta2+b1)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
  
dy = zeros(5,1); 
dy(1) = delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+bita4*u+(bita6-g)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
dy(2) =(1-c1)*bita1*u+((1-c1)*bita2-c2-g)*y(2)+bita5*y(1)-(1-c1)*(1-sb)*ib*y(3); 
dy(3)=dy(1)+(h1+h2-1)*dy(2)+(g-sb*il)*y(1)+((h1+h2-1)*g-sb*(ib*h2-
id))*y(2)+(sb*ib-g)*y(3); 
dy(4)=xi1*(g-gn)+xi2*(lfT0-y(4)); 
dy(5)=e1*((y(1)-y(4))-(lf0-lfT0))+e2*((lb-phi*y(4))-(lb0-lbT0))+e3*(govT-y(5)); 
end 
 
clear 
Banking_Parameters; 
 
xi1max = 40; 
for i= 1:1:xi1max 
xi1(i)=0.63+i/1000; 
options =odeset('RelTol',1e-10,'AbsTol',1e-10); 
[t,y]=ode23s(@Banking,[0:100],[lf0,d0,a0,lfT0*1.01,govr],[], options, xi1(i)); 
out1(i,:) = y(:,1); 
lf(i,:) = out1(i,:); 
out2(i,:) = y(:,2); 
d(i,:) = out2(i,:); 
out3(i,:) = y(:,3); 
a(i,:) = out3(i,:); 
out4(i,:) = y(:,4); 
lfT(i,:) = out4(i,:); 
out5(i,:) = y(:,5); 
govern(i,:) = out5(i,:); 
 
leverage(i,:)=( lf(i,:) +(h1+h2)* d(i,:))./( lf(i,:) +(h1+h2-1)* d(i,:) - a(i,:)); 
capacity(i,:)=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)* lfT(i,:) + govern(i,:) +(c1*bita2+c2)* d(i,:) 
+bita3* lf(i,:) -c1*(1-sb)*ib* a(i,:) -b2* leverage(i,:))/delta; 
leverageT(i,:)= phi*lfT(i,:); 
investment(i,:)=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)* lfT(i,:) +delta1* capacity(i,:) -
(delta2+b1)* lf(i,:) -b2* leverage(i,:); 
end 
 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName','Georgia') 
set(0,'defaultTextFontName','Georgia') 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(lf); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
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set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([0.15,0.25]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(leverage); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([2.5,4.5]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(lfT); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([0.2,0.4]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(leverageT); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([3,5.5]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(d); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([0.27,0.33]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(a); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
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set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([-0.05,0.05]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(investment); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([-0.1,0.2]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(capacity); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
zlim([-0.5,2]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figures 2 and 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
%------------------------------------- 
%       Model Parametrisation 
%------------------------------------- 
% Goods Markets 
delta0=0.02; delta1 = 0.1; delta2 = 0.5; sf = 0.6; sw = 0.6; v = 0.25;% Desired 
investment 
b0 = 0.01; b1 = 0.5; b2 = 0.01; % Credit rationing 
c1 = 0.7; c2 = 0.1;  %Consumption function 
ia= 0.02; ib=ia; hd=0.5; hl=4; il = hl*ia; id=hd*ia;   %Interest rates 
govr = 0.005; sb= 0.3; h1=0.05; h2 = 0.75; gn=0.04; phi=15; 
xi2=0.5; xi1= 0.659; 
e1=0; e2=0; e3=0; 
% Parameters and steady state 
bita1=v-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita2=ia*h2-sb*(ia*h2-id); 
bita3=c1*(sf-sb)*il-delta2-b1; 
bita4=delta1-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita5=(1-c1)*(sf-sb)*il; 
bita6=sf*il-delta2-b1; 
bita7=sf*(1-sw); 
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delta_0=v-c1*bita1; 
delta=v-c1*bita1-delta1; 
alpha0=bita1*(gn+govr)/delta_0; 
alpha1=((v*bita2)/delta_0)+(c2*bita1/delta_0)-(v*(1-sb)*ia*(sb*(ia*h2-id)-(h1+h2-
1)*gn)/(delta_0*(sb*ia-gn))); 
alpha2=v*(sf-sb)*il/delta_0-v*(1-sb)*ia*(sb*il-gn)/((sb*ia-gn)*delta_0); 
lf0nom=gn-bita7*(alpha0+gn+govr)-bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha0/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0den=bita7*alpha2-sf*il+gn+bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha2/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0 =lf0nom/lf0den ; 
d0 =((1-c1)*alpha0+(1-c1)*alpha2*lf0)/(gn+c2-(1-c1)*alpha1); 
a0=((sb*il-gn)*lf0+(sb*(ia*h2-id)-(h1+h2-1)*gn)*d0)/(sb*ia-gn); 
lb0=(lf0+(h1+h2)*d0)/(lf0+(h1+h2-1)*d0-a0); 
lfT0=(delta0-b0+delta1*(gn+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+c1*(sf-sb)*il*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ia*a0)/delta_0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0-gn)/(-delta2-b2*phi); 
lbT0=lfT0*phi; 
u0=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+bita3*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ia*a0-b2*lb0)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+delta1*u0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0; 
 
function [ dy ] = Banking( t,y ) 
  
Banking_Parameters; 
lb=(y(1)+(h1+h2)*y(2))/(y(1)+(h1+h2-1)*y(2)-y(3)); 
u=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+y(5)+(c1*bita2+c2)*y(2)+bita3*y(1)-c1*(1-
sb)*ib*y(3)-b2*lb)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+delta1*u-(delta2+b1)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
  
dy = zeros(5,1); 
dy(1) = delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+bita4*u+(bita6-g)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
dy(2) =(1-c1)*bita1*u+((1-c1)*bita2-c2-g)*y(2)+bita5*y(1)-(1-c1)*(1-sb)*ib*y(3); 
dy(3)=dy(1)+(h1+h2-1)*dy(2)+(g-sb*il)*y(1)+((h1+h2-1)*g-sb*(ib*h2-
id))*y(2)+(sb*ib-g)*y(3); 
dy(4)=xi1*(g-gn)+xi2*(lfT0-y(4)); 
dy(5)=e1*((y(1)-y(4))-(lf0-lfT0))+e2*((lb-phi*y(4))-(lb0-lbT0))+e3*(govr-y(5)); 
end 
 
clear 
Banking_Parameters; 
 
[T,Y] = ode23s (@Banking,[0 100],[ lf0 d0 a0 lfT0*1.01 govr]) 
lb=(Y(:,1)+(h1+h2)*Y(:,2))./(Y(:,1)+(h1+h2-1)*Y(:,2)-Y(:,3)); 
lbT=phi* Y(:,4) 
u=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*Y(:,4)+Y(:,5)+(c1*bita2+c2)*Y(:,2)+bita3*Y(:,1)-
c1*(1-sb)*ib*Y(:,3)-b2*lb)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*Y(:,4)+delta1*u-(delta2+b1)*Y(:,1)-b2*lb; 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName','Georgia') 
set(0,'defaultTextFontName','Georgia') 
plot(Y(:,1),g,'-o')  
set(gca, 'FontSize',20);plot(Y(:,1),g); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
set(get(gca,'XLabel'),'String',' Firms’ leverage ratio (lf)','FontSize',24); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'String',' Effective investment rate (g)','FontSize',24); 
xlim([0.184,0.193]) 
ylim([0.02,0.06]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName','Georgia') 
set(0,'defaultTextFontName','Georgia') 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(Y(:,1)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0.184,0.194]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(lb(:)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([3.35,3.6]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(Y(:,4)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0.274,0.294]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(lbT(:)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([4.1,4.4]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(Y(:,2)); 
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set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0.296,0.304]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(Y(:,3)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0,0.01]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(g(:)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0.02,0.06]) 
 
figure 
set(gca, 'FontSize',24);plot(u(:)); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',24) 
xlim([0,100]) 
ylim([0.5,0.85]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
%------------------------------------- 
%       Model Parametrisation 
%------------------------------------- 
% Goods Markets 
delta0=0.02; delta1 = 0.1; delta2 = 0.5; sf = 0.6; sw = 0.6; v = 0.25;% Desired 
investment 
b0 = 0.01; b1 = 0.5; b2 = 0.01; % Credit rationing 
c1 = 0.7; c2 = 0.1;  %Consumption function 
ib= 0.02; hd=0.5; hl=4; il = hl*ib; id=hd*ib;   %Interest rates 
govr = 0.005; sb= 0.3; h1=0.05; h2 = 0.75; gn=0.04; phi=15; 
xi2=0.5; 
e1=0.8; e2=0.05; e3=20; 
% Parameters and steady state 
bita1=v-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita2=ib*h2-sb*(ib*h2-id); 
bita3=c1*(sf-sb)*il-delta2-b1; 
bita4=delta1-sf*(1-sw)*v; 
bita5=(1-c1)*(sf-sb)*il; 
bita6=sf*il-delta2-b1; 
bita7=sf*(1-sw); 
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delta_0=v-c1*bita1; 
delta=v-c1*bita1-delta1; 
alpha0=bita1*(gn+govr)/delta_0; 
alpha1=((v*bita2)/delta_0)+(c2*bita1/delta_0)-(v*(1-sb)*ib*(sb*(ib*h2-id)-(h1+h2-
1)*gn)/(delta_0*(sb*ib-gn))); 
alpha2=v*(sf-sb)*il/delta_0-v*(1-sb)*ib*(sb*il-gn)/((sb*ib-gn)*delta_0); 
lf0nom=gn-bita7*(alpha0+gn+govr)-bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha0/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0den=bita7*alpha2-sf*il+gn+bita7*(alpha1-gn)*(1-c1)*alpha2/(gn+c2-(1-
c1)*alpha1); 
lf0 =lf0nom/lf0den ; 
d0 =((1-c1)*alpha0+(1-c1)*alpha2*lf0)/(gn+c2-(1-c1)*alpha1); 
a0=((sb*il-gn)*lf0+(sb*(ib*h2-id)-(h1+h2-1)*gn)*d0)/(sb*ib-gn); 
lb0=(lf0+(h1+h2)*d0)/(lf0+(h1+h2-1)*d0-a0); 
lfT0=(delta0-b0+delta1*(gn+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+c1*(sf-sb)*il*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ib*a0)/delta_0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0-gn)/(-delta2-b2*phi); 
lbT0=lfT0*phi; 
u0=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+govr+(c1*bita2+c2)*d0+bita3*lf0-c1*(1-
sb)*ib*a0-b2*lb0)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*lfT0+delta1*u0-(delta2+b1)*lf0-b2*lb0; 
 
function [ dy ] = Banking(~,y,~, xi1)  
  
Banking_Parameters; 
lb=(y(1)+(h1+h2)*y(2))/(y(1)+(h1+h2-1)*y(2)-y(3)); 
u=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+y(5)+(c1*bita2+c2)*y(2)+bita3*y(1)-c1*(1-
sb)*ib*y(3)-b2*lb)/delta; 
g=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+delta1*u-(delta2+b1)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
  
dy = zeros(5,1); 
dy(1) = delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)*y(4)+bita4*u+(bita6-g)*y(1)-b2*lb; 
dy(2) =(1-c1)*bita1*u+((1-c1)*bita2-c2-g)*y(2)+bita5*y(1)-(1-c1)*(1-sb)*ib*y(3); 
dy(3)=dy(1)+(h1+h2-1)*dy(2)+(g-sb*il)*y(1)+((h1+h2-1)*g-sb*(ib*h2-
id))*y(2)+(sb*ib-g)*y(3); 
dy(4)=xi1*(g-gn)+xi2*(lfT0-y(4)); 
dy(5)=e1*((y(1)-y(4))-(lf0-lfT0))+e2*((lb-phi*y(4))-(lb0-lbT0))+e3*(govr-y(5)); 
end 
 
clear 
Banking_Parameters; 
 
xi1max = 40; 
for i= 1:1:xi1max 
xi1(i)=0.63+i/1000; 
options =odeset('RelTol',1e-10,'AbsTol',1e-10); 
[t,y]=ode23s(@Banking,[0:100],[lf0,d0,a0,lfT0*1.01,govr],[], options, xi1(i)); 
out1(i,:) = y(:,1); 
lf(i,:) = out1(i,:); 
out2(i,:) = y(:,2); 
d(i,:) = out2(i,:); 
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out3(i,:) = y(:,3); 
a(i,:) = out3(i,:); 
out4(i,:) = y(:,4); 
lfT(i,:) = out4(i,:); 
out5(i,:) = y(:,5); 
govern(i,:) = out5(i,:); 
 
leverage(i,:)=( lf(i,:) +(h1+h2)* d(i,:))./( lf(i,:) +(h1+h2-1)* d(i,:) - a(i,:)); 
capacity(i,:)=(delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)* lfT(i,:) + govern(i,:) +(c1*bita2+c2)* d(i,:) 
+bita3* lf(i,:) -c1*(1-sb)*ib* a(i,:) -b2* leverage(i,:))/delta; 
leverageT(i,:)= phi*lfT(i,:); 
investment(i,:)=delta0-b0+(delta2+b2*phi)* lfT(i,:) +delta1* capacity(i,:) -
(delta2+b1)* lf(i,:) -b2* leverage(i,:); 
end 
 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName','Georgia') 
set(0,'defaultTextFontName','Georgia') 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(lf); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([0.15,0.25]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(leverage); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([2.5,4.5]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(lfT); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([0.2,0.4]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(leverageT); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
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set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([3,5.5]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(d); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([0.27,0.33]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(a); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([-0.05,0.05]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(investment); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
%zlim([-0.1,0.2]) 
 
figure 
set(gca,'FontSize',20);surfl(govern); 
set(gca, 'Ytick',[1,20,40], 'YTickLabel', {'0.63';'0.65'; 0.67'}); 
set(get(gca,'YLabel'),'Interpreter','latex','String','$$\xi_1$$','FontSize',28); 
set(gcf, 'color', 'white'); 
view(20,15) 
xlabel('Time','FontSize',28) 
xlim([0,100]) 
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4. Securitisation, wage stagnation and financial fragility:  
A stock-flow consistent perspective 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Securitisation has been at the core of various academic analyses for the causes of the 
recent financial crisis. Broadly speaking, securitisation is a technique that transforms 
illiquid assets into liquid tradable instruments. In its more widespread form, this 
technique allows banks to remove loans from the asset side of their balance sheets and 
distribute the associated risks to other financial units. Securitisation has, therefore, 
given rise to the so-called ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking in which the 
default risk on granted loans is disconnected from loan originators. By doing so it has 
played a prominent role in facilitating excessive lending and in supporting speculative 
financial activities in money manager capitalism, with adverse effects on 
macroeconomy’s financial fragility (see Minsky, 2008; Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2009; 
Lavoie, 2012-3).  
 
Wage stagnation has been viewed as another main root cause of the recent crisis 
(Palley, 2010; Lysandrou, 2011; Stockhammer, 2012; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012; 
Wisman, 2013). It has been argued that the decline in the wage income share of 
workers in the pre-crisis period was conducive to the excessive rise in household debt, 
the deterioration of workers’ financial position, and the growing tendency of the 
economies toward financial speculation. Wage stagnation has also been regarded as a 
factor that put downward pressures on domestic demand, giving rise to unsustainable 
growth regimes.   
 
In this chapter, we employ the recently developed stock-flow consistent (SFC) 
approach to macroeconomics
1
 to integrate into a coherent macro framework the 
complex mechanisms of securitisation and their interaction with functional income 
distribution. With the aid of simulations we study how a more widespread adoption of 
securitisation is likely to increase the financial fragility of an economy. We also 
examine the mechanisms through which wage stagnation can reinforce this tendency 
                                            
1
 See Godley and Lavoie (2007).  
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of securitisation to increase the financial fragility. The simulation results of the chapter 
provide support to the view that the combination of risky financial practices and 
higher inequality can substantially increase the likelihood of financial instability in a 
macro system.    
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes the potential adverse 
effects of securitisation and wage stagnation on financial fragility. Section 4.3 
develops the stock-flow consistent model. Section 4.4 presents the simulation 
experiments. Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
4.2 Securitisation and wage stagnation: Their interconnected role in the 
emergence of financial fragility 
 
The securitisation process begins when commercial banks (the originators) decide to 
securitise a part of their loans. There are various motives that may induce banks to do 
so. Among them are the need for liquidity, the minimisation of credit risk and the 
reduction of capital requirements (see e.g. Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010).
2
 The loans 
decided to be securitised are pooled together and are sold off to administrators. The 
administrators set up the special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which purchase the pooled 
loans in exchange of fee income.
3
 The SPVs issue asset-backed securities (ABSs) and 
distribute the cash inflows from loan repayment and interest to the holders of the 
ABSs. The ABSs are bought by institutional investors (typically with the aid of 
underwriters that receive fee income) and the proceeds are then used by the SPVs to 
purchase the loans from banks. Institutional investors finance their investment in 
ABSs either by repo transactions or shares that are bought by households. 
Remarkably, various credit enhancement techniques (e.g. excess spread, 
overcollateralisation, tranching etc.) are utilised to render ABSs attractive for 
                                            
2
 Lysandrou (2011) has pointed out that securitisation can also be significantly prompted by the need of 
institutional investors to find new securities to invest the accumulated wealth of rich households.  
3
 This chapter focuses on the modern, more widespread, form of securitisation in which securitised 
loans are removed from the balance sheet of banks. In other forms of securitisation the securitised loans 
remain within the bank that originates the loans (see Lavoie, 2012-3). Furthermore, there are cases in 
which the securitisation is utilised for banks’ liabilities (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010). For a detailed 
description of the securitisation process analysed in the current chapter see Gorton and Souleles (2007), 
Stein (2010) and Noeth and Sengupta (2011). See also Tymoigne (2009B) for the various complex 
forms that the securitisation procedure can take in the real world economies.  
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institutional investors.
4
 The attractiveness of ABSs can also be enhanced by high 
grades from credit-rating agencies. 
 
The securitisation process can be a significant source of financial fragility. First, by 
allowing banks to remove loans from their balance sheets, securitisation disrupts the 
traditional loan assessment procedure: since banks do not bear the cost of a loan 
default, they are induced to provide loans without paying sufficient attention to the 
creditworthiness of their borrowers (see e.g. Kregel, 2008; Tymoigne, 2009A; 
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Lavoie, 2012-3). 
Excessive loan expansion is also enhanced by the reduction of capital requirements. 
The overall result can be the provision of loans to borrowers with weak economic 
status and prospects, rendering them financially fragile. 
 
Second, of particular importance is the fact that mortgage loans are among the main 
assets that tend to be securitised. This can foster excessive investment in housing 
market, generating a virtuous cycle in which easy access to credit increases housing 
prices, higher housing prices improve the net worth of borrowers, and higher net worth 
encourages new borrowing, further boosting housing prices. Such a virtuous cycle can 
be conducive to the development of Ponzi financing schemes since many borrowers 
may rely on housing price appreciation in order to acquire new loans that are 
necessary for meeting their debt commitments (see Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2009; 
Tymoigne, 2010).
5
 Ponzi financing schemes can easily collapse as a result of small 
unexpected shocks. In such a case a virtuous cycle is transformed into a vicious one, 
which can lead to a widespread loan default, with adverse effects on the stability of the 
financial system. 
 
Third, with the aim to promote investment in ABSs, credit-rating agencies may have a 
tendency to underestimate in their public assessments the risks associated with the 
holding of ABSs (see Minsky, 2008; Wray, 2009). Hence, although there is no 
                                            
4
 Credit enhancement is a mechanism through which the holders of ABSs are protected from default and 
prepayment risk. For a presentation of the various credit enhancement techniques see Fabozzi and 
Kothari (2008, ch. 5).  
5
 See also Gorton (2009) for the role of housing price appreciation in the refinancing of subprime 
mortgages.  
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credible market maker for securities like ABSs,
6
 the investors can be prompted by the 
credit-rating agencies to act as if this was the case. This implies that the ABSs market 
can easily collapse when there is a widespread liquidation the ramifications of which 
cannot be countered by the credit enhancement techniques. This possibility is also 
reinforced by the short-term nature of the funding on which the ABSs market is 
usually based. In such a case, a sudden stop to loan expansion can occur, endangering 
the stability of the macroeconomic system. 
 
Under specific circumstances, wage stagnation can reinforce these destabilising forces 
created by the securitisation process. First, by reducing worker households’ income, 
wage stagnation can contribute to the deterioration of the financial position of workers 
that have acquired securitised loans. Such a deterioration can have important adverse 
effects on the ABSs market, since it makes higher the possibility of loan default. 
 
Second, in an economy in which there are changes in income distribution in favour of 
profit earners, workers may try to maintain their relative consumption standards by 
demanding more loans (see e.g. Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; 
Wisman, 2013). Since securitisation tends to decrease banks’ credit rationing, its 
coexistence with wage stagnation can lead to extensive credit expansion which, under 
certain conditions, can reduce the robustness of households’ financial structure. 
 
Third, the redistribution of income from workers to wealthy individuals may increase 
the propensity of the economy to speculate (Stockhammer, 2012). The rationale 
behind this argument is that wealthy individuals tend to use the income that is added to 
their wealth for speculation activities (see also Lysandrou, 2011). So long as the ABSs 
market is a market in which speculation activities are encouraged, wage stagnation is a 
factor that can contribute to the further development of this market; and, hence, of its 
destabilising forces. 
 
                                            
6
 A credible market maker is an agent that has the capacity to buy a significant amount of securities 
whenever there is a cascade of sell orders, ensuring that the investors will invariably liquidate their 
assets without significant losses (see Davidson, 2008A). Remarkably, in the financial distress of 2007 
the underwriters of ABSs tried without success to act as market makers, with significant negative 
effects on their solvency position (see Davidson, 2008B). 
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Fourth, in wage-led economies wage stagnation can place downward pressures on 
economic activity, with negative effects on household income and, thus, on household 
fragility. Moreover, in wage-led economies macroeconomic performance can become 
more dependent on credit availability. Thus, the detrimental macroeconomic effects of 
a rise in securitisation, which is likely at a first stage to promote credit expansion, but 
gradually to create the conditions for a sharp credit restriction, may be much more 
important. 
 
4.3 The macroeconomic model 
 
The model developed in this section allows us to explore, within a coherent macro 
framework, the mechanisms through which securitisation and wage stagnation can 
jointly affect the financial fragility of the macroeconomy. To keep the analysis 
tractable and in line with the purposes of the chapter, various simplifying assumptions 
in the formulation of the securitisation process have been adopted.  
 
First, the securitisation procedure is confined to home mortgages provided to workers. 
Home mortgages constitute the most prominent securitised asset class in both the US 
and the European economy (see Loutskina, 2011; ECB, 2011). Furthermore, the link 
between securitisation and home mortgage provision to workers was particularly 
intense in the pre-crisis period, especially in the US, and has greatly contributed to the 
sub-prime crisis.  
 
Second, commercial banks are both originators and administrators in the securitisation 
process. Thus, in the model they receive fee income from the SPVs when they sell off 
the securitised loans.  
 
Third, the SPVs and the underwriters are grouped into one single sector. The sector of 
SPVs-underwriters pays fee income to commercial banks, transforms securitised loans 
into MBSs and distributes coupon and principal payments to institutional investors. It 
also receives income by investing in treasury bills. Importantly, the SPVs-underwriters 
are postulated to issue only single class pass-through MBSs.
7
 In particular, the 
                                            
7
 For an analysis of the features of mortgage pass-through securities see Fabozzi (2000, ch. 11).  
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principal and the interest payments are ‘passed-through’ to institutional investors with 
a part of interest being held to cover the fees provided to commercial banks and to 
create the excess spread, which is the only credit enhancement technique in the model 
(note that administration fees for the services of SPVs and underwriters have been 
assumed away). The excess spread is retained with the purpose to cover a 
predetermined rate of default on securitised loans. If the actual rate of default is higher 
than the guaranteed one, the excess losses are transferred to institutional investors.
8
 
Lastly, note that the complications arising from prepayments are not part of the 
analysis in the model of this chapter.   
 
Fourth, the investment in MBSs is exclusively financed in our model via shares which 
are purchased by investor households. Investor households in the model are basically 
wealthy agents that receive income from investment in various financial assets. They 
also receive the distributed profits of firms. Therefore, their income is positively 
affected, all other things being equal, by wage stagnation. This formulation allows us 
to concentrate on the link between wage stagnation and investment in MBSs.  
 
Nine sectors comprise our macroeconomy: worker households of type I, worker 
households of type II, firms, commercial banks, SPVs-underwriters, institutional 
investors, investor households, government and the central bank. Table 1 displays the 
balance sheet matrix of the model. Table 2 depicts the transactions matrix. The 
number of households in each household type is constant and all households in the 
model are postulated to be of the same size and composition. In worker households 
there is one member that participates in the labour force.   
 
Worker households of type I take out mortgages from commercial banks to partly 
finance the purchase of houses. A proportion of the housing loans are securitised and 
become a component of the asset side of the balance sheet of SPVs-underwriters. The 
later transform these loans into MBSs, which are acquired by institutional investors, 
who issue shares bought by investor households.
9
 Worker households of type II take 
                                            
8
 An alternative assumption would be to postulate that the SPVs-underwriters cover all loan losses so 
long as their capital is positive. However, this would complicate the model without changing the 
substance of the underlying mechanism.  
9
 The institutional investors in the model refer basically to mutual and hedge funds. For a description of 
the features of institutional investors see Davis (2003). 
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out only consumer loans and dissave (as in Dutt, 2008). Except shares, investor 
households hold houses, firms’ equities, deposits, treasury bills and money.10 Firms 
build houses, invest in productive capital and produce goods. They pay wages to 
worker households and dividends to investor households. They issue equities and take 
out loans from commercial banks. Government finances its expenditures by issuing 
treasury bills, imposing income taxes and using the central bank’s profits. Central 
bank holds treasury bills on the asset side of its balance sheet and high-powered 
money and advances on the liability side.  
 
In what follows, we present the equations of the model for each sector of the economy. 
Note that inflation is assumed away and the price of output in the economy is set equal 
to unity. For simplicity, expected values of endogenous variables are proxied by their 
values in the previous period. Note also that, unless otherwise indicated, the 
parameters in the presented equations are positive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10
 To avoid unnecessary complications, no housing transactions between worker and investor 
households are considered. Furthermore, we have assumed away any rental transaction. 
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4.3.1 Worker households-type I 
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Equation (1) defines the net disposable income of type I worker households  1WYD  as 
the difference between wages  1WW , the sum of taxes  1WT  and interest payments on 
housing loans; LHi  is the interest rate on housing loans and LH  is the amount of loans 
that worker households take out to invest in the housing market. Equation (2) specifies 
the gross disposable income of type I worker households  GWYD 1 . Equation (3) shows 
that the wage bill of type I worker households is a proportion   211 nnn   of the 
total wage bill  W  paid by firms to worker households; 21 ,nn  is the number of 
90 
 
worker households of type I and of type II, respectively. It is assumed that the 
employment rate in the two types of households is the same. Equation (4) gives the 
consumption of type I worker households  1WC , which depends on their lagged net 
disposable income and wealth  1WV . The capital gains due to changes in the price of 
houses  HWCG  are defined in equation (5), where DWH  is the demand for houses 
from worker households of type I and Hp  is the price of houses.  
 
In the model there is a distinction between the desired amount of new loans and the 
actual amount of new loans. As will be explained below, the latter is a proportion of 
the former, since a part of the new loans demanded by worker household are not 
provided by banks due to credit rationing. The desired amount of new loans  DNLH  
are given by equation (6) as the sum of worker households’ desired investment in the 
housing market and the repayment of outstanding loans, minus their saving; DDWH  is 
the desired demand for houses and Lrep  is the loan repayment ratio. Note that the 
lagged price of houses is used by households as a proxy for the current level of prices 
in the procedure of estimating the amount of money that they need to borrow from 
banks to acquire their desired houses. 
 
The change in housing loans is depicted by equation (7) where NLH  stands for the 
actual amount of new housing loans. The model explicitly introduces the possibility of 
default on the part of type I worker households. The amount of defaulted loans  DL  
is defined in equation (8). The rate of default    is a positive function of the lagged 
burden of debt  1WBUR  of worker households and a negative function of the lagged 
degree of credit availability for housing loans  Hk (see equation (9)). The burden of 
debt is defined, according to equation (10), as the ratio of the debt commitments of 
worker households to their gross disposable income.
11
 It is assumed that, when the 
burden of debt of this sector increases, there is a higher likelihood that more worker 
households (at the unit level) will face liquidity problems. Thus, at the aggregate level, 
a higher burden of debt translates into a higher rate of default. Furthemore, the 
liquidity problems are reinforced when the degree of credit availability by banks 
                                            
11
 See also van Treeck (2009) and Dafermos (2012).  
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declines, that is when there is a rise in the proportion of new housing loans that are 
credit rationed (for the exact defition of the degree of credit availability see equation 
(51) below). A lower credit availability implies that more households cannot attain 
their desired liquidity. This is important because the liquidity created by new loans can 
be partially used for the repayment of existing debt. Accordingly, the higher the 
unwillingness of banks to safisfy the demand for new loans the higher the rate of 
default. 
 
Equation (11) shows worker households’ wealth. Defaulted loans exert a positive 
impact on their wealth.
12
 Equation (12) defines the leverage of worker households 
 1WLEV , expressed as the ratio of housing loans to the value of houses. In our model 
this variable plays a crucial role in the credit availability from commercial banks. 
Equation (13) shows worker households’ desired demand for houses. It is assumed 
that this demand relies negatively on the lagged households’ burden of debt and 
positively on the lagged growth rate of housing prices.
13
 Equation (14) defines the 
change in the demand for houses as the difference between the sum of the change of 
housing loans and the amount of defaulted loans minus saving, divided by the price of 
houses. The higher the housing loans the larger, ceteris paribus, the demand for 
houses. 
 
4.3.2 Worker households-type II 
 
2122 WLCWW TLCiWYD    (15) 
122  LCiYDYD LCW
G
W  (16) 
W
nn
n
WW
21
2
2

  (17) 
122  LCLCYDC WW  (18) 
3
1
2
n
C
CA IHDW
   (19) 
D
W
D
W CAnC 222   (20) 
                                            
12
 For simplicity, we assume that there is no bankruptcy in the economy. See Charpe et al. (2011, ch. 9) 
for a SFC model in which both bankruptcy and default are explicitly considered. 
13
 See Zezza (2008) for a similar formula and Andre (2010) for some empirical evidence regarding the 
main drivers of housing demand.  
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Equation (15) gives the net disposable income of type II worker households  2WYD , 
which is equal to wages  2WW  minus the sum of taxes  2WT  and the interest 
payments on consumer loans; LCi  is the interest rate on consumer loans  and LC  is the 
amount of consumer loans. Equation (16) defines the gross disposable income of type 
II worker households  GWYD 2 . Their wages are a proportion   212 nnn   of the total 
wage bill paid by firms. 
 
Equation (18) gives the consumption of type II worker households  2WC . These 
households consume all their net disposable income and take out consumer loans to 
finance part of their consumption expenditures. The amount of loans demanded by 
type II worker households for consumption purposes depends on their desired 
consumption. Following Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), Barba and Pivetti (2009) and 
Wisman (2013), it is assumed that these workers try to emulate the consumption of 
their reference group to maintain their relative social status. In our model, investor 
households constitute the reference group for type II worker households. Thus, 
according to equation (19), the average desired consumption of type II worker 
households  DWCA 2  is a proportion  1  of the average consumption of investor 
households;  IHC  is the aggregate consumption of investor households and 3n  is the 
number of investor households.
14
 The aggregate desired consumption of type II worker 
households  DWC 2  is defined in equation (20). Note that wage stagnation increases, 
ceteris paribus, the desired aggregate consumption of type II worker households, since 
it positively affects the income and the consumption of investor households.  
 
The desired amount of new loans  DNLC  is equal to the sum of the desired amount of 
consumption and the repayment of outstanding loans, minus the net disposable income 
                                            
14
 See Dutt (2008) for a similar formula. 
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of type II worker households (see equation (21)). The amount of consumer loans is 
given by equation (22), where NLC  is the actual amount of consumer loans. As in 
housing loans, the presence of credit rationing implies that the actual amount of new 
consumer loans is a fraction of the desired amount of new consumer loans. Notice that 
when the amount of amortised loans is higher than the amount of new loans, the 
change in loans is negative. In this case, consumption expenditures are lower than the 
net disposable income (see equation (18)). To avoid unnecessary complications, it is 
postulated that there is no default on consumer loans. The burden of debt of worker 
households-type II  2WBUR  is equal to the ratio of households’ debt commitments to 
their gross disposable income (see equation (23)).  
 
4.3.3 Firms 
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Equation (24) shows that the output of the economy  Y  is equal to the sum of worker 
households’ consumption, investor households’ consumption, investment in 
productive capital  INV , investment in housing  H  and government expenditures 
 GOV .15 Equation (25) shows that investment in productive capital is affected by the 
lagged rate of capacity utilisation  u  and the lagged firms’ rate of undistributed 
profits  Fr . Capacity utilisation, firms’ rate of undistributed profits and productive 
capital  FK  are given in equations (26), (27) and (28) respectively; v  is the potential 
output to capital ratio. Equation (29) defines firms’ profits  PF . It has been 
postulated that firms take out loans  LF  and, hence, they pay interest income; LFi  is 
the interest on firms’ loans. Wages are determined as a fixed proportion of the lagged 
output produced (see equation (30)); Ws  is income share of wages. Firms keep a part 
 Fs  of their profits  UPF  while the rest profits  DPF  are distributed to investor 
households (see equations (31) and (32)). A proportion  x  of firms’ investment 
expenditures are financed by issuing equities (see equation (33)); e  is the number of 
firms’ equities and ep  is their price. Equation (34) suggests that firms’ loans act as a 
residual in the budget constraint of firms; DIH  is the demand for houses from investor 
households. 
 
The housing investment is positively affected by the ratio of demanded to existing 
houses as well as by the growth rate of the price of houses (see equation (35)).
16
 
Equation (36) defines the change in unsold houses  HU  as the difference between the 
change in existing and the change in demanded houses. The growth rate of the price of 
houses depends positively on the growth rate of the demanded houses relative to 
growth rate of the existing houses (see equation (37)).
17
  
                                            
15
 For simplicity, the price of new houses is assumed to be equal to the general price level (recall that 
the latter is equal to unity). However, the price of existing houses in the housing market is different and 
not associated with the general price level. See Zezza (2008) for a similar assumption.  
16
 For the role of housing price appreciation in the supply of houses see e.g. Andre (2010).  
17
 This formulation relies on Eatwell et al. (2008). 
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4.3.4 Commercial banks 
 
 TMM yysss  110  (38) 
sLHLHS   (39) 
 LHsLHNS  1  (40) 
111111   AiDiFEETBiLFiLCiLHiPB AIHDBTLFLCNSLHB  (41) 
1xii ALH   (42) 
2xii ALC   (43) 
3xii ALF   (44) 
4xii AD   (45) 
NSBUBB DLPBKK  1  (46) 
1 NSNS LHDL   (47) 
1 BBBU PBsPB  (48) 
BUBBD PBPBPB   (49) 
D
HNLHkNLH   (50) 
  4113121110 HWHTHWHHH kBURkCARCARkLEVkkk    (51) 
D
CNLCkNLC   (52) 
  122110   WCTCCC BURkCARCARkkk  (53) 
LFLCLH
K
CAR
NS
B

  (54) 
IHBB DhHPM   (55) 
BNSIHBBN HPMLFLCLHDKTB   (56) 
IHBBNSN DKHPMLFLCLHA   (57) 
NAA  , iff 0NA ; otherwise 0A  (58) 
BNB TBTB  , iff 0BNTB ; otherwise 0BTB  (59) 
 
Equation (38) defines the proportion  s  of loans that are securitised. The first term 
 0s  captures some exogenous factors related with the institutional structure in the 
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economy and the regulation with regard to the financial activities. The second term 
reflects the fact that there is a target yield on MBSs and that the supply of MBSs 
partially adjusts to their demand so as for the actual yield to remain close to the target 
one.
18
 In particular, when the actual yield  My , which is inversely linked with the 
price of MBSs (see equation (79)), is lower (higher) than the target yield  TMy , the 
level of securitisation increases (decreases) and so does the supply of MBSs. This 
places downward (upward) pressures on the price of MBSs, increasing (decreasing) 
the actual yield. Equation (39) gives the amount of securitised loans, which are 
transferred to the balance sheet of SPVs-underwriters  SLH . Equation (40) shows the 
amount of non securitised loans, which are retained in the balance sheet of commercial 
banks  NSLH . 
 
The profits of commercial banks  BPB  are equal to the sum of the interest on non 
securitised loans, the interest on consumer loans, the interest on firms’ loans, the 
interest on treasury bills  BTB  and the administrative fees  FEE  due to securitised 
loans, minus the interest on deposits and on the advances from the central bank )(A  
(see equation (41)); Ti  is the interest on treasury bills, IHD  are the deposits of investor 
households and Di  is the interest on deposits. The interest rates on loans and deposits 
are set with reference to the interest rate of the central bank  Ai . Note that, for 
simplicity, 4321 ,,, xxxx  are deemed exogenous. According to equation (46), the 
change in the capital of commercial banks  BK  equals their undistributed profits 
minus the amount of defaulted loans (see also Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch. 11; 
Charpe et al. 2011, ch. 9). The amount of defaulted loans )( NSDL  is a proportion    
of NSLH  (equation (47)). Equation (48) and (49) show that commercial banks retain a 
proportion )( Bs  of their profits )( BUPB  while the rest profits are distributed )( BDPB  
to the investor households who are the owners of the commercial banks (for a similar 
assumption see Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch.11). 
 
Commercial banks apply credit rationing when they grant loans to worker households-
type I and to worker households-type II. This is captured in our model by making a 
                                            
18
 This mechanism draws on Lysandrou (2014).  
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distinction between the desired amount of new loans demanded by worker households 
and the effective amount of new loans; the latter represents the amount of new loans 
that are ultimately provided after imposing the credit rationing procedure. Equation 
(50) gives the effective amount of new housing loans as a proportion of the desired 
amount of new housing loans.
19
 The variable Hk  captures the degree of credit 
availability for housing loans  10  Hk . According to equation (51), this depends 
negatively on the lagged leverage ratio of worker households-type I, positively on the 
lagged actual capital adequacy ratio  CAR  of commercial banks relative to the target 
capital adequacy ratio  TCAR , negatively on the burden of debt of worker households 
of type I and negatively on the default rate. The target capital adequacy ratio is 
determined by the regulatory authority and the actual capital adequacy ratio is defined 
as the ratio of banks’ capital to the sum of non-securitised loans, consumer loans and 
firms’ loans (equation (54)).20 
 
Equation (52) defines the effective amount of consumer loans as a proportion  Ck  of 
the desired amount of consumer loans  10  Ck . According to equation (53), the 
degree of credit availability for consumer loans depends positively on the difference 
between the lagged capital adequacy ratio and the target capital adequacy ratio and 
negatively on the burden of debt of type II worker households. Importantly, our 
formulation implies that the higher the proportion of securitised loans the higher, 
ceteris paribus, the actual capital adequacy ratio and the lower, thereby, the credit 
rationing. In this way, securitisation can be conducive to higher investment in housing 
market and larger consumption expenditures by type II worker households. 
 
Equation (55) shows that the commercial banks hold a proportion of deposits in the 
form of cash  BHPM , based on the reserve requirement ratio  Bh  determined by the 
central bank. Banks hold treasury bills when the sum of capital and deposits is higher 
than the sum of loans and cash. Otherwise, the commercial banks take advances from 
the central bank and hold no treasury bills. This fact is captured by equations (56)-
(59). 
                                            
19
 See Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) and Dafermos (2012) for similar formulations.  
20
 Following Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch. 11), housing and consumption loans are assigned a 100% 
risky weight, while cash and treasury bills are assumed to carry a 0% weight.  
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4.3.5 SPVs-underwriters 
 
1 coupMCOUPON  (60) 
5xicoup LH   (61) 
1 SfeLHFEE  (62) 
FEECOUPONLHiES SLH  1  (63) 
FEETBiLHiPU UTSLH   11  (64) 
ESTBiPU UTBU  1  (65) 
SUS DLLHMM  1  (66) 
1 SS LHDL   (67) 
SSU DLDL  , iff 
g  ; otherwise 1 S
g
SU LHDL   (68) 
MMpPUTBTB MUUU  1  (69) 
MSUUUU CGDLPUKK  1  (70) 
1 MpCG MM  (71) 
 
Equation (60) defines the coupon payment, COUPON , provided by SPVs-
underwriters to institutional investors; M  is the amount of MBSs. The coupon rate 
 coup  is defined according to the interest rate on loans minus a specific spread  5x , 
which is deemed to be high enough to cover the guaranteed loan losses and the 
administrative fees (equation (61)). Equation (62) determines the amount of 
administrative fees that the SPVs-underwriters provide to the commercial banks. 
Administrative fees are a proportion  fe  of the loans that are securitised. The excess 
spread  ES  is determined by subtracting administrative fees and coupon payments 
from interest payments (see equation (63)). Equation (64) gives the total profits of 
SPVs-underwriters PU  and equation (65) defines the profits that are retained  UPU ; 
UTB  denotes the amount of treasury bills held by SPVs-underwriters.  
 
Equation (66) indicates that the change in the amount of MBSs equals the change in 
securitised loans plus the amount of defaulted securitised loans  SUDL  that are 
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covered by SPVs-underwriters. Two points are in order. First, it is postulated that the 
commercial banks sell mortgage loans to the SPVs-underwriters at a price equal to $1 
while the face value of an MBS is also $1. However, the SPVs-underwriters may sell 
the mortgages at price different than $1 (this is the price of the MBSs, Mp , which can 
only accidentally be equal to 1). Second, equations (67)-(68) suggest that the principal 
repayments are distributed to institutional investors without being affected by defaults 
on securitised loans  SDL  in so far as the latter are lower than those guaranteed by 
the SPVs-underwriters. If SUS DLDL   the principal repayments to MBSs holders 
decline by   1 Sg LH ; g  is the guaranteed rate of default by SPVs-
underwriters.
21
 Note that in this case there is also a reduction in the coupon payments. 
 
Equation (69) indicates that treasury bills act as a residual in the portfolio choice of 
SPVs-underwriters. The change in the capital of SPVs-underwriters  UK  is defined in 
equation (70). Equation (71) specifies the capital gains on MBSs  MCG . 
 
4.3.6 Institutional investors 
 
1 IITTBiCOUPONPI  (72) 
1 PIsPI IU  (73) 
UD PIPIPI   (74) 
SIIMUIIII DLCGPIKK  1  (75) 
  1 SgSII LHDL  , iff g  ; otherwise 0SIIDL  (76) 
  111211110   SHKirMp IITMM   (77) 
  1122112120   SHKirTB IITMII   (78a) 
MpSHKTB MIIII   (78) 
11 

Mp
COUPON
y
M
M  (79) 
11 

Mp
CG
yr
M
M
MM  (80) 
                                            
21
 This can be shown by combining equations (7), (39), (66), (67) and (68), which yields: 
  11   SgSL LHLHrepsNLHM  . 
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The institutional investors get revenues from holding MBSs and treasury bills. Their 
profits  PI  are given by equation (72); IITB  is the amount of treasury bills held by 
institutional investors. A small part of their profits are retained  UPI ; Is  denotes the 
retention ratio (see equation (73)). The rest profits  DPI  are distributed to investor 
households who hold the shares issued by institutional investors (equation (74)). The 
shares bought by investor households constitute the main source of fund of 
institutional investors’ investments. For simplicity, it is assumed that the shares issued 
by institutional investors have a stable price equal to $1 per share.
22
 
 
Equation (75) defines the change in the capital of institutional investors  IIK ; SIIDL  
denotes the amount of defaulted loans that are not guaranteed by SPVs-institutional 
investors (see equation (76)). The portfolio choice of institutional investors is captured 
by equations (77) and (78a). In our formulation, Godley’s (1999) imperfect asset 
substitutability framework has been adopted. Therefore, the expected gross wealth of 
institutional investors (which is equal to 11   SHK II ) is imperfectly allocated 
between treasury bills and MBS according to the respective rates of return; SH  are the 
shares of institutional investors.
23
 Note that equation (78a) is replaced in the computer 
model by equation (78), with treasury bills acting as a buffer. The yield on MBSs is 
given by the ratio of the coupon payments to the lagged value of MBSs (equation 
(79)). The total rate of return of MBSs  Mr , defined in equation (80), consists of two 
components: the yield and the capital gain on MBSs. 
 
4.3.7 Investor households 
 
BDDDIHDIHTI PBPFPIDiTBiYT   11  (81) 
IHII TYTYD   (82) 
HIeIHIII CGCGCYDVV  1  (83) 
                                            
22
 Unlike our abstraction, in practice the price of institutional investors’ shares can be different than 
unity due to significant changes in institutional investors’ net asset value or due to adverse expectations 
on the part of borrowers regarding the safety of their investment (see e.g. Macey, 2011; Duygan-Bumb 
et al., 2013). However, in normal times this price is close to unity. 
23
 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry adding-
up conditions. Thus, some of them are negative. 
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IHIIF HPMVV   (84) 
IHIIH ChHPM   (85) 
132131   IIIH VcYDcC  (86) 
1 epCG ee  (87) 
1 DIHHI HpCG  (88) 
1
1
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  (89) 
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  (93a) 
DIHeIHIFIH HpepTBSHVD   (93) 
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Equation (81) defines the before taxes income of investor households  IYT . The 
disposable income of investor households  IYD  is given by equation (82). Note that 
IHTB  denotes the treasury bills held by investor households and IHT  stands for their 
income taxes. Equations (83) and (84) describe, respectively, the wealth of investor 
households  IV  and their financial market asset wealth  IFV . The high-powered 
money  IHHPM  is, according to equation (85) a proportion  Ih  of their 
consumption. Equation (86) gives the consumption of investor households, which 
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depends on their expected disposable income and expected wealth. Equations (87) and 
(88) define, respectively, the capital gains on firms’ equity  eCG  and houses  HICG . 
 
Investor households allocate their expected financial market asset wealth between 
deposits, treasury bills, houses, firms’ equities and institutional investors’ equities. As 
in the portfolio choice of institutional investors, Godley’s (1999) imperfect asset 
substitutability framework is adopted (see equations (89-93a)).
24
 Note that equation 
(93a) is replaced in the computer model by equation (93), with deposits acting as a 
buffer. Equations (94), (95) and (96) define, respectively, the rate of return on 
institutional investors’ equity  Sr , the rate of return on firms’ equity  er  and the rate 
of return on houses  Hr . 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, two points are worth highlighting. First, a decline in 
the distributed profits of institutional investors (e.g. due to excessive mortgage 
defaults) reduces investor households’ willingness to invest in institutional investors’ 
shares with adverse effects on the MBSs market. Second, a fall in the wage income 
share exerts, ceteris paribus, a positive impact on the income of investor households 
and thereby on their wealth. Hence, since a proportion of investor households’ wealth 
is held in the form of institutional investors’ equities, wage stagnation can enhance 
investment in MBS, fostering mortgage securitisation. 
 
4.3.8 Government 
 
CBTIHWW PBTBiTTTGOVTBTB   1211  (97) 
 gGOVGOV   11  (98) 
111  WWW WT   (99) 
122  WWW WT   (100) 
1 IIHIH YTT   (101) 
AT ii   (102) 
 
                                            
24
 Again the parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry 
adding-up constraints.  
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Equation (97) gives the amount of treasury bills issued by the government  TB . As 
equation (98) shows, the government expenditures are increasing with a constant rate 
g . Equations (99)-(101) define income taxes. Equation (102) states that the interest 
rate on treasury bills equals the interest rate on the central bank. The latter is set 
exogenously.  
 
4.3.9 Central bank 
 
11   AiTBiPB ACBTCB  (103) 
BIH HPMHPMHPM   (104) 
AHPMTBCB   (105) 
UIIBIHCB TBTBTBTBTBTB   (106) 
 
Equation (103) describes the profits of the central bank  CBPB . The high-powered 
money provided by the central bank  HPM  is depicted by equation (104). Equation 
(105) gives the amount of treasury bills held by the central bank  CBTB . The 
redundant equation of the model (equation (106)) indicates that the central bank is the 
residual purchaser of treasury bills.  
 
4.4 Simulation experiments 
 
The complexity of the model presented in section 4.3 precludes analytical solutions. 
Hence, the model was solved numerically using reasonable values for its parameters. 
Steady-state solutions were then found that served as a basis for our simulation 
experiments in which exogenous shocks were imposed on the model.
25
 
 
                                            
25
 The Eviews programme utilised in the simulation analysis is available in the appendix. Note that the 
methodology used here (and is widely adopted in the related literature) has the drawback that it explores 
the behaviour of the model only close to specific plausible steady states. Therefore, the behaviour of the 
model around other possible steady states is not analysed. This is the cost of developing a model that is 
complex enough to capture the joint macroeconomic effects of securitisation and wage stagnation. It 
should, however, be pointed out that an advantage of the employed methodology is that it isolates the 
effects that stem from the exogenous changes under investigation.   
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The first experiment simulates the effects of some exogenous developments that 
increase the degree of securitisation in the economy. In particular, we consider a rise 
in the exogenous component that determines the proportion of mortgages securitised 
by banks ( 0s ). This rise is postulated to stem from changes in the institutional 
structure of the banking sector that prompt banks to engage more intensively in 
securitisation activities. An additional development is the reallocation of investor 
households’ wealth from bank deposits to institutional investors’ shares (i.e. 10  
increases). This reallocation reflects investor households’ willingness to increase the 
yield of their portfolio taking advantage of the higher return provided by institutional 
investors. It may also be prompted by a more favourable evaluation of the quality of 
MBSs by the credit rating agencies. Note that the reallocation enhances the demand 
for MBSs, putting downward pressures on their yield. This, in turn, increases the 
proportion of the mortgages that are securitised.   
 
Figure 1 shows the main effects of these shocks.
26
 The increase in the proportion of 
mortgages that are securitised brings about a rise in the capital adequacy ratio of 
commercial banks, inducing them to decrease their credit rationing (Figure 1a). 
Accordingly, the amount of new mortgages and consumer loans becomes higher. The 
rise in mortgages causes an increase in the demand for houses from worker households 
that leads to: (i) a housing price appreciation (Figure 1b) that has feedback enhancing 
effects on credit availability since it tends to reduce the leverage of households;
27
 and 
(ii) an increase in the supply of houses. The rise in consumer loans boosts consumer 
spending. These developments increase the output of the economy (Figure 1d). 
Remarkably, the output is also positively affected by the rise in the consumption of 
investor households, as a result of the income and wealth effects that stem from the 
expansion of the MBSs market: Figure 1b indicates that there is a rise in the price of 
MBSs after a passing initial decline. 
 
                                            
26
 In Figure 1 (and in Figure 2 below) the series are expressed as a ratio of their values in the steady- 
state baseline solution. 
27
 Note that, as indicated in Figure 1c, the leverage ratio of type I households increases relative to the 
baseline solution. The reason is that in our simulations the increase in loans outweights the rise in the 
the value of houses, making the leverage ratio higher. However, without the increase in the price of 
houses the leverage would be higher. 
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Furthermore, credit expansion increases the debt commitments of worker households. 
The result is a gradual rise in the burden of debt of worker households, which is more 
important in the case of type I households. This increase tends to make higher the rate 
of default. However, the significant rise in credit availability overpowers the adverse 
effects of the higher burden of debt, leading to a lower rate of default in the first 
periods after the shocks (see Figure 1d).  
 
Overall, in the first periods the economy experiences an economic, housing and 
financial boom that coexists with a rise in the burden of debt of households and a fall 
in the rate of default. It is also noteworthy that higher credit provision and increasing 
housing and MBSs prices reinforce the one the other. Following Tymoigne’s (2010, 
2011) conceptualisation of financial fragility, it can be argued that these developments 
correspond to an economy characterised by increasing financial fragility. 
 
This growing financial fragility has long-run adverse effects. The gradual increase in 
the burden of debt of type I workers households, in conjuction with the loan expansion 
that places donward pressures on the capital adequacy ratio, reduces banks’ credit 
availability and increases the rate of default on mortgages (Figure 1d). Moreover, the 
higher burden of debt negatively affects worker households’ demand for houses 
leading to a decline in the price of houses (Figure 1b). Hence, housing investment and 
consumption start falling, reducing the level of output in the economy. Importantly, 
this reduction in the output has detrimental feedback effects on households’ burden of 
debt, further reducing credit availability and further increasing the rate of default (see 
Figures 1a and 1d). The increasing rate of default has adverse effects on the MBSs 
market since the capital of institutional investors declines, putting downward pressures 
on the price of the MBSs. This tends to increase the yield on MBSs and, therefore, the 
proportion of mortgages that are securitised declines, further slowing down credit 
expansion. As a result of these developments, output ends up lower than its baseline 
solution. Overall, after a period of economic and financial prosperity, the initial rise in 
the degree of securitisation brings eventually the economy into a period of financial 
instability, which is characterised by a lower output, a higher rate of loan defaults and 
a declining price of houses. 
106 
 
Fig. 1. Effects of an increase in the degree of securitisation 
 
(a)  
 
 
(c)  
 
 
 
 
(b)  
 
 
(d)  
 
 
 
 
The second simulation experiment is identical to the first one with the only difference 
being that the rise in the degree of securitisation is accompanied by a decline in the 
wage income share ( Ws ). Figure 2 presents the results. Initially, the economy 
experiences a passing decline in the level of economic activity (Figure 2d). This 
decline is basically due to the adverse impact of the wage shock on consumption. In 
our simulations this adverse impact outweighs the favourable effects on the profits of 
firms that push upwards the investment in productive capital and the consumption of 
investor households. In other words, with our choice of parameters, aggregate demand 
is wage-led.   
 
However, after the initial reduction the economy enters a borrowing-induced 
expansion as in the first simulation. There are, though, various noteworthy differences. 
To begin with, the decline in the wage income share induces type II worker 
households to demand more loans to attain their consumption norms. This produces a 
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more vigorous rise in their debt commitments, compared with the first simulation. In 
conjunction with the direct negative effect of the wage shock on households’ gross 
disposable income, this higher increase in debt commitments leads to a more rapid rise 
in their burden of debt (Figure 2c). At the same time, worker households of type I also 
experience a higher rise in their burden of debt, due to the adverse effect of the wage 
shock on the their gross income. This more rapid rise in the burden of debt of 
households is the main driving force behind the lower price increase in houses (see 
Figure 1b) and lower duration of the economic boom in the second simulation, in 
comparison with the first simulation (see Figure 2d). The shorter economic boom is 
also explained by the lower initial rise in the proportion of mortgages that are 
securitised. Notice that wage stagnation affects favourably the income of investor 
households and, thus, their wealth. As a result, it provides an additional boost in the 
shares of institutional investors and, hence, in the demand for MBSs. This higher 
demand for MBSs ultimately leads to a higher degree of securitisation.    
 
Another important implication of the wage shock is that the negative longer-run 
effects of the initial credit expansion on the macroeconomy are more intense. The 
higher debt expansion in the initial periods combined with the direct detrimental 
effects of wage stagnation on worker households’ consumption leads eventually to a 
lower level of output and a higher rate of default compared to the first simulation 
(Figure 2d). Moreover, the leverage and the burden of debt of households keep rising 
in the long run (in the first experiment there was a decline after the initial periods) and 
the credit availability for consumer loans becomes lower than in the baseline 
solution.
28
 Consequently, it can be overall argued that wage stagnation reinforces in 
our model the long-run adverse effects of securitisation on macroeconomic stability.  
                                            
28
 Interestingly, the degree of credit availability for housing loans remains higher than in the baseline 
solution. The reason for this is that the wage shock reduces the loans of firms placing upward pressures 
on the capital adequacy ratio. The firm loans decline because the wage shock affects prositively the 
internal funds of firms and negatively the desired investment (due to the wage-led structure of aggregate 
demand).   
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Fig. 2. Effects of an increase in the degree of securitisation combined with a decline in the wage 
income share 
 
(a)  
 
 
(c)  
 
 
(b)  
 
 
(d)  
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the macroeconomic effects of securitisation and wage stagnation 
within a SFC model, paying particular attention to their role in the emergence of 
financial fragility. The simulation experiments indicated that a rise in securitisation 
practices is likely to bring about, at a first stage, a borrowing-induced expansion, a 
housing boom, an appreciation in MBSs prices and a decline in the rate of default. 
However, this prosperity is accompanied by a rise in the burdens of debt of 
households, indicating a situation of increasing financial fragility. The rising burdens 
of debt gradually set the stage for the reversal of the initial expansionary effects of 
securitisation. Ultimately, the economy is led to a lower level of output, a higher rate 
of default on mortgages and a declining level of house and MBSs prices.   
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When the securitisation shock is accompanied by an exogenous decline in the wage 
income share the period of prosperity is shorter, basically because the burden of debt 
of households increases much more rapidly. Furthermore, the long-run adverse effects 
on macroeconomic performance are enhanced. Overall, these results provide support 
to the view that the combination of risky financial practices and higher inequality can, 
under certain circumstances, render a macro system more prone to instability.    
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Appendix 
 
The Eviews programme of the simulation analysis is as follows: 
 
'Creation of a work file called ‘SEC’ 
 
wfcreate(wf=SEC) a 2500 3100 
smpl 2500 3100 
genr year=@trend 
 
'Values for parameters and exogenous variables  
 
genr n1=50 
genr n2=50 
genr n3=4 
 
'Worker households – type I 
 
genr c11=0.6 
genr c12=0.05 
 
genr phi0=0.025 
genr phi1=0.05 
genr phi2=0.01 
 
genr h10=0.0357 
genr h11=0.001 
genr h12=0.9 
 
'Worker households – type II 
 
genr xi=0.28 
 
'Firms 
 
genr a0=0.0125 
genr a1=0.02 
genr a2=0.13 
 
genr v=0.19 
 
genr sF=0.6 
 
genr x=0.05 
 
genr h21=0.052 
genr h22=0.5 
 
genr h3=0.7 
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'Commercial banks 
 
genr kH0=0.35 
genr kH1=0.05 
genr kH2=15 
genr kH3=1.7 
genr kH4=1 
 
genr kC0=0.661 
genr kC1=2.4 
genr kC2=0.75 
 
genr repL=0.1 
 
genr hB=0.02 
genr CART=0.08 
 
genr sB=0.4 
 
'Institutional investors 
 
genr gamma10=0.46 
genr gamma11=0.1 
genr gamma12=-0.1 
 
genr gamma20=1-gamma10 
genr gamma21=-0.1 
genr gamma22=0.1 
 
genr sI=0.2 
 
'Investor households 
 
genr hI=0.1 
 
genr c31=0.4 
genr c32=0.02 
 
genr lambda11=0.04 
genr lambda12=-0.01 
genr lambda13=-0.01 
genr lambda14=-0.01 
genr lambda15=-0.01 
genr lambda16=-0.0012 
 
genr lambda20=0.01 
genr lambda21=-0.01 
genr lambda22=0.04 
genr lambda23=-0.01 
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genr lambda24=-0.01 
genr lambda25=-0.01 
genr lambda26=-0.001 
 
genr lambda30=0.25 
genr lambda31=-0.01 
genr lambda32=-0.01 
genr lambda33=0.04 
genr lambda34=-0.01 
genr lambda35=-0.01 
genr lambda36=-0.001 
 
genr lambda40=0.1 
genr lambda41=-0.01 
genr lambda42=-0.01 
genr lambda43=-0.01 
genr lambda44=0.04 
genr lambda45=-0.01 
genr lambda46=-0.001 
 
genr lambda51=-0.01 
genr lambda52=-0.01 
genr lambda53=-0.01 
genr lambda54=-0.01 
genr lambda55=0.04 
genr lambda56=0.004 
 
'Government  
 
genr g=0.03 
genr tauW=0.15 
genr tauIH=0.25 
 
'Interest rates 
 
genr iA=0.02 
genr iT=iA 
genr x1=0.02 
genr x2=0.021 
genr x3=0.001 
genr x4=0.001 
genr x5=0.022 
genr iLH=iA+x1  
genr iLC=iA+x2  
genr iLF=iA+x3 
genr iD=iA-x4 
genr coup=iLH-x5 
genr yMT=0.021 
 
genr fe=0.006   
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genr phig=0.0221 
 
'Exogenous changes 
 
genr lambda10=0.1 '*(year<500)+0.2*(year>=500) 
genr lambda50=1- lambda10- lambda20- lambda30- lambda40 
 
genr s0=0.2 '*(year<500) + 0.28*(year>=500) 
genr s1=0.5 
 
genr sw=0.65 '*(year<500)+0.647*(year>=500) 
 
'INITIAL VALUES FOR ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
 
genr p_H=1.478748 
genr H_DW= 1.448573e+24 
genr H_DI=1.467045e+23 
genr H=2.765149e+24 
genr HU=H-H_DW-H_DI 
genr dH=8.053828e+22 
genr gPH=0 
genr gH_DW=0.03 
genr gH_DI=0.03 
genr gH_D=0.03 
genr gH=0.03 
genr ratH=(H_DW+H_DI)/H 
 
genr C_IH=1.155634e+23 
genr C_W1=2.934382e+23 
genr C_W2=3.466398e+23 
genr INV=2.895654e+23 
genr GOV=1.842925e+23 
genr Y=C_IH+C_W1+C_W2+GOV+INV+dH 
genr W=8.267227e+23 
genr W_W1=(n1/(n1+n2))*W 
genr W_W2=(n2/(n1+n2))*W 
genr YD_W1=3.442835e+23 
genr YD_WG1=YD_W1 
genr YD_W2=3.288496e+23 
genr YD_I=1.804773e+23 
genr YT_I=2.383226e+23 
 
genr LH=2.286495e+23 
genr LH_NS=1.820366e+23 
genr LH_S=4.661294e+22 
genr LC= 6.108027e+23 
genr NLH= 3.374419e+22 
genr NLH_DN=4.539041e+22 
genr NLC= 7.709145000000001e+22 
genr NLC_DN=1.349234e+23 
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genr BUR_W1=0.0880007 
genr LEV_W1=LH/(P_H*H_DW) 
genr BUR_W2=0.2367596 
genr k_H=0.7429375 
 
genr K_F=9.941745e+24 
genr PF=4.764651e+23 
genr PF_U=2.775525e+23 
genr PF_D=PF-PF_U  
genr p_e=1069019 
genr e=5.573908e+17 
genr CG_e= 3.2986e+21 
genr r_F=PF_U/K_F 
genr u=Y/(v*K_F) 
genr LF=3.3596e+23 
genr BUR_LF=0.0816592 
 
genr D_IH=1.283391e+24 
 
genr p_M=1.355815 
genr M=8.080898000000001e+22 
genr PU=3.466306e+21 
genr COUPON=1.412196e+21 
genr PU_U=2.05411e+21 
 
genr HPM_IH=hI*C_IH 
genr HPM_B=hB*D_IH 
genr HPM=HPM_IH+HPM_B 
genr A=0   
genr TB_IH=1.55735e+22 
genr TB_B=2.605763e+23 
genr TB_II=1.361207e+23 
genr TB_U=9.927287e+22 
genr TB=5.4876753E+23 
genr TB_CB=HPM-A   
genr K_B=HPM_B+LH_NS+LC+LF+TB_B-D_IH-A 
genr PB_B=1.988963e+22 
genr TB_CBred=TB-TB_IH-TB_B-TB_II-TB_U 
 
genr SH=2.186456e+23 
genr PI=4.055317e+21 
genr PI_U=7.874403e+20 
genr PI_D=PI-PI_U 
genr CG_M=3.27855e+16 
genr V_W1=p_H*H_DW-LH  
genr V_I=HPM_IH+TB_IH+D_IH+SH+p_e*e+p_H*H_DI 
genr V_IF=V_I-HPM_IH 
genr K_II=TB_II+p_M*M-SH  
genr K_U=LH_S+TB_U-p_M*M  
genr CAR=K_B/(LH_NS+LC+LF) 
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genr MP=M*p_M 
 
genr r_SH=0.0153944 
genr r_e=0.3495401 
genr r_H=0 
genr y_M=0.0132762 
genr r_M=0.0132765 
 
'MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
delete *_model 
model SEC_model 
 
'Worker households type I 
 
SEC_model.append YD_W1=W_W1-iLH*LH(-1)-T_W1 'equation (1) 
SEC_model.append YD_WG1=YD_W1+iLH*LH(-1) 'equation (2) 
SEC_model.append W_W1=(n1/(n1+n2))*W 'equation (3) 
SEC_model.append C_W1=c11*YD_W1(-1)+c12*V_W1(-1) 'equation (4) 
SEC_model.append CG_HW=(p_H-p_H(-1))*H_DW(-1) 'equation (5) 
SEC_model.append NLH_DN=p_H(-1)*(H_DDW-H_DW(-1))+repL*LH(-1)+C_W1-
YD_W1 'equation (6) 
SEC_model.append NLH_D=(NLH_DN>0)*NLH_DN+0 
SEC_model.append LH=LH(-1)+NLH-repL*LH(-1)-DL 'equation (7) 
SEC_model.append DL=phi*LH(-1) 'equation (8) 
SEC_model.append phi=phi0+phi1*BUR_W1(-1)-phi2*k_H(-1) 'equation (9) 
SEC_model.append BUR_W1=((iLH+repL)*LH(-1))/YD_WG1 'equation (10) 
SEC_model.append V_W1=V_W1(-1)+YD_W1-C_W1+CG_HW+DL 'equation (11) 
SEC_model.append LEV_W1=LH/(p_H*H_DW) 'equation (12) 
SEC_model.append H_DDW=H_DW(-1)+(h10-h11*BUR_W1(-1)+h12*gPH(-
1))*H_DW(-1) 'equation (13) 
SEC_model.append H_DW=H_DW(-1)+(YD_W1+(LH-LH(-1))-C_W1+DL)/p_H 
'equation (14) 
SEC_model.append gH_DDW=(H_DDW-H_DW(-1))/H_DW(-1) 
SEC_model.append gH_DW=(H_DW-H_DW(-1))/H_DW(-1) 
SEC_model.append gH_DI=(H_DI-H_DI(-1))/H_DI(-1) 
 
'Worker households type II 
 
SEC_model.append YD_W2=W_W2-iLC*LC(-1)-T_W2 'equation (15) 
SEC_model.append YD_WG2=YD_W2+iLC*LC(-1) 'equation (16) 
SEC_model.append W_W2=(n2/(n1+n2))*W 'equation (17) 
SEC_model.append C_W2=YD_W2+LC-LC(-1) 'equation (18) 
SEC_model.append CA_W2D=(xi/n3)*C_IH 'equation (19) 
SEC_model.append C_W2D=n2*CA_W2D 'equation (20) 
SEC_model.append NLC_DN=C_W2D-YD_W2+ repL*LC(-1) 'equation (21) 
SEC_model.append NLC_D=(NLC_DN>0)*NLC_DN+0 
SEC_model.append LC=LC(-1)+NLC-repL*LC(-1) 'equation (22) 
SEC_model.append BUR_W2=((iLC+repL)*LC(-1))/YD_WG2 'equation (23) 
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'Firms 
 
SEC_model.append Y=C_W1+C_W2+C_IH+INV+GOV+dH 'equation (24) 
SEC_model.append INV=(a0+a1*u(-1)+a2*r_F(-1))*K_F(-1) 'equation (25) 
SEC_model.append u=Y/(v*K_F) 'equation (26) 
SEC_model.append r_F=PF_U/K_F 'equation (27) 
SEC_model.append K_F=K_F(-1)+INV 'equation (28) 
SEC_model.append PF=Y-W-iLF*LF(-1) 'equation (29) 
SEC_model.append W=sw*Y(-1) 'equation (30) 
SEC_model.append PF_U=sF*PF(-1) 'equation (31) 
SEC_model.append PF_D=PF-PF_U 'equation (32) 
SEC_model.append e=e(-1)+(x*INV(-1))/p_e 'equation (33) 
SEC_model.append LF=LF(-1)+INV+dH-PF_U-(H_DW-H_DW(-1))*p_H-(H_DI-
H_DI(-1))*p_H -(e-e(-1))*p_e 'equation (34) 
SEC_model.append BUR_LF=((iLF+repL)*LF(-1))/(Y-W) 
SEC_model.append H=H(-1)+(h21*ratH+h22*gPH)*H(-1) 'equation (35) 
SEC_model.append HU=HU(-1)+(H-H(-1))-(H_DW-H_DW(-1))-(H_DI-H_DI(-1)) 
'equation (36) 
SEC_model.append p_H=p_H(-1)+h3*(gH_D(-1)-gH(-1))*p_H(-1) 'equation (37) 
SEC_model.append dH=H-H(-1) 
SEC_model.append gPH=(P_H-P_H(-1))/P_H(-1) 
SEC_model.append gH=(H-H(-1))/H(-1) 
SEC_model.append ratH=(H_DW+H_DI)/H 
SEC_model.append gH_D=(H_DW+H_DI-H_DW(-1)-H_DI(-1))/(H_DW(-
1)+H_DI(-1)) 
 
'Commercial banks 
 
SEC_model.append s=s0-s1*(y_M(-1)-yMT) 'equation (38) 
SEC_model.append LH_S=s*LH 'equation (39) 
SEC_model.append LH_NS=(1-s)*LH 'equation (40) 
SEC_model.append PB_B=iLH*LH_NS(-1)+iLC*LC(-1)+iLF*LF(-1)+iT*TB_B(-
1)+FEE-iD*D_IH(-1)-iA*A(-1) 'equation (41) 
SEC_model.append iLH=iA+x1 'equation (42) 
SEC_model.append iLC=iA+x2 'equation (43) 
SEC_model.append iLF=iA+x3 'equation (44) 
SEC_model.append iD=iA-x4 'equation (45) 
SEC_model.append K_B=K_B(-1)+PB_BU-DL_NS 'equation (46) 
SEC_model.append DL_NS= phi*LH_NS(-1) 'equation (47) 
SEC_model.append PB_BU=sB*PB_B(-1)  'equation (48) 
SEC_model.append PB_BD=PB_B-PB_BU  'equation (49) 
SEC_model.append NLH=k_H*NLH_D 'equation (50) 
SEC_model.append k_H=kH0-kH1*LEV_W1(-1)+kH2*(CAR(-1)-CART)-
kH3*BUR_W1(-1)-kH4* phi 'equation (51) 
SEC_model.append NLC=k_C*NLC_D 'equation (52) 
SEC_model.append k_C=kC0+kC1*(CAR(-1)-CART)- kC2*BUR_W2(-1) 'equation 
(53) 
SEC_model.append CAR=K_B/(LH_NS+LC+LF) 'equation (54) 
SEC_model.append HPM_B=hB*D_IH 'equation (55) 
SEC_model.append TB_BN=K_B+D_IH-LH_NS-LC-LF-HPM_B 'equation (56) 
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SEC_model.append A_N=LH_NS+LC+LF+HPM_B-K_B-D_IH 'equation (57) 
SEC_model.append A=(A_N>0)*A_N+0 'equation (58) 
SEC_model.append TB_B=(TB_BN>0)*TB_BN+0 'equation (59) 
 
'SPVs-underwriters 
 
SEC_model.append COUPON=coup*M(-1) 'equation (60) 
SEC_model.append coup=iLH-x5 'equation (61) 
SEC_model.append FEE=fe*LH_S(-1) 'equation (62) 
SEC_model.append ES=iLH*LH_S(-1)-COUPON-FEE 'equation (63) 
SEC_model.append PU= iLH*LH_S(-1)+iT*TB_U(-1)-FEE 'equation (64) 
SEC_model.append PU_U=iT*TB_U(-1)+ES 'equation (65) 
SEC_model.append M=M(-1)+LH_S-LH_S(-1)+DL_SU 'equation (66) 
SEC_model.append DL_S= phi *LH_S(-1) 'equation (67) 
SEC_model.append DL_SU=DL_S*( phi <= phig)+(phig*LH_S(-1))*(phi>phig) 
'equation (68) 
SEC_model.append TB_U=TB_U(-1)+ PU_U+(M-M(-1))*p_M - (M-M(-1)) 'equation 
(69) 
SEC_model.append K_U=K_U(-1)+PU_U-CG_M-DL_SU 'equation (70) 
SEC_model.append CG_M=(p_M-p_M(-1))*M(-1) 'equation (71)  
 
'Institutional investors 
 
SEC_model.append PI= iT*TB_II(-1)+COUPON 'equation (72) 
SEC_model.append PI_U=sI*PI(-1) 'equation (73) 
SEC_model.append PI_D=PI-PI_U 'equation (74)  
SEC_model.append K_II=K_II(-1)+PI_U+CG_M-DL_SII 'equation (75) 
SEC_model.append DL_SII=(( phi - phig)*LH_S(-1))*(phi>phig)+0*(phi<=phig) 
'equation (76) 
SEC_model.append P_M=(coef_M*(K_II(-1)+SH(-1)))/M 'equation (77) 
SEC_model.append TB_II=K_II+SH-M*p_M 'equation (78) 
SEC_model.append y_M=COUPON/(p_M(-1)*M(-1)) 'equation (79) 
SEC_model.append r_M=y_M + CG_M/(p_M(-1)*M(-1)) 'equation (80) 
SEC_model.append coef_M=gamma10+gamma11*r_M(-1)+gamma12*iT 
SEC_model.append coef_TBII=gamma20+gamma21*r_M(-1)+gamma22*iT 
 
'Investor households 
 
SEC_model.append YT_I= iD*D_IH(-1)+iT*TB_IH(-1)+PI_D+PF_D+PB_BD 
'equation (81) 
SEC_model.append YD_I= YT_I-T_IH 'equation (82) 
SEC_model.append V_I=V_I(-1)+YD_I-C_IH+CG_e+CG_HI 'equation (83) 
SEC_model.append V_IF=V_I-HPM_IH 'equation (84) 
SEC_model.append HPM_IH=hI*C_IH 'equation (85) 
SEC_model.append C_IH=c31*YD_I(-1)+c32*V_I(-1)'equation (86) 
SEC_model.append CG_e=(p_e-p_e(-1))*e(-1)'equation (87) 
SEC_model.append CG_HI=(p_H-p_H(-1))*H_DI(-1)'equation (88) 
SEC_model.append SH=(lambda10+lambda11*r_SH(-
1)+lambda12*iT+lambda13*r_e(-1)+ lambda14*r_H(-
1)+lambda15*iD+lambda16*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)))*V_IF(-1) 'equation (89) 
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SEC_model.append TB_IH=(lambda20+lambda21*r_SH(-
1)+lambda22*iT+lambda23*r_e(-1)+ lambda24*r_H(-
1)+lambda25*iD+lambda26*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)))*V_IF(-1) 'equation (90) 
SEC_model.append p_e=((lambda30+lambda31*r_SH(-
1)+lambda32*iT+lambda33*r_e(-1)+lambda34*r_H(-
1)+lambda35*iD+lambda36*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)))*V_IF(-1))/e(-1)-(x*INV(-1))/e(-1) 
'equation (91) 
SEC_model.append H_DI =((lambda40+lambda41*r_SH(-
1)+lambda42*iT+lambda43*r_e(-1)+ lambda44*r_H(-
1)+lambda45*iD+lambda46*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)))*V_IF(-1))/P_H 'equation (92) 
SEC_model.append D_IH=V_IF-SH-p_e*e-TB_IH-H_DI*p_H 'equation (93)  
SEC_model.append r_SH =PI_D/SH(-1) 'equation (94) 
SEC_model.append y_E=PF_D/(p_e(-1)*e(-1)) 
SEC_model.append r_e =(PF_D+CG_e)/(p_e(-1)*e(-1)) 'equation (95) 
SEC_model.append r_H =CG_HI/(p_H(-1)*H_DI(-1)) 'equation (96) 
 
'Government  
 
SEC_model.append TB=TB(-1)+GOV-T_W1-T_W2-T_IH+iT*TB(-1)-
PB_CB'equation (97) 
SEC_model.append GOV=GOV(-1)*(1+g) 'equation (98) 
SEC_model.append T_W1=tauW*W_W1(-1) 'equation (99) 
SEC_model.append T_W2=tauW*W_W2(-1) 'equation (100) 
SEC_model.append T_IH=tauIH*YT_I(-1) 'equation (101) 
SEC_model.append iT=iA 'equation (102) 
 
'Central bank 
 
SEC_model.append PB_CB=iT*TB_CB(-1)+iA*A(-1) 'equation (103) 
SEC_model.append HPM=HPM_IH+HPM_B 'equation (104) 
SEC_model.append TB_CB=HPM-A 'equation (105) 
SEC_model.append TB_CBred=TB-TB_IH-TB_B-TB_II-TB_U 'equation (106) 
 
'additional helpful parameters and variables 
 
SEC_model.append g_Y=(Y-Y(-1))/Y(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_CIH=(C_IH-C_IH(-1))/C_IH(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_CW1=(C_W1-C_W1(-1))/C_W1(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_CW2=(C_W2-C_W2(-1))/C_W2(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_INV=(INV-INV(-1))/INV(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_dH=(dH-dH(-1))/dH(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_W=(W-W(-1))/W(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append g_NLDH=(NLH_DN-NLH_DN(-1))/NLH_DN(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_NLDC=(NLC_DN-NLC_DN(-1))/NLC_DN(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append g_YDW1=(YD_W1-YD_W1(-1))/YD_W1(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_BUR1=(BUR_W1-BUR_W1(-1))/BUR_W1(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_LH=(LH-LH(-1))/LH(-1) 
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SEC_model.append g_YDW2=(YD_W2-YD_W2(-1))/YD_W2(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_BUR2=(BUR_W2-BUR_W2(-1))/BUR_W2(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_LC=(LC-LC(-1))/LC(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append g_PFU=(PF_U-PF_U(-1))/PF_U(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append g_e=(e-e(-1))/e(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_pe=(p_e-p_e(-1))/p_e(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_DIH=(D_IH-D_IH(-1))/D_IH(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_TBIH=(TB_IH-TB_IH(-1))/TB_IH(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append MP=M*P_M 
SEC_model.append g_MP=(MP-MP(-1))/MP(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_M=(M-M(-1))/M(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_PM=(P_M-P_M(-1))/P_M(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_SH=(SH-SH(-1))/SH(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_TBII=(TB_II-TB_II(-1))/TB_II(-1) 
SEC_model.append g_KII=(K_II-K_II(-1))/K_II(-1) 
 
SEC_model.append rat_SH=SH/V_IF 
SEC_model.append rat_TBIH=TB_IH/V_IF 
SEC_model.append rat_e=(p_e*e)/V_IF 
SEC_model.append rat_PDIH=(P_H*H_DI)/V_IF 
SEC_model.append rat_DIH=D_IH/V_IF 
 
SEC_model.append rat_CW1Y=C_W1/Y 
SEC_model.append rat_CW2Y=C_W2/Y 
SEC_model.append rat_CIHY=C_IH/Y 
SEC_model.append rat_INVY=INV/Y 
SEC_model.append rat_dHY=dH/Y 
SEC_model.append rat_GOVY=GOV/Y 
 
SEC_model.append ratHDW_H=H_DW/H 
SEC_model.append ratHDI_H=H_DI/H 
 
SEC_model.append ratCW2D_YD=C_W2D/YD_W2 
SEC_model.append ratCW2_YD=C_W2/YD_W2 
 
SEC_model.append ratYD_CW2=YD_W2/C_W2 
SEC_model.append ratLC_CW2=(LC-LC(-1))/C_W2 
SEC_model.append ratYD_HDW=(YD_W1-C_W1)/((H_DW-H_DW(-1))*P_H) 
SEC_model.append ratLH_HDW=(LH-LH(-1))/((H_DW-H_DW(-1))*P_H) 
SEC_model.append ratDL_HDW=(DL)/((H_DW-H_DW(-1))*P_H) 
 
SEC_model.append coef_SH=lambda10+lambda11*r_SH(-
1)+lambda12*iT+lambda13*r_e(-1)+ lambda14*r_H(-
1)+lambda15*iD+lambda16*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)) 
SEC_model.append coef_TBIH=lambda20+lambda21*r_SH(-
1)+lambda22*iT+lambda23*r_e(-1)+ lambda24*r_H(-
1)+lambda25*iD+lambda26*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)) 
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SEC_model.append coef_pe=lambda30+lambda31*r_SH(-
1)+lambda32*iT+lambda33*r_e(-1)+lambda34*r_H(-
1)+lambda35*iD+lambda36*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)) 
SEC_model.append coef_PHDI =lambda40+lambda41*r_SH(-
1)+lambda42*iT+lambda43*r_e(-1)+ lambda44*r_H(-
1)+lambda45*iD+lambda46*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)) 
SEC_model.append coef_DIH= lambda50+lambda51*r_SH(-
1)+lambda52*iT+lambda53*r_e(-1)+ lambda54*r_H(-
1)+lambda55*iD+lambda56*(YD_I(-1)/V_IF(-1)) 
 
'SIMULATION 
 
SEC_model.scenario "Baseline" 
SEC_model.solve 
 
'main economic variables 
 
group data0 
(TB_CB_0)(TB_CBred_0)(g_Y_0)(g_CW1_0)(g_CW2_0)(g_CIH_0)(g_INV_0)(g_d
H_0)(rat_CW1Y_0)(rat_CW2Y_0)(rat_CIHY_0)(rat_INVY_0)(rat_dHY_0)(rat_GOV
Y_0)(NLH_DN_0)(NLH_D_0)(NLH_0)(g_LH_0)(gH_DDW_0)(gH_DW_0)(gH_DI_
0)(gH_D_0)(gH_0)(gPH_0)(H_DDW_0)(H_DW_0)(H_DI_0)(H_0)(dH_0)(ratH_0)(r
atHDW_H_0)(ratHDI_H_0)(HU_0)(p_H_0)(ratYD_CW2_0)(ratLC_CW2_0)(ratYD_
HDW_0)(ratLH_HDW_0)(ratDL_HDW_0)(k_H_0)(LEV_W1_0)(CAR_0)(BUR_W1
_0)(LH_0)(phi_0)(DL_0)(W_W1_0)(YD_W1_0)(YD_WG1_0)(C_W1_0)(T_W1_0)(
V_W1_0)(CG_HW_0)(g_LC_0)(NLC_DN_0)(NLC_D_0)(NLC_0)(k_C_0)(BUR_W
2_0)(LC_0)(W_W2_0)(YD_W2_0)(YD_WG2_0)(C_W2_0)(C_W2D_0)(ratCW2D_
YD_0)(ratCW2_YD_0)(T_W2_0)(YT_I_0)(YD_I_0)(C_IH_0)(T_IH_0)(PI_D_0)(PF
_D_0)(PB_BD_0)(V_I_0)(HPM_IH_0)(V_IF_0)(SH_0)(TB_IH_0)(e_0)(p_e_0)(D_I
H_0)(rat_SH_0)(rat_TBIH_0)(rat_e_0)(rat_PDIH_0)(rat_DIH_0)(coef_SH_0)(coef_T
BIH_0)(coef_PE_0)(coef_PHDI_0)(coef_DIH_0)(r_SH_0)(y_e_0)(r_e_0)(CG_E_0)(r
_H_0)(CG_HI_0)(s_0)(y_M_0)(r_M_0)(M_0)(P_M_0)(MP_0)(LH_S_0)(DL_S_0)(D
L_SU_0)(DL_SII_0)(K_U_0)(CG_M_0)(PU_0)(PU_U_0)(COUPON_0)(ES_0)(FEE_
0)(TB_U_0)(coef_M_0)(coef_TBII_0)(K_II_0)(TB_II_0)(PI_0)(PI_U_0)(LH_NS_0)(
PB_B_0)(PB_BU_0)(DL_NS_0)(K_B_0)(TB_B_0)(TB_BN_0)(A_0)(A_N_0)(HPM_
B_0)(LF_0)(BUR_LF_0)(K_F_0)(INV_0)(u_0)(r_F_0)(PF_0)(PF_U_0)(W_0)(Y_0)(
GOV_0)(HPM_0)(TB_0)(PB_CB_0) 
 
show data0 
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5. Bank liquidity and macroeconomic fragility: Empirical 
evidence for the EMU 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The imprudent management of bank liquidity has been one of the core factors that 
contributed to the 2007-8 financial distress. When the crisis unfolded, various banks 
exhibited a fragile liquidity position by having a high exposure to short-term funding, 
even though their capital buffers were at a sufficient level (see e.g. BCBS, 2010A; 
Ayadi et al., 2012; Bonfim and Kim, 2012). The reversal in the liquidity of the 
interbank market induced them to resort to the fire-sale of assets, transforming their 
illiquidity problems into insolvency ones. The overall result was the destabilisation of 
the financial system and the macroeconomy. 
 
These crisis developments have induced important changes in the regulatory 
framework of banks. Basel III has introduced two liquidity indices, with the aim to 
better supervise the liquidity of the financial system (see BCBS, 2010A). By imposing 
certain minimum limits in these indices, the new regulatory framework intends to 
contribute to the monitoring of both the short-term and the medium- to long-term 
liquidity of banks. 
 
Even though the explicit consideration of liquidity measures in Basel III is an 
important step towards a more effective supervision of the banking sector, there are 
still many issues that remain to be addressed in the field of liquidity regulation. This 
chapter focuses on two of them. The first is the need for a more dynamic definition of 
liquidity. In the current regulatory framework the weights assigned to banks’ assets 
and liabilities are predetermined and do not adjust according to the conditions in the 
related financial markets. This is quite problematic since the liquidity and the stability 
of a balance sheet item is likely to be time-varying as a result of changes in risk 
perceptions and financial conditions (see e.g. Ayadi et al., 2012). A characteristic 
example is the liquidity of the government bonds. In Basel III government bonds are 
assigned a static weight equal to 0.05. This implies that in the aftermath of the EMU 
sovereign crisis all government bonds continue to be treated as highly liquid, despite 
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the substantial deterioration in their liquidity profile. To address the issue of time-
varying liquidity this chapter puts forward a dynamic liquidity ratio in which the 
weights of the balance sheet items adjust to their time specific liquidity and stability 
properties. The suggested ratio is applied to EMU-12 economies and is compared with 
the static ratio introduced by Basel III. 
 
The second issue refers to the link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic risk. In 
Basel III, the minimum liquidity requirements are invariant to the fragility of the 
macro system. From the macroprudential point of view this is problematic: higher 
(lower) perceived macro risk should be accompanied by a higher (lower) bank 
liquidity. The reason is twofold. First, higher liquidity requirements in periods of 
increasing macro fragility restrict banks’ liquidity creation; the latter tends to rise in 
periods of financial euphoria amplifying instability trends.
1
 Second, a more liquid 
banking sector can more adequately absorb the shocks that may stem from a more 
fragile macroeconomy. In this chapter we provide econometric evidence which shows 
that in most EMU countries the bank liquidity does not increase when the 
macroeconomic fragility becomes higher. This calls for the imposition of macro 
fragility-related minimum liquidity requirements. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 develops our dynamic liquidity ratio 
and applies it to EMU-12 countries. Section 5.3 presents the econometric evidence for 
the link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic risk. Section 5.4 concludes and 
sets out the policy implications of the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 There is evidence that bank liquidity follows a countercyclical pattern, being excessively low when 
the economy expands and excessively high when the economy shrinks (see Aspachs et al., 2004; 
Acharya et al., 2011). 
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5.2 The Dynamic Net Stable Funding Ratio: Definition and application 
 
5.2.1 Definition 
 
The liquidity of a bank expresses its ability to meet contractual liability obligations 
and to fund asset positions without significant cost.
2
 This ability depends positively on 
(a) the degree of liquidity of its assets and (b) the proportion of stable liabilities in total 
liabilities. An asset is perceived to be more liquid when it has a low credit and market 
risk. The credit risk is related with the possibility of borrower’s default; a default can 
lead to the loss of expected inflows that come from loan repayments and interest 
income. The market risk is associated with the possibility that an asset will be 
liquidated at an unfavourable price in the related market. A liability is conceived to be 
stable when it provides a long-term funding and it is not expected to be liquidated by 
banks’ lenders in financial distress conditions. Overall, the higher the amount of stable 
liabilities relative to the amount of less liquid assets the better the liquidity position of 
a bank. 
 
In line with this general framework, in Basel III the liquidity position of banks in the 
medium to long term is captured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which is 
given by the ratio of the Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF) to the Required 
amount of Stable Funding (RSF). The ratio is written as: 
 



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jtj
t
t
t
SAsw
SLsw
RSF
ASF
NSFR  (1) 
 
where jsw  is the static weight of liability j, isw  is the static weight of asset i , jtSL  is 
the stock of liability j in time t and itSA  is the stock of asset i in time t. According to 
formula (1), the ASF is defined as the weighted sum of the stock of liabilities that are 
deemed stable. The greater the weight assigned to a liability the more stable this 
liability is conceived. The RSF is calculated as the weighted sum of the stock of assets 
that are less liquid and must be supported with stable funding. The greater the weight 
                                            
2
 For a detailed definition of the concept of liquidity and its macroeconomic implications see e.g. 
Minsky (2008), Davidson (2002), BCBS (2008, 2010A) and Nikolaou (2009). 
124 
 
applied to an asset the more this asset needs to be supported with stable funding. 
Given that holding more stable liabilities relative to illiquid assets improves the 
medium- to long-term liquidity of banks, a higher NSFR is desirable. 
 
Table 1 shows how NSFR is estimated in this chapter. The static weight of each asset 
and liability is calculated following broadly the approach of BCBS (2010A). Since this 
ratio is going to be applied to EMU countries, the assets and the liabilities have been 
categorised according to the classification of balance sheet data provided by the 
European Central Bank (ECB); see Appendix A for the detailed aggregated balance 
sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs). 
 
On the liability side, capital and reserves are deemed more stable and thereby a weight 
equal to 1 is assumed. Moreover, deposits with agreed maturity and debt securities 
issued for longer than one year are classified as equally stable. Deposits of monetary 
financial institutions, deposits of the central government, external liabilities and 
overnight deposits are regarded less stable than the other deposits. Hence, the former 
are assigned a weight of 0.8 while the latter are assigned a weight of 0.9. All the other 
liabilities are given a zero weight. On the asset side, securities other than shares issued 
by the government in the euro area constitute the most liquid asset, after cash and 
loans to monetary financial institutions, with a weight equal to 0.05. Loans are 
classified according to their maturity and type. We consider loans to non-financial 
corporations up to one year and loans for house purchase as more liquid than the rest 
long term loans, assigning a weight of 0.5 and 0.65 respectively. For other loans to 
households, for loans to non-financial corporations greater than one year and for 
external assets, which tend to be less liquid, a higher weight equal to 0.85 is assigned. 
The rest of the assets have a weight equal to 1. 
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Table 1. Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
Corresponding Basel III category Liability Weight
Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments Capital and reserves 1
Deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year 1
Debt securities issued for longer than 1 year 1
Deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year 0.9
Deposits redeemable at notice 0.9
Repurchase agreements 0.9
Overnight deposits 0.8
Deposits of monetary financial institutions 0.8
Deposits of the central government 0.8
External liabilities 0.8
All other liabilities All other liabilities 0
Corresponding Basel III category Asset Weight
Cash - 0
Loans to banks (e.g. interbank) Loans to monetary financial institutions (MFIs) 0
Sovereign securities Holdings of securities other than shares issued by general 
government in the euro area
0.05
Retail loans up to 1 year Loans to non-financial corporations up to 1 year 0.5
Mortgages Loans for house purchase 0.65
Retail loans Loans to non-financial corporations greater than 1 year 0.85
Loans to households excluding  lending for house purchase 0.85
External assets 0.85
All other assets All other assets 1
Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF )
Required amount of Stable Funding (RSF )
Other liabilities with an effective maturity of 
one year or greater
Stable deposits with residual maturity less than 
a year
Less stable deposits with residual maturity less 
than a year
Note: The selection of the weights is based on BCBS (2010A) 
 
One important feature of NSFR is that the weights of balance sheet items are static. 
This is quite problematic since in the real world financial system the liquidity of assets 
and the stability of liabilities change continuously due to time-varying market 
conditions, financial perceptions and perceived risks. For example, as Minsky (2008) 
has pointed out, in tranquil years economic agents’ required margins of safety become 
lower due to the widespread euphoria; hence, the credit and the market risk are 
perceived to be low (see also Kregel, 1997). The opposite holds in a period that 
follows a financial episode in which the perceived risks are high and the stability of 
banks’ liabilities declines, due to the generalised increase in economic agents’ 
liquidity preference. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that a market can 
rapidly turn from a liquid into an illiquid one if, for some reason, many investors try to 
liquidate their assets at the same time. This is a common feature of financial distress 
situations. 
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This dynamic nature of financial markets and financial behaviours brings forward the 
need for a more dynamic definition of liquidity. In this chapter this is done by 
allowing the balance sheet weights in NSFR to be a function of the interest rates that 
correspond to the assets and liabilities under investigation. On the asset side, the 
interest rates can be used as proxies for the perceived credit and market risk. A higher 
interest rate is broadly associated with a higher risk premium and, thus, with less 
liquid assets. On the liability side, a high interest rate implies that banks’ lenders are 
not very willing to provide the required funding. Hence, they are more prone to 
withdraw their liabilities in a stress event. 
 
In the estimation of the dynamic balance sheet weights the interest rates are compared 
to a benchmark interest rate. The benchmark interest rate expresses the interest rate 
that corresponds to the safest and most liquid lending for banks, as this is determined 
by the monetary policy. The higher the spread between the interest rate of an asset and 
the benchmark interest rate the less liquid this asset is considered. Furthermore, a high 
spread between the interest rate of a liability and the benchmark interest rate implies 
that banks are willing to foregone their profitability in order to obtain funding from 
this type of liability. Thus, the higher this spread the more banks need to compensate 
the potential borrowers in order to convince them to become less liquid. This 
corresponds to cases of less stable funding. 
 
However, many empirical studies
3
 have shown that the interest rate spreads on loans 
and deposits provided to or held by households and non-financial corporations are 
significantly affected by the degree of competition in the banking sector. In particular, 
high competition reduces banks’ ability to set high loan rates and low deposit rates, 
relative to the benchmark interest rate. Consequently, the fluctuations and the cross-
country differences of the interest rate spreads on loans and deposits may not only 
reflect changes/differences in the perceived credit and market risks, but they may also 
partly capture changes/differences in the oligopoly structure of the banking sector. To 
account for this fact, in the procedure of estimating the time-varying weights the 
interest rate spreads on loans and deposits are suitably adjusted to consider the impact 
of the oligopoly structure. 
                                            
3
 See e.g. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) and the references therein. 
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We have chosen not to make other adjustments in the interest rate spreads. Obviously, 
these spreads may also be affected by various other factors, such as the rate of non-
performing loans (that affects the perceived credit risk), the banks’ operating costs, the 
quality of management or the degree of financial innovation (see e.g. Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Gropp et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the impact of these 
factors is less clear-cut and cannot be easily captured quantitatively, as in the case of 
the oligopoly structure. Thus, to avoid unnecessary complications we have abstracted 
from considering their potential role in the determination of the interest rate spreads. 
 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the actual financial risk of banks’ assets and 
liabilities is not completely reflected on interest rate spreads. This risk also depends on 
various macroeconomic factors, such as the unemployment rate of banks’ borrowers, 
the growth rate of the economy, the developments in the housing market etc. The 
advantage, though, of the use of interest rates is that they are available for each 
balance sheet category and can be easily employed to provide an overall picture of the 
time-varying liquidity of banks, which is the purpose of our analysis. A more detailed 
and integrated analysis of bank liquidity can well be the subject of future extensions of 
the present approach. 
 
We proceed to describe the procedure through which the time-varying weights of 
assets and liabilities are calculated in this chapter. The calculation requires a panel 
data sample. The time-varying weights are estimated for each country separately 
taking into account the properties of the whole sample. 
 
The actual interest rate spread of asset i in period t  itspr  is defined as the difference 
between the interest rate of this asset in period t  itr  and the benchmark interest rate 
 trb : 
 
titit rbrspr   (2) 
 
The adjusted interest rate spread of asset i  itaspr , which is used for the calculation of 
the time-varying weight in our analysis, is given by the following formula: 
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                            )min( iit sprspr  , if the asset’s spread is invariant to the degree of oligopoly 
itaspr  (3) 
                          
t
iit
CI
sprspr
ln
)min(
, if the asset’s spread is affected by the degree of oligopoly 
 
where  isprmin  is the minimum value of the interest rate spread of asset i calculated 
across time and countries, and tCI  is a concentration index that takes values between 
0 and 1. 
 
According to formula (3), the adjusted interest rate spread is always non-negative and 
its minimum value over the sample is equal to zero; this is ensured by subtracting  the 
minimum value of the spread (over the whole sample) from the interest rate spread. 
Moreover, in the case of loans provided to households and non-financial corporations, 
whose spread is considered to positively depend on the degree of oligopoly, it is 
postulated that the credit risk increases when the spread becomes higher relative to the 
degree of oligopoly. Therefore, by adopting a simplifying formulation, it is assumed 
that the adjusted spread for loans equals the ratio of the actual spread (after the 
subtraction of the minimum value over the sample) to the concentration index. Note 
that the absolute value of the natural logarithm of the concentration index is used to 
smooth the values of the index and avoid an unnecessarily high impact of very low or 
very high figures. 
 
Applying a simple normalisation method,
4
 the adjusted interest rate spread is 
transformed into the normalised spread  itnspr , which lies between 0 and 1: 
 
 
   ii
iit
it
aspraspr
aspraspr
nspr
minmax
min


  (4) 
 
                                            
4
 For a brief description of the various methods of normalisation used for the construction of composite 
indices see Giovannini et al. (2008).  
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where  iasprmin  and  iasprmax  is the minimum and maximum value of adjusted 
interest rate spread of asset i calculated across time and countries; recall that 
  0min iaspr . 
 
The time-varying weight of asset i in time t  ittw  is estimated via the following 
formula:
5
 
 
 )( iitiiit nsprmediannspraswtw   (5) 
 
where 0ia  is the responsiveness of the time-varying weight of asset i to the 
divergence between the normalised spread of this asset and the median value of the 
normalised spread across time and countries  )( insprmedian . Note that when 
 iit nsprmediannspr  , the dynamic weight is the same with the static one. This 
implies that the static weight of each asset corresponds to the median financial risk in 
our sample. 
 
For each asset we define a minimum value for its time-varying weight which is equal 
to a proportion, 1q , of the static weight (i.e.   ii qswtw min ). Since the time-
varying weight should take its minimum value when the normalised spread is at its 
minimum level, we have that: 
 
    )(minmin iiiiii nsprmediannspraswqswtw   (6) 
 
Since by definition   0min inspr , from (6) it can be easily derived that: 
 
 
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 (7) 
 
Note that in the case of the loans to monetary financial institutions, in which the static 
weight equals 0 (see Table 1), the following formula is used instead of (5). 
                                            
5
 For simplicity, a linear function has been assumed. 
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 0 itiiit nspraswtw  (5') 
 
Formula (5') implies that for the loans to monetary financial institutions the minimum 
dynamic weight is equal to the static weight. Moreover, for this type of asset we define 
that 05.0ia  in order for the maximum dynamic weight not to exceed the next most 
liquid asset according the static approach, namely the sovereign securities (see Table 
1). 
 
A similar procedure is followed for the estimation of the time-varying weights of 
liabilities. The actual interest rate spread of liability j in period t  jtspr  is defined as: 
 
tjtjt rbrspr   (8) 
 
where jtr  is the interest rate of this liability j in period t. 
 
The adjusted interest rate spread of liability j in period t  jtaspr  is given by the 
following formula: 
 
                            )min( jjt sprspr  , if the liability’s spread is invariant to the degree of oligopoly 
jtaspr  (9) 
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In the case of deposits held by households and non-financial corporations, whose 
spread is considered to inversely rely on the degree of competition, it is postulated that 
their financial risk increases when the spread becomes higher relative to the degree of 
competition in the banking sector. Therefore, the adjusted spread for these deposits 
equals the ratio of the actual spread (after the subtraction of the minimum value over 
the sample) to the absolute logarithm of 1 minus the concentration index; 
tCI1  is 
used to capture the degree of competition. Again the absolute value of the natural 
logarithm is employed to smooth the values of the concentration index. 
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The normalised spread of liability j  jtnspr  in period t is computed as: 
 
 
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The time-varying weight of liability j in time t  jttw  is estimated as: 
 
 )( jjtjjjt nsprmediannsprbswtw   (11) 
 
where 0jb  is the responsiveness of the time-varying weight of liability j to the 
divergence between the normalised spread of this asset and the median value of the 
normalised spread. The parameter jb  is negative because a higher spread implies a 
less stable liability. Again, the static weight of each liability refers to the median 
financial risk in our sample. 
 
For each liability we define a maximum value for its time-varying weight which 
equals to p times the static weight, where 1p  (i.e.   jj pswtw max ). Since the 
time-varying weight should take its maximum value when the normalised spread is at 
its minimum level, we have that: 
 
    )(minmax jjjjj nsprmediannsprbswtw   (12) 
 
Since by definition   0min jnspr  from (12) it can be easily derived that: 
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The ratio that is based on time-varying balance sheet weights is called Dynamic Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (DNSFR) and is defined as follows: 
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Table 2 reports the interest rates that have been used for each balance sheet item in the 
construction of the above ratio. Note that in the case of capital and reserves, debt 
securities issued for longer than 1 year, deposits of the central government, all other 
liabilities and all other assets the dynamic weight is assumed to be invariably equal to 
the static weight. 
 
Table 2. Interest rates used to calculate the balance sheet weighting in Dynamic Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (DNSFR)  
Liability Interest rate
Capital and reserves -
Deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year 
(to non-financial corporations and households)
Debt securities issued for longer than 1 year -
Deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year (to non-
financial corporations and households)
Deposits redeemable at notice Interest rate on deposits redeemable at notice (to households)
Repurchase agreements Interest rate on repurchase agreements (to non-financial 
corporations and households)
Overnight deposits Interest rate on overnight deposits (to non-financial corporations 
and households)
Deposits of monetary financial institutions Euribor 3 months rate
Deposits of the central government -
External liabilities Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year 
(to non-financial corporations and households)
All other liabilities -
Asset Interest rate
Loans to monetary financial institutions (MFIs) Euribor 3 months rate
Domestic securities: Long-term interest rate for convergence 
purposes, debt security issued (10 years)
Other than domestic securities: Euro area 10-year government 
benchmark bond yield
Loans to non-financial corporations up to 1 year Interest rate on loans for non-financial corporations up to 1 year
Loans for house purchase Interest rate on loans on house purchases (to households)
Loans to non-financial corporations greater than 1 year Interest rate on loans for non-financial corporations over 1 year
Loans to households excluding  lending for house purchase Interest on consumer credit and other loans (to households)
External assets Interest on consumer credit and other loans (to households)
All other assets -
Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF )
Required amount of Stable Funding (RSF )
Holdings of securities other than shares issued by general 
government in the euro area
Notes: 
1/ Households include also non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). 
2/ Interest rates on loans and deposits are either annualised agreed rates (AAR) or narrowly defined 
effective rates (NDER) (see ECB, 2003 for definitions). These interest rates refer to new business 
indicators. 
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5.2.2 Application to EMU-12 countries 
 
In our estimations, aggregated data from the ECB database over the period 2003:01 to 
2012:07 have been utilised. The analysis refers to the EMU-12 countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Luxemburg) for which data are available for a sufficiently long period of 
time. In the case of government securities on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, 
we have opted to make a distinction according to the nationality of their issuer: the 
credit and market risk of these securities is significantly affected by the fiscal position 
of the country that issues them. For this purpose, the Bruegel database on sovereign 
bond holding has been employed. This database provides data on the amount of each 
country’s government securities held by the domestic banking sector, allowing us to 
estimate securities’ ‘home bias’.6 Although these data do not allow us to fully consider 
the impact of government securities’ nationality on the liquidity position of banks, the 
consideration of the ‘home bias’ permits us to capture, at least partially, some 
important aspects of this impact. In the baseline calculations the ECB policy rate has 
been used as the benchmark interest rate. However, to check for the robustness of the 
results, the EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) interest rate has also been used as 
a benchmark interest rate; the related results are presented in Appendix C. The EONIA 
interest rate refers to the interbank overnight lending and gives information about the 
gains and the costs of short-tem lending/borrowing for banks, especially in periods of 
financial distress. It is also the rate that the ECB attempts to control via its operations 
and facilities (see e.g. de Bondt, 2005). 
 
Moreover, the Herfindahl index has been used to account for the impact of the 
oligopoly structure on the interest rate spreads of loans and deposits. The Herfindahl 
index is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares to total assets of all the 
credit institutions in the banking sector. The index ranges from 0 to 1. A higher value 
of the index indicates more concentration in the market. The available data are 
annually and have been transformed to monthly ones using the cubic-spline function. 
To verify the robustness of our results the baseline ratio has also been calculated 
                                            
6
 For the countries or the time points for which Bruegel does not provide data for the government 
securities held by the domestic banking sector, the ‘home bias’ is proxied by the figures reported by 
Acharya et al. (2012, p. 54, Chart 3) based on the European Bank stress tests on March 31
st
, 2010. 
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without adjusting for the concentration index, i.e. without dividing the interest rate 
spreads in formulas (5) and (9) by the term that refers to the concentration index. The 
related results are reported in Appendix D.
7
 
 
In the baseline calculations it holds that 8.0q  and 2.1p . For robustness, we have 
also considered the case in which 9.0q  and 1.1p ; the related results are reported 
in Appendix E. Note that the loans and deposits in which the spread is considered to 
depend on the concentration index are the loans for house purchase, the loans to non-
financial corporations up to 1 year, the loans to non-financial corporations greater than 
1 year, the loans to households excluding lending for house purchase, the deposits 
with agreed maturity greater than 1 year, the deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 
year, the overnight deposits, repurchase agreements and the deposits redeemable at 
notice. 
 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of NSFR and DNSFR over the period under 
examination, according to our baseline calculations. The vertical dotted line marks the 
time point in which the collapse of the Lehman Brothers occurred (2008:08). We 
observe the following: First, in almost all countries DNSFR was higher than NSFR for 
almost all time points before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers and lower 
thereafter.
8
 This suggests that the liquidity ratio adopted by Basel III potentially 
underestimates the liquidity position of banks before the crisis and overestimates it in 
the after-crisis period. Second, in 8 out of 12 countries (Germany, Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and Austria) the evolution of liquidity over the last 
decade seems to be quite different according to the ratio utilised. In particular, while 
NSFR suggests that the bank liquidity in these countries has either remained 
approximately the same or even improved after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, 
DNSFR shows a substantial deterioration in liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7
 All the data sources of our analysis are reported in Appendix B. 
8
 The only exceptions are Germany and Greece. 
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Fig. 1. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Dynamic Net Stable Funding Ratio (DNSFR) in 
percentage points, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07; baseline calculations 
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The difference between the two indices has basically to do with the adverse after-crisis 
developments in various markets. In particular, after the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers there was a brisk rise in the 3-month Euribor interest rate as a result of the 
distress in the interbank market. This rise explains the deterioration in the liquidity 
index in all countries of our sample in the first months after the crisis. Moreover, many 
countries, most notably Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, saw a decline in the lending 
interest rates spread in 2007 and a substantial increase thereafter. This explains to a 
great extent why in these countries the dynamic liquidity index improved slightly in 
2007 and declined significantly after the crisis. In Greece of particular importance for 
the evolution of the dynamic liquidity index was the existence of low deposit interest 
rates before the crisis and their significant rise after 2008 due to the adverse impact of 
the crisis on the behaviour of depositors and thereby on the stability of deposits. 
Lastly, the crisis has substantially modified the liquidity of bonds that have been 
issued by countries with fiscal problems. Hence, banks that hold government bonds of 
these countries have seen a deterioration in their liquidity position. Due to the ‘home 
bias’ in the holding of government bonds, this implies that the banking sector in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain has most greatly been affected by the 
distress in the sovereign bond market. 
 
The main conclusions inferred from our baseline calculations do not change when the 
EONIA rate is employed as a benchmark interest rate instead of the ECB policy rate, 
when the baseline calculations are made without adjusting for the concentration index, 
or when higher values for p and q are utilised; see Appendix C, Appendix D and 
Appendix E respectively. There are, however, some slight differences that need to be 
pointed out. In particular, when the EONIA rate is used in the calculations, the DNSFR 
is lower in the after-crisis period relative to the baseline estimations. This is due to the 
fact that the EONIA rate was lower than the ECB policy rate in this period as a result 
of the distress in the interbank market. According to our formulas, the lower the 
benchmark interest rate the lower, ceteris paribus, the liquidity of assets and the 
stability of liabilities. As a result, in Appendix C we can see that in some countries 
(most notably Austria and Luxembourg) the DNSFR is lower than the NSFR in some 
time points after the crisis. Moreover, when the baseline ratio is calculated without 
adjusting for the concentration index, there is noteworthy difference in the case of 
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Germany. In this country the concentration index is much smaller than in the other 
EMU-12 countries. Consequently, when we make no adjustment for the concentration 
index the relative dynamic liquidity of the banks of this country appears to improve.
9
 
Lastly, higher values for q and lower values for p imply that the differences between 
the static and the dynamic weights are lower. This explains why DNSFR and NSFR are 
closer the one to the other in Appendix E. This, though, does not affect the qualitative 
implications of our analysis. 
 
On the basis of the above estimates, it can be overall argued that the NSFR does not 
successfully gauge the decline in the liquidity of banks that seems to have occurred in 
various EMU countries as a result of the recent financial distress. By assigning static 
weights in banks’ balance sheet items, this ratio ignores the changing nature of 
liquidity, which is particularly important in periods of financial distress. On the 
contrary, the dynamic liquidity ratio suggested in this chapter reflects the effects of 
financial distress on the liquidity of assets and the stability of liabilities, depicting 
more accurately the fragility of banks over periods of high volatility and uncertainty, 
as the current one. 
 
5.3 The link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic fragility in the EMU:  
An econometric analysis 
 
In Basel III, the imposed minimum liquidity requirements are invariant to 
macroeconomic conditions. For example, the minimum NSFR is equal to 100% 
irrespective of the degree of financial fragility in the macroeconomy (see, BCBS, 
2010A). However, from a macroprudential point of view the bank liquidity should, 
arguably, increase when the macro system seems to be more prone to financial 
instability. The rational is twofold. First, excessive financial expansion is commonly 
one of the underlying reasons behind the build-up of financial fragility structures. A 
rise in bank liquidity (which, practically, implies lower debt expansion for both 
financial and non-financial corporations) can slow down the financial instability trends 
of the macro system. Second, a more liquid financial system can more successfully 
absorb the shocks that stem from the real economy. For instance, a stronger liquidity 
                                            
9
 Note that, according to our formulas, the adjustment for the concentration index improves the DNSFR 
in countries with high concentration and does the opposite in countries with low concentration. 
139 
 
position allows banks to more successfully face the problems arising from an 
unexpected rise in the loan default rate of households and firms. 
 
In this section we explore whether the banking sector in EMU countries increases its 
liquidity when the macro system becomes more fragile. Failure to find a positive link 
between bank liquidity and macro fragility implies that banks do not self-impose 
macro fragility-related liquidity requirements. This would suggest the need for the 
regulatory agents in the EMU to impose such requirements in order to decrease the 
system-wide risk. Note that since the responsiveness of bank liquidity to 
macroeconomic fragility over a sufficiently long horizon is of interest, our analysis 
focuses on the long-run relationship between the two variables. The absence of a 
short-term responsiveness would not necessarily be problematic since this might be 
due to the sluggish reaction of banks to macroeconomic factors. However, the non-
existence of such a responsiveness in the long run would imply that banks 
systematically fail to take into account macro fragility in the determination of their 
liquidity. 
 
In our empirical investigation bank liquidity is captured both by the static and the 
dynamic liquidity ratio developed in the previous section. Following Tymoigne 
(2011), the macroeconomic fragility is viewed ‘as the propensity of financial problems 
to generate financial instability’. In this chapter, the macroeconomic fragility is 
proxied by the credit-to-GDP ratio. Although this measure cannot provide a detailed 
view of the macroeconomic fragility (see Tymoigne, 2011 for sector-specific indices), 
it can be used to give an overall picture of some financial instability trends. Empirical 
evidence has shown that the credit-to-GDP ratio can quite successfully signal periods 
of financial distress (see Drehmann et al., 2010). It has also been used by Basel III as 
the main guide for determining the appropriate amount of countercyclical capital 
buffer (see BCBS, 2010B). An additional advantage is that this index is available for 
most of the countries under investigation. 
 
However, it must be noted that an increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio does not 
necessarily reflect only higher financial risk. It may also capture procedures like the 
financial deepening and the institutional penetration of financial intermediation. It is, 
though, important to point out that in our sample the credit-to-GDP ratio is in most 
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cases higher than 100%, which implies that it is more likely to capture higher risk 
rather than the aforementioned procedures. 
 
5.3.1 Econometric methodology 
 
The econometric exploration of the link between bank liquidity and macro fragility is 
conducted by utilising time-series techniques and making the analysis distinctively for 
each country with the use of aggregated data for the banking sector.
10
 Time-series 
techniques have been chosen instead of panel data ones for two reasons. First, we wish 
to avoid the heterogeneity bias which basically stems from the diversification of 
macroeconomic fragility within the EMU. Second, the purpose of the econometric 
investigation is to examine how each national banking sector responds to the 
macroeconomic fragility of its country. Thus, a panel investigation of this issue would 
not be illuminating for our purposes. 
 
The econometric analysis is conducted by utilising the ARDL (Auroregressive 
Distributed lag)-bounds testing procedure, developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and 
Pesaran et al. (2001). The main advantage of this approach, in comparison with the 
more traditional Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood method, is twofold. First, it 
allows us to check for cointegration when the variables of the econometric analysis are 
either I(0) or I(1). On the contrary, Johansen’s cointegration technique prerequisites 
the existence of only I(1) series. As will be shown below, in our sample the possibility 
of I(0) series cannot be excluded, implying that the ARDL-bounds testing approach is 
more appropriate. Second, the ARDL-bounds testing procedure is more suitable for 
small sample data sizes, as our own one. The Johansen method relies on a VAR 
system of equations and, thus, the degrees of freedom may decline significantly when 
the size of the sample is small.
11
 
 
The following econometric specification is used: 
 
                                            
10
 Recent empirical literature has investigated the relationship between banks’ liquidity and micro 
characteristics using micro panel datasets (see e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Fungacova et al., 2010; 
Horvath et al., 2012; Distinguin et al., 2013). 
11
 Note also that in the ARDL-bounds testing approach the potential endogeneity problems are mitigated 
due to the use of lagged values of the explanatory variables. 
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ttt uCREDITtLIQ  210   (15) 
 
where LIQ is the liquidity ratio (either the NSFR or the DNSFR, see section 5.2) and 
CREDIT is the credit-to-GDP ratio obtained from the ECB database. The credit-to-
GDP ratio is available on a quarterly basis. For the purposes of our analysis the 
quarterly data have been transformed to monthly ones, using the cubic-spline function. 
All variables in the econometric analysis are expressed in percentage points. The 
analysis refers to the period 2003:01 to 2012:07.
12
 
 
Following Pesaran et al. (2001), the econometric analysis is conducted in four steps. 
First, we conduct unit root tests. At this stage it is important to rule out the possibility 
of I(2) series. To test for the order of integration we apply the Phillips-Perron unit root 
test. Having excluded the possibility of I(2) series, we then conduct the Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) test with one structural break. Since the financial crisis has potentially 
caused a structural break in our series, the Zivot and Andrews test is appropriate to 
identify if the series are I(0) or I(1). In the test the break point is endogenously 
determined by the data using as a criterion the minimisation of the ADF t-test statistic. 
We estimate two models of the Zivot and Andrews test: model A with a change in 
intercept and model C with a change in both intercept and slope. The null hypothesis is 
that the time series have a unit root without a structural break; the alternative 
hypothesis suggests that there is a trend stationary series with a structural break.
13
 
Note that although the result of Zivot and Andrews test cannot affect our inference for 
the appropriateness or not of the ARDL-bounds testing approach, it is necessary in our 
case in order to properly identify the order of integration of our series. 
 
The second step involves the estimation of the unrestricted error correction model of 
function (15) using the OLS estimation technique: 
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12
 For the Netherlands and Luxemburg the data begin from 2005:01 while for Austria they start from 
2006:01. Notice that the first four observations in each country are reserved to construct the necessary 
lagged variables. 
13
 For a description of the Phillips-Perron and the Zivot and Andrews unit root tests see Appendix F. 
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where   is the first difference operator, r is the lag order for the error correction 
model and 
tD  is a dummy variable associated with the outbreak of the crisis 02 

. 
The ARDL-bounds testing procedure requires the estimation of specific F-test and t-
test statistics. Using (16) as a general formula, we consider the following four cases 
that have been analysed by Pesaran et al. (2001): Case II (restricted intercept and no 
trend), in which the F-test statistic checks the null hypothesis that 0320  

; 
Case III (unrestricted intercept and no trend) in which the F-test statistic checks the 
null hypothesis that 032 

; Case IV (unrestricted intercept and restricted trend) in 
which the F-test statistic checks the null hypothesis that 0321  

; Case V 
(unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend) in which the F-test statistic checks the 
null hypothesis that 032 

. In all cases the t-test statistic is employed to check the 
null hypothesis that 02 

. These statistics are then compared with the critical values 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). The existence of a long-run relationship between 
LIQ and CREDIT requires that the null hypothesis is rejected. If the t-test and F-test 
statistics are higher than the upper bound of the respective critical values then the null 
hypothesis is rejected. If the t-test and F-test statistics are below the lower bound of 
the respective critical values then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and no long-
run relationship exists. When the computed t-test and F-test statistics fall within the 
bounds of the critical values, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive decision. 
 
Before estimating equation (16) we need to control for the existence of a possible 
structural breakpoint. In particular, we test whether such a break exists in September 
2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
14
 To this end, the Chow test is conducted. 
The t-test statistic checks if 06 

. The null hypothesis suggests that no break exists. 
The rejection of the null hypothesis implies that a dummy variable must be included in 
equation (16). Additionally, it is essential to choose the optimal lag structure (r) of 
equation (16). In this procedure, our criterion is the minimisation of the Akaike (AIC) 
and Schwartz (SBC) Bayesian Information Criteria as well as the existence of no 
autocorrelation. 
 
                                            
14
 ECB (2012B) has reported a break in bank financing patterns in the third quarter of 2008. 
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Third, if cointegration has been found, we proceed to estimate the optimal ARDL 
specification. Note, though, that in our analysis we have chosen the ARDL model to 
be estimated even if no cointegration is found. This allows us to further check that the 
result of the cointegration analysis is valid. Moreover, to explore whether the financial 
crisis has prompted a change in the relationship between CREDIT and LIQ we also 
conduct estimations for the sub-periods 2003:01 to 2008:08 and 2008:09 to 2012:07. 
The ARDL(p, q) model for LIQ is computed based on the following equation: 
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where p, q are the orders of the ARDL(p, q) model specified using the AIC criterion. 
From the estimation of the optimal ARDL(p, q) model we obtain the following long-
run parameters for equation (15): 
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In order for a positive long-run relationship to exist between the liquidity ratios and 
the credit-to-GDP a statistically significant long-run coefficient for CREDIT, 2 , is 
required. When 2  is statistically significant a 1 percentage point rise in CREDIT 
causes 2  percentage points rise in LIQ. 
 
Fourth, suitable transformation of ARDL(p, q) equation (17) can give us its error 
correction form: 
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In equation (18) the coefficient of the error correction term  5  stands for the speed 
of adjustment towards the equilibrium. For instance, if 5.05   and the data are 
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monthly, the adjustment back to equilibrium takes place at a rate of 50% per month. 
The coefficient of the error correction term is given by the following formula: 
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A negative and statistically significant 5  suggests that the long-run equilibrium is 
stable. The rationale is that when 1tEC  is positive (negative) and, thus, 1tLIQ  is 
above (below) its equilibrium value, a negative 5  implies that there is a downward 
(upward) pressure on tLIQ , or equivalently, that there is a tendency for tLIQ  to be 
negative (positive). This ensures the adjustment towards the equilibrium. On the 
contrary, a positive and statistically significant 5  term implies that the equilibrium is 
not restored. 
 
Overall, the existence of a positive and stable long-run relationship between the 
liquidity ratios and the credit-to-GDP in the long run requires that: (i) the F and t 
statistics indicate cointegration; (ii) there is a positive statistically significant long-run 
coefficient for CREDIT and (iii) the (lagged) error correction term coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. If any of these conditions is not satisfied for a 
specific country, then it can be argued that the liquidity of this country’s banking 
sector does not react positively to a rise in the credit-to-GDP ratio, supporting the view 
for the imposition of macro fragility-related liquidity requirements. 
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
In Appendix G the results from the Phillips-Perron unit root test are reported. It turns 
out that the variables are a mixture of I(0) and I(1). When the Zivot and Andrews test 
is used to control for the existence of a structural break (see Appendix H), some of the 
series being I(1) according to the Phillips-Perron test turn out to be I(0) with one 
structural break. The existence of stationary series in our sample indicates the need for 
the use of the ARDL-bounds testing approach to cointegration, which is valid for both 
I(0) and I(1) variables. 
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Table 3 and Table 4 display the various F and t statistics that have been computed for 
the examination of cointegration over the whole period of the analysis. The Chow test, 
presented in Appendix I, indicates the existence of a structural break in most EMU 
countries. AIC and SBC criteria have been used to determine the appropriate lag order 
r for each country with or without deterministic trend (see Appendix I). In Table 5 and 
Table 6 the estimation results for the optimal ARDL specification over the whole 
period and the two sub-periods are presented. 
 
Table 3. F and t statistics for testing the existence of long-run relationship of equation (16) when the 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is used as a dependent variable, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 
2012:07 
r tIII FII FIII tv FIV FV
BE 2 -3.42
c 4.57c  6.49c -3.00a 4.41a 5.36a
GE 1 -0.60
a 1.36a 2.01a -1.04a 1.67a 0.78a
IR 3 -2.53
a 10.2c 14.22c - 2.03a 9.62c 6.79b
GR 3 -0.80
a 0.72a 0.50a -0.94a 7.43c 11.14c
SP 3 -2.07
a 2.93a 3.23a -2.53a 2.96a 3.88a
FR 3 -2.13
a 2.18a 2.97a -2.18a  2.16a 2.66a
IT 3 -2.83
a 2.97a 4.46a -3.42b 4.25a 5.86a
PT 3 -3.24
c 3.67b 5.25b -3.60b 4.35a 6.52a
FI 1 -2.9
b 5.85c 8.62c -3.84c 5.78c 7.64c
NL 3 -6.06
c  14.75c 21.89c  -6.17c 15.02c 21.21c
AT 2 -4.11
c 6.49c 8.85c -3.95c 6.37c 8.00c
LU 1 -1.29
a 3.66b 4.67a -1.25a 3.23a 1.05a
Without trends With trends
 
Note: 
a
 indicates that the statistic lies below the 0.05 lower bound, 
b
 that it falls within the 0.05 bounds 
and 
c 
 that the statistic lies above the 0.05 upper value; tIII and tV are the t-test statistics which check the 
null hypothesis that 02 

 in equation (16) with no trend and with a trend respectively; FII, FIII, FIV and 
FV are respectively the F-test statistics for the Case II (restricted intercept and no trend) in which the 
null hypothesis that 0320  

 is checked, Case III (unrestricted intercept and no trend) in which 
the null hypothesis that 032 

 is checked, Case IV (unrestricted intercept and restricted trend) in 
which the null hypothesis that 0321  

 is checked and Case V (unrestricted intercept and 
unrestricted trend) the null hypothesis that 032 

 is checked; r is the selected lag order for 
equation (16). The critical values of the t-tests and F-tests have been obtained from Pesaran et al. 
(2001). 
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The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 show that when NSFR is used as a dependent 
variable there is evidence in favour of a long-run relationship for Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Austria. When DNSFR is used as a liquidity ratio, cointegration 
exists for Belgium, Portugal, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and France. However, 
for these cases Tables 5 and 6 show that there are signs for a positive statistically 
significant relationship between the liquidity ratios and the credit-to-GDP ratio only 
for Austria, when the liquidity is captured by the NSFR, and for Portugal, Greece and 
the Netherlands, when the DNSFR is the dependent variable. It is also worth noting 
that in the latter countries the statistically significant relationship is not retained in all 
sub-periods. 
 
In the other cases in which cointegration turns out to exist, there is either no 
statistically important relationship or the impact of CREDIT on the liquidity ratios is 
negative and statistically significant. The latter holds for Belgium and Finland when 
the liquidity is captured by the NSFR, and for Spain when the DNSFR is the dependent 
variable. This relationship is not, though, robust for the two sub-periods. For instance, 
in Belgium the statistical significant coefficient of CREDIT is negative for the period 
2003:01 to 2008:08, but it turns positive for the period 2008:09 to 2012:07. Overall, 
these results show very little evidence in favour of a long-run positive relationship 
between bank liquidity and macroeconomic fragility in the EMU. 
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Table 4. F and t statistics for testing the existence of long-run relationship of equation (16) when the 
Dynamic Net Stable Funding Ratio (DNSFR) is used as a dependent variable, EMU-12 countries, 
2003:01 to 2012:07 
r tIII FII FIII tv FIV FV
BE 3 -3.58
c 4.60c 6.53c -3.49b  4.49a 6.71c
GE 1 -2.07
a 2.23a 3.34a -2.19a 5.25c 7.87c
IR 3 -2.10
a 1.59a  2.29a -2.13a 2.48a 3.46a
GR 3 -2.05
a 1.96a 2.16a -3.44b 4.23a 6.33a
SP 3 -1.37
a  4.78c 5.91c -3.74c 5.58c 7.97c
FR 3 -4.16
c 6.29c 8.76c -4.13c 5.89c 8.80c
IT 3 -2.33
a 2.14a  2.72a -2.50a 2.12a 3.16a
PT 3 -3.81
c 4.93c 7.38c -4.40c  6.60c 9.89c
FI 2 -3.53
c 5.55c 8.21c -3.54b 5.94c 7.99c
NL 3 -3.40
c 11.24c 16.79c -3.34a 11.13c 13.90c
AT 2 -2.97
b  2.97a 4.42a -2.94a 2.90a 4.36a
LU 2 -1.47
a 1.95a 2.85a -1.36a 1.95a 2.08a
Without trends With trends
 
Note: 
a
 indicates that the statistic lies below the 0.05 lower bound, 
b
 that it falls within the 0.05 bounds 
and 
c 
 that the statistic lies above the 0.05 upper value; tIII and tV are the t-test statistics which check the 
null hypothesis that 02 

 in equation (16) with no trend and with a trend respectively; FII, FIII, FIV and 
FV are respectively the F-test statistics for the Case II (restricted intercept and no trend) in which the 
null hypothesis that 0320  

 is checked, Case III (unrestricted intercept and no trend) in which 
the null hypothesis that 032 

 is checked, Case IV (unrestricted intercept and restricted trend) in 
which the null hypothesis that 0321  

 is checked and Case V (unrestricted intercept and 
unrestricted trend) the null hypothesis that 032 

 is checked; r is the selected lag order for 
equation (16). The critical values of the t-tests and F-tests have been obtained from Pesaran et al. 
(2001). 
 
In the countries in which no cointegration is found, the results from the estimation of 
the ARDL models (see Tables 5 and 6) show that only in three of them (Greece, Italy 
and Luxemburg) there may be a possibility for a positive relationship between 
CREDIT and the NSFR. In addition, in only two countries (Germany and Luxemburg) 
there is a chance for a positive relationship between NSFR and the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
For the other countries the coefficient of CREDIT is either insignificant or negative. 
Therefore, even if someone doubts the inference of the Pesaran et al. (2001) test, the 
overall conclusion for little evidence of a positive link between macroeconomic 
fragility and bank liquidity in the EMU does not alter. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has centered on the issue of liquidity regulation. This issue has been at 
the core of the innovations of Basel III. The chapter has put forward a dynamic 
liquidity ratio that, contrary to the ratios used in Basel III, allows for a time-varying 
definition of bank balance sheet items’ liquidity and stability. The implementation of 
this ratio in the EMU-12 countries has shown that it can more successfully portray the 
actual liquidity problems of banks, especially in the aftermath of the crisis. This 
implies that a more dynamic view of liquidity needs to be adopted in the current 
regulatory framework. 
 
Using the ARDL bounds-testing approach, the chapter has also indicated that in most 
EMU countries bank liquidity is not positively related with macroeconomic fragility. 
Based on this evidence, it has been argued that bank liquidity requirements should 
increase when the macroeconomic risk becomes higher. This will allow liquidity 
regulation to play a more substantial role in preventing financial instability in the 
macroeconomy.  
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Appendix B. Description of the data sources 
Variable name Data sources
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR ) ECB, monetary statistics, MFI balance sheets
Credit-to-GDP ratio (CREDIT ) ECB,  Euro area accounts, main indicators
Herfindahl index for credit institutions (CI ) ECB, monetary and financial statistics, structural 
finance indicators
Sovereign bond holding by resident banks Bruegel (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Acharya et 
al ., 2012, p. 54, Chart 3)
Long-term interest rate for convergence 
purposes, debt security issued (10 years)
ECB, monetary statistics, long term interest rates
Euro area 10-year government benchmark 
bond yield for other than domestic securities 
ECB, monetary statistics, market indices
ECB policy rate (rb ) ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
indices
EONIA interest rate (rb ) ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
indices
Euribor 3 months rate European Bank Federation
Interest rate on deposits ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
interest rates, deposits
Interest rate on loans ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
interest rates, loans
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Appendix C. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Dynamic Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (DNSFR) in percentage points, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07, DNSFR 
has been calculated by setting p=0.8, q=1.2, adjusting for the  concentration index and 
using the EONIA policy rate as a benchmark interest rate  
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Appendix D. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Dynamic Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (DNSFR) in percentage points, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07; DNSFR 
has been calculated by setting p=0.8, q=1.2, without adjusting for the concentration 
index and using the ECB policy rate as a benchmark interest rate  
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Appendix E. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Dynamic Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (DNSFR), EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07; DNSFR has been calculated 
by setting p=0.9, q=1.1 , adjusting for the concentration index and using the ECB 
policy interest rate as a benchmark interest rate 
 
 
(a) Belgium 
 
 
(c) Ireland 
 
 
(e) Spain 
 
 
 
 
(b) Germany 
 
 
(d) Greece 
 
 
(f) France 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued from the previous page) 
 
 
(g) Italy 
 
 
(i) Finland 
 
 
(k) Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
(h) Portugal 
 
 
(j) Netherlands 
 
 
(l) Luxemburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
 
Appendix F. Description of the Phillips-Perron and Zivot and Andrews unit root tests 
 
The Phillips-Perron unit root test (see Phillips and Perron, 1988) requires the 
estimation of the following regression equation using OLS (Ordinary Least Squares): 
 
ttt yty   110  (F.1) 
 
where ty  is the variable under investigation (LIQ or CREDIT), Tt ,...,1  is an index 
of time and t  is I(0) and may be heteroskedastic. The Phillips-Perron test calculates 
the tZ  statistic that corrects for any serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the 
errors t  of the test regression.
15
 The tZ  statistic is given by: 
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In the above expressions T is the number of observations, k is the number of 
covariates in the regression (1 for random walk, 2 for random walk with drift and 3 
for trend stationary), L is the number of Newey-West lags to use in calculating  , 
and 
2  is the asymptotic variance of 

. We test the null hypothesis that 0  to 
examine whether a unit root is present. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we conclude 
that there are no unit roots in ty . For all variables for which the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, there is strong evidence of non-stationarity. We then proceed to 
explore whether the unit root is removed by taking first differences. 
 
                                            
15
 The Phillips-Perron test corrects serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by using the Newey-West 
covariance matrix estimator. 
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Regarding the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test, its Model A has the following 
regression form: 
 
t
k
j
jtjttt yDUyty   


1
531210  (F.2) 
 
The regression form of model C is as follows: 
 
t
k
j
jtjtttt yDTDUyty   


1
5431210  (F.3) 
 
In equations (F.2) and (F.3) tDU  is a dummy variable that is equal to one for BPt   
and zero otherwise; tDT  is the corresponding trend shift variable, where 
BPtDTt   if BPt   and zero otherwise, and BP  is the break point. The jty   
terms allow for serial correlation. The t-test statistic that 02   is calculated for 
recursive regressions where tDU  or tDT  change each time for the ‘trimming region’ 
[0.15-0.85]. The break point, BP , is endogenously determined by the data using as a 
criterion the minimisation of the ADF t-test statistic. This statistic is then compared 
with the critical values provided by Zivot and Andrews (1992). The null hypothesis is 
that the time series has a unit root without a structural break; the alternative 
hypothesis suggests that there is a trend stationary series with a structural break.  
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Appendix G. Philips-Perron unit root tests 
Without trends With trends Without trends With trends
BE NSFR -0.229 -2.604 -11.078*** -11.221***
DNSFR -0.924 -1.934 -9.654*** -9.672***
CREDIT 0.066 -1.433 -4.626*** -4.699***
GE NSFR -0.386 -1.850 -10.913*** -10.998***
DNSFR -2.403  -2.617 -11.075*** -11.038***
CREDIT -1.701 -1.390 -3.118** -3.212*
IR NSFR -2.419 -2.183 -12.973*** -13.124***
DNSFR -2.312 -2.482 -10.927*** -10.914***
CREDIT -1.029 -0.820 -3.399** -3.469**
GR NSFR -2.225 -2.183 -15.275*** -15.210***
DNSFR -1.998 -2.737 -10.006***  -9.961***
CREDIT -1.888 0.918 -3.097** -3.506**
SP NSFR -0.806 -2.580 -11.668*** -11.637***
DNSFR -1.211 -2.371 -10.389*** -10.346***
CREDIT -3.510*** 2.348 -1.268 -2.686
FR NSFR -1.858 -2.261 -12.914*** -12.976***
DNSFR -2.392 -3.563** -10.283*** -10.242***
CREDIT 0.343 -2.261  -3.727*** -3.727**
IT NSFR -5.414*** -5.622*** -18.249*** -18.262***
DNSFR -2.292 -2.789  -9.987*** -9.951***
CREDIT -2.074 0.476 -3.867*** -3.904**
PT NSFR -1.768  -4.721*** -14.168*** -14.097***
DNSFR -1.512 -2.827 -10.251*** -10.202***
CREDIT -0.895 -0.508 -3.319** -3.382*
FI NSFR -2.504 -3.570** -14.720*** -15.097**
DNSFR -2.257 -2.932 -13.300*** -13.402***
CREDIT -0.620 -1.711  -3.971*** -3.953**
NL NSFR -3.583*** -3.984** -10.022*** -10.128***
DNSFR -1.340 -1.895 -8.573*** -8.523***
CREDIT -1.530 -1.974 -3.840*** -3.804**
AT NSFR -1.887 -3.100 -13.708*** -13.762***
DNSFR  -2.894* -2.889 -7.164*** -7.104***
CREDIT -1.380 -1.120 -3.352** -3.486**
LU NSFR -2.187 -1.044  -11.278*** -12.472***
DNSFR -2.225 -2.076 -9.010*** -9.035***
CREDIT -1.287 -1.876 -4.303*** -4.324***
Levels First differences
 
Note: The table reports 
tZ  statistics according to equation (F.1). The tZ  statistics tests the null 
hypothesis 0  to examine whether a unit root is present. For all variables for which the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, there is strong evidence of non-stationarity. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix H. Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests with one structural break 
t Break point t Break point
BE NSFR -3.311 2008-10 -3.635 2006-09
DNSFR -3.902 2008-09 -3.760 2008-09
CREDIT -5.254** 2008-03 -4.025 2010-12
GE NSFR -15.711*** 2010-12 -14.764*** 2010-12
DNSFR -3.571 2008-04 -3.860 2008-04
CREDIT -5.177** 2008-07 -6.127*** 2008-07
IR NSFR -3.520 2008-10 -3.868 2008-10
DNSFR -3.315 2007-07 -3.538 2007-02
CREDIT -1.926 2008-01 -2.991 2008-06
GR NSFR -3.810 2008-11 -2.282 2008-12
DNSFR -3.277 2006-03 -3.776 2009-06
CREDIT -0.156 2011-01 -1.792 2010-09
SP NSFR -4.513 2009-05 -4.708 2009-05
DNSFR -4.164 2009-05 -4.056 2007-09
CREDIT -2.370 2005-08 -3.555 2009-01
FR NSFR -3.981 2005-11 -4.809 2006-01
DNSFR -4.415 2008-08 -5.399** 2008-10
CREDIT -5.165** 2010-09 -5.297** 2009-06
IT NSFR -4.000 2010-08 -4.045 2006-03
DNSFR -3.351 2007-09 -3.614 2007-09
CREDIT -3.147 2010-06 -6.108*** 2008-11
PT NSFR -5.326** 2004-12 -5.755*** 2004-12
DNSFR -3.996 2008-10 -3.875 2008-10
CREDIT -3.137 2007-04 -3.380 2008-04
FI NSFR -3.338 2010-12 -3.599 2008-10
DNSFR -3.724 2008-10 -4.308 2008-10
CREDIT -4.021 2007-12 -4.597 2009-06
NL NSFR -4.709 2006-10 -4.708 2006-10
DNSFR -5.809** 2006-10 -6.636*** 2006-10
CREDIT -4.723 2007-01 -4.452 2007-01
AT NSFR -3.684 2005-09 -7.417*** 2005-09
DNSFR -4.637 2006-06 -4.818 2006-06
CREDIT -2.697 2007-10 -3.614 2007-10
LU NSFR -2.757 2004-06 -3.432 2006-01
DNSFR -3.504 2005-07 -4.364 2007-02
CREDIT -6.273*** 2006-09 -7.623*** 2006-09
Model CModel A
 
Note: The table reports the t-test statistics for model A and model C according to equations (F.2) and 
(F.3), respectively. The null hypothesis is that the time series has a unit root without a structural break; 
the alternative hypothesis suggests that there is a trend stationary series with a structural break. Critical 
values for model A (model C) are equal to -5.43 (-5.57) and -4.80 (-5.08) at 0.01 and 0.05 significant 
levels, respectively. The symbols *** and ** denote statistical significance at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, 
respectively. 
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Appendix I. Chow tests results for equation (16) 
Without trends With trends Without trends With trends
BE -1.13 [0.26] -1.29 [0.20] -2.79 [0.006] -2.81 [0.006]
GE -1.56 [0.12] -1.65 [0.10] -1.52 [0.13] -3.01 [0.003]
IR 4.66 [0.00] 4.01 [0.00] 0.70 [0.48] -0.72 [0.46]
GR 1.49 [0.13] 1.13 [0.26] -1.58 [0.11] -2.39 [0.01]
SP 0.47 [0.63] 1.14 [0.25]  -1.74 [0.08] -2.38 [0.01]
FR  0.54 [0.58] 0.24 [0.80] -2.56 [0.01] -2.58 [0.01]
IT 0.09 [0.92] 0.51 [0.60] -0.99 [0.32]  -0.93 [0.35]
PT -0.36 [0.71] -1.15 [0.25] -2.60 [0.01] -3.36 [0.001]
FI -0.92 [0.35] -0.78 [0.43] -2.83 [0.006]  -3.03 [0.003]
NL -3.91 [0.00] -3.87 [0.00] -5.82 [0.00]  -5.07 [0.00]
AT  3.21 [0.002] 3.19 [0.002] -0.68 [0.49] -0.69 [0.49]
LU  1.00 [0.32] 0.87 [0.38] -0.53 [0.59]  -0.44 [0.65]
NSFR  and CREDIT DSFR  and CREDIT
 
Note: The table shows the t-test statistics; p-values are reported in brackets. The t-test statistic checks 
that 06 

 in equation (16). The rejection of the null hypothesis implies that a dummy variable should 
be included in equation (16). 
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Appendix J. Statistics for selecting the lag order of equation (16) 
r AIC SBC x
2
SC AIC SBC x
2
SC r AIC SBC x
2
SC AIC SBC x
2
SC
BE 1 -253.9 -263.4 23.28 [0.02] -254.2 -265.0 22.33 [0.03] BE 1 -298.9 -308.4 25.82 [0.01] -299.4 -310.3 29.44 [0.003]
2 -254.9 -267.1 23.61 [0.02] -255.5 -269.1 22.46 [0.03] 2 -298.8 -310.9 24.02 [0.02] -299 -312.5 28.65 [0.004]
3 -254.4 -269.3 18.76 [0.09] -254.4 -270.7 17.24 [0.14] 3 -298.9 -313.8  21.30 [0.04] -299.6 -315.9 26.10 [0.01]
GE 1 -243.3 -252.8 20.06 [0.06] -243.6 -254.4 21.64 [0.04] GE 1 -324.9 -334.3 31.98 [0.001] -322.4 -333.2 32.80 [0.001]
2 -238.2 -250.3 38.77 [0.00] -238.2 -251.7 35.55 [0.00] 2 -323.0 -335.2 21.74 [0.04] -321.3 -334.8 22.47 [0.03]
3 -231.8 -246.7 32.35 [0.001] -232.8 -249.0 33.25 [0.001] 3 -318.7 -333.6 24.00 [0.02] -317.7 -333.9 19.34 [0.08]
IR 1 -183.8 -193.2 11.13 [0.51] -184.6 -195.5 11.22 [0.50] IR 1 -283.9 -293.4 9.92 [0.62] -283.2 -294.1 10.01 [0.61]
2 -182.1 -194.3 8.54 [0.74] -182.8 -196.4 8.76 [0.72] 2 -285.7 -297.9 13.31 [0.34] -285.1 -298.6 10.24 [0.59]
3 -183.9 -198.8 9.00 [0.70] -184.6 -200.9 9.08 [0.69] 3 -286.8 -301.7 17.64 [0.12] -286.3 -302.5 10.70 [0.55]
GR 1 -253.3 -262.8 18.43 [0.10] -245.0 -255.8 26.88 [0.008] GR 1 -295.2 -304.7 15.35 [0.22] -293.8 -304.7 22.83 [0.02]
2 -254.5 -266.7 12.68 [0.39] -246.0 -259.5 27.31 [0.007] 2 -296.8 -309.0 18.97 [0.08] -294.6 -308.1 21.57 [0.04]
3 -256.1 -271.0 15.99 [0.19] -247.0 -263.2 29.55 [0.003] 3 -298.4 -313.3 22.01 [0.03] -296.1 -312.4 22.19 [0.03]
SP 1 -141.8 -151.3 7.48 [0.82] -141.5 -152.3 7.24 [0.84] SP 1 -290.3 -299.8 22.05 [0.03] -289.9 -300.8 20.62 [0.05]
2 -143.6 -155.8 9.18 [0.68] -142.9 -156.4 9.01 [0.70] 2 -291.2 -303.4 34.83 [0.00] -289.9 -303.4 31.66 [0.002]
3 -145.5 -160.4 17.16 [0.14] -144.6 -160.8 16.88 [0.15] 3 -292.9 -307.8 35.32 [0.00] -291.5 -307.7 31.07 [0.002]
FR 1 -209.7 -219.2 17.78 [0.12] -210.7 -221.5 17.82 [0.12] FR 1 -284.8 -294.3 27.18 [0.007] -285.7 -296.5 29.37 [0.003]
2 -210.4 -222.6 15.45 [0.21] -211.3 -224.9 15.64 [0.20] 2 -285.7 -297.9 25.63 [0.01] -286.6 -300.1 26.84 [0.008]
3 -211.4 -226.3 19.15 [0.08] -212.2 -228.5 19.52 [0.07] 3 -287.7 -302.6 28.08 [0.005] -288.5 -304.8 30.86 [0.002]
IT 1 -194.1 -203.6 10.53 [0.56] -191.8 -202.7 11.07 [0.52] IT 1 -298.9 -308.4 30.46 [0.002] -299.3 -310.2 27.02 [0.008]
2 -194.3 -206.5 12.88 [0.37] -192.9 -182.9 12.28 [0.42] 2 -300.1 -312.3 22.76 [0.03] -300.9 -314.4 26.23 [0.01]
3 -195.7 -210.6 12.97 [0.37] -194.6 -210.8 13.20 [0.35] 3 -301.7 -316.6 28.79 [0.004] -302.3 -318.5 34.72 [0.001]
PT 1 -188.3 -197.7 7.61 [0.81] -187.3 -198.2 10.14 [0.60] PT 1 -280.9 -290.4 27.85 [0.006] -280.3 -291.2 25.31 [0.01]
2 -189.7 -201.9 9.74 [0.63] -189.0 -202.5 9.33 [0.67] 2 -281.6 -293.8 31.54 [0.002] -280.3 -293.9 24.36 [0.01]
3 -191.5 -206.4 11.66 [0.47] -190.5 -206.8 9.88 [0.62] 3 -283.5 -298.4 31.44 [0.002] -282 -298.2 24.47 [0.01]
FI 1 -271.6 -281.1 17.17 [0.14] -272.6 -283.5 17.16 [0.14] FI 1 -296.4 -305.9 27.57 [0.006] -297.1 -307.9 28.56 [0.005]
2 -268.7 -280.9 9.63 [0.64] -269.7 -283.3 9.83 [0.63] 2 -297.2 -309.4 23.15 [0.02] -297.5 -311 23.70 [0.02]
3 -270.0 -284.9 8.25 [0.76] -271.0 -287.2  8.79 [0.72] 3 -296.9 -311.8 15.56 [0.21] -297.4 -313.6 16.60 [0.16]
NL 1 -168.9 -177.6 44.32 [0.00] -169.1 -179.0 42.58 [0.00] NL 1 -207.8 -216.4 18.61 [0.09] -208.2 -218.1 20.74 [0.05]
2 -169.0 -180.1 44.00 [0.00] -169.5 -181.8 42.79 [0.00] 2 -208.4 -219.5 19.01 [0.08] -208.9 -221.3 20.18 [0.06]
3 -169.8 -183.3 37.54 [0.00] -170.1 -184.9 34.79 [0.001] 3 -208.7 -222.2 28.84 [0.004] -209.6 -224.3 28.67 [0.004]
AT 1 -118.5 -126.6 16.12 [0.18] -119.2 -128.5 14.99 [0.24] AT 1 -225.7 -233.9 12.43 [0.41] -226.7 -236 15.07 [0.23]
2 -119.6 -130.1 16.60 [0.16] -119.9 -131.5 14.00 [0.30] 2 -227.1 -237.6 18.70 [0.09] -228.1 -239.7 20.11 [0.06]
3 -119.1 -131.8 16.77 [0.15] -119.9 -133.8 15.60 [0.21] 3 -226.6 -239.3 17.36 [0.13] -227.5 -241.4 19.07 [0.08]
LU 1 -174.9 -183.5 19.67 [0.07] -175.8 -185.6 20.64 [0.05] LU 1 -265.7 -274.4 10.10 [0.60] -266.7 -276.6 10.14 [0.60]
2 -172.4 -183.5 13.22 [0.35] -173.1 -185.4 12.61 [0.39] 2 -266.2 -277.3 13.84 [0.31] -267.2 -279.5 13.99 [0.30]
3 -173.5 -187.0 15.72 [0.20] -174.3 -189.1 16.93 [0.15] 3 -265.4 -278.9 20.72 [0.05] -266.1 -280.9 20.36 [0.06]
NSFR  and CREDIT DNSFR  and CREDIT
Without trends With trends Without trends With trends
 
Note: r is the lag order for the error correction model in equation (16); AIC and SBC denote Akaike's 
and Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criteria, respectively; 2
SCx  is the chi-squared statistics to test for 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The criterion to choose r is the minimisation of the AIC and 
SBC Bayesian Information Criteria as well as the existence of no autocorrelation. p-values are reported 
in brackets. 
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6. Extending Minsky’s financial taxonomy to the 
government sector: An application to Greece 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
One of the defining features of Minsky’s theoretical framework is his well-known 
classification of economic units into various regimes (hedge, speculative and Ponzi) 
according to their financial position. Minsky’s financial taxonomy is a useful tool for 
the assessment of economic units’ degree of financial fragility and thereby for the 
evaluation of the financial fragility of the whole macroeconomic system. It is also at 
the core of his ‘financial instability hypothesis’ in which he explains how economic 
units can gradually shift from hedge finance regimes to speculative and Ponzi ones. 
 
Minsky’s financial taxonomy has been basically applied to the private sector and, in 
particular, to the non-financial firms. This is the case in Minsky’s original texts (see 
e.g. Minsky, 1975, 1982, 2008) as well as in more recent theoretical and empirical 
contributions (see, inter alia, Foley, 2003; Lima and Meirelles, 2007; Chalres, 2008; 
Arza and Español, 2008; Mulligan, 2013). However, his classification could also be 
employed for the analysis of the government sector’s financial fragility. Although 
Minsky has in some cases used his financial taxonomy when he describes the 
financial structure of the government sector (see e.g. Minsky, 1982, pp. 32-33; 
1992A, p. 28), the analysis of the financial fragility of the government is limited in his 
writings. The main reason for this is that his argumentation has largely concentrated 
on sovereign countries in which the government sector appears to be a potential 
source of financial stability. He has not explicitly considered the case of non-
sovereign countries in which the government sector might be a potential source of 
financial instability.  
 
Lemmen and Goodhart (1999), Sawyer (2001), Bell (2003), Wray (2003), Sardoni and 
Wray (2006) and Kelton and Wray (2009) have pointed out that the financial posture 
of the government sector of non-sovereign countries matters, because these countries 
cannot finance their expenditures and debt obligations by issuing their own currency. 
They have also argued that within the current institutional structure of the Eurozone 
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the non-sovereign government spending depends on the perceived credit risk of 
government bonds in the financial markets. If this risk is conceived to be high, then 
the financing of government expenditures and debt commitments can be disrupted.
1
 
Moreover, the institutional framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) which 
does not authorise the latter to function as ‘lender of last resort’ to the government 
sector of the Eurozone countries is the major reason that the sovereign bonds of these 
countries face default risk.
2 
As long as the ECB does not guarantee the non-default of 
the euro states, the debt-financing of the government deficits is susceptible to 
financial perceptions, the judgments of credit rating agencies and the speculation of 
investors, especially when these deficits are higher than the percentage defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty.
3
 Consequently, the financial posture of the national government 
sectors in the Eurozone has become of paramount importance for the analysis and 
evaluation of economies’ financial stability and possibility of default. As the recent 
sovereign debt crisis has indicated, a government sector with increasing financing 
needs is susceptible to potential changes in financial perceptions. The latter may lead 
to its incapability to borrow, with devastating effects on the implementation of fiscal 
policy as well as on the financial and macroeconomic stability. Therefore, the 
application of Minsky’s financial taxonomy to the government sector of non-
sovereign countries, like the Eurozone ones, can provide some useful insights into the 
financial fragility of these economies. 
 
                                            
1
 The financial posture of the government sector can also be important in the case of sovereign 
countries, in as far as the fiscal balance affects the external balance. In particular, under fixed exchange 
rate regimes, fiscal deficits are likely to cause an undesirable reduction in international reserves (see 
Wray, 2006). Under flexible exchange rate regimes, fiscal deficits can lead to domestic exchange rate 
depreciation, with potential detrimental effects on inflation and the ability of a country to meet its 
financial commitments denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, in both regimes fiscal deficits 
may have adverse effects on the interest rates. However, in non-sovereign countries the risks stemming 
from a financially fragile government sector are, arguably, more significant and straightforward. 
2
 Of course, even if the ECB was authorised to operate as ‘lender of last resort’, this would not 
eliminate all risks of partial default for bond holders. In particular, both the exchange rate risk and the 
inflation risk would still exist. However, the main source of default risk would not be present. 
3
 On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme. 
Through this programme the ECB committed to set a floor to the price of government bonds by making 
unlimited purchases in the secondary sovereign market. The OMT framework has substantially 
promoted ECB’s role as ‘lender of last resort’ to national governments. However, it has not arguably 
rendered the ECB a full ‘lender of last resort’ to the public sector basically for two main reasons. First, 
the ECB continues to be prohibited to intervene in the primary bonds market. Second, a necessary 
condition for a country to qualify for bond purchases by the ECB is to have previously committed to 
some kind of austerity programme. The latter implies that the ECB supports the fiscal policies of 
Eurozone national governments only when it approves them. 
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In this chapter we put forward a liquidity index that applies Minsky’s financial 
taxonomy to a non-sovereign government sector and we estimate this index for 
Greece. Our index extends and improves the index developed by Ferrari-Filho et al. 
(2010) along various lines. The chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2, we 
develop a liquidity index that enables us to measure the financial fragility of a 
government that has relinquished its monetary independence. In section 6.3, we apply 
the liquidity index to the Greek government sector over the period 2001-2009. Section 
6.4 concludes. 
 
6.2 Applying Minsky’s financial taxonomy to a non-sovereign government sector 
 
The constructed liquidity index relies on the relationship between the cash inflows 
and the cash outflows of the government. The cash inflows refer only to the revenues 
from the main operations of the government. Thus, they do not include inflows from 
liquid financial assets or from the sale of less liquid financial assets. The cash 
outflows comprise government primary expenditures and debt commitments (interest 
and principal repayment). Utilising the relationship between these cash flows, we 
make a distinction between four finance regimes. 
 
The first finance regime is the hedge one, in which government is capable of covering 
all its debt commitments from its primary surplus. Algebraically, it holds that: 
 
AMORTINTTETR   (1) 
 
where TR denotes the total government revenues, TE stands for the total government 
primary expenditures, AMORT symbolises the amortisation of debt and INT denotes 
the interest payments. The hedge finance regime reflects the case in which there is 
sufficient liquidity to ensure the repayment of the debt obligations without new 
borrowing. 
 
The second case is that of a speculative government, which can repay its interest 
without resorting to new borrowing. However, its primary surplus is not enough to 
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cover the principal repayment. The speculative finance regime is characterised by the 
following relationship: 
 
AMORTINTTETRINT   (2) 
 
Government’s finance regime is Ponzi when the primary surplus is not enough to 
cover its interest payments. The relationship between the cash flows of a Ponzi 
finance regime is expressed as: 
 
INTTETR 0  (3) 
 
Finally, when the government sector exhibits an ultra-Ponzi finance regime, it runs a 
primary deficit. This implies that a part of government’s primary expenditures cannot 
be covered without new borrowing. The margins of safety are, therefore, at their 
lowest level. Algebraically, it holds that: 
 
0TETR  (4) 
 
Several important points are in order. First, each of the above-mentioned finance 
regimes generates certain dynamics in the government’s debt and financial 
commitments. In particular, if the government’s finance regime is characterised as 
Ponzi or ultra-Ponzi, the net debt increases (assuming no changes in asset prices and 
exchange rates).
4
 Since a higher net debt implies more debt commitments and less 
financial assets in the future, the more a government remains in the Ponzi or ultra-
Ponzi regime, the more difficult it is to improve its liquidity position. This may give 
rise to problems of debt sustainability, insolvency and loss of credibility. On the 
contrary, if the government is hedge or speculative its net debt declines. Thus, the 
risks of illiquidity and insolvency are lower. 
                                            
4
 The net debt is defined here as the difference between the market value of financial liabilities and the 
market value of financial assets. The gross debt does not necessarily rise in the case of Ponzi or ultra-
Ponzi finance, as the government may, for instance, sell some financial assets in order to reduce its 
gross debt. Similarly, the gross debt does not necessarily decline in the case of hedge or speculative 
finance as the government may decide to purchase a significant amount of financial assets, offsetting 
the favourable effects of fiscal surplus on gross debt. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
gross debt, net debt and fiscal balance see Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2006) and Hartwig Lojsch et 
al. (2011). 
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However, it should be remarked that the link between the finance regimes and the 
gross debt-to-GDP dynamics is not straightforward. The government sector may be 
for many years in the ultra-Ponzi regime without seeing an explosion in its debt-to-
GDP ratio. This is more likely to be the case when government expenditures have a 
significant growth-enhancing effect and the real (after-tax) lending interest rate is low 
relative to the real growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, the government 
sector may run a primary surplus that proves insufficient to prevent a rise in its debt-
to-GDP ratio due to the existence of a much higher real (after-tax) lending interest 
rate than the real growth rate of the economy. 
 
Second, the ability of a government to attain and sustain a sufficiently large budget 
surplus depends on various macroeconomic factors, which may not be directly 
controlled by itself. According to the ‘financial balances approach’ (Wray, 2006, 
2012; Godley et al., 2007; Kregel, 2011; Sawyer, 2011; Semieniuk et al., 2011; 
Zezza, 2012), the financial position of the government is, by definition, a function of 
the balances of the private and the foreign sector of the economy.
5
 The fiscal balance 
can improve only if there is a deterioration in the balance of the private sector and/or 
in the balance of the foreign sector. Thus, a rise in private sector expenditures and/or a 
rise in exports can improve, everything else given, the fiscal balance without any 
change in the behaviour of fiscal authorities. On the contrary, cuts in government 
expenditures may not be effective in reducing a fiscal deficit to a target level if the 
expenditures of the private and the foreign sector do not increase enough to counter 
the contractionary effects of these cuts. In this case, the output is adversely affected 
and the automatic stabilisers may prevent the attainment of the intended balance. 
Similarly, a rise in tax rates may have, under certain circumstances, important 
detrimental effects on output and tax evasion, leading to lower rather than to higher 
tax revenues.
6
 
 
Furthermore, the sustainability of the private sector’s financial position is of 
paramount importance. Since government has a prominent role to play in stabilising 
                                            
5
 See also Minsky’s (2008, ch. 2) analysis for the budget effects of the ‘Big Government’. 
6
 See, for instance, the theoretical and the empirical literature on the Laffer curve (e.g. Fullerton, 1982; 
Matthews, 2003; Heijman and van Ophem, 2005). 
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the macroeconomy, a highly fragile private sector increases the possibility of 
unexpected government interventions (e.g. bank bailouts) which can substantially 
deteriorate the financial posture of the public sector. Moreover, if the tax revenues 
from various Ponzi activities of the private sector are significant, the financial position 
of the government sector can rapidly deteriorate as a result of financial or other 
shocks that dampen these activities. 
 
Third, Ponzi and ultra-Ponzi governments might need to take further initiatives to 
create the liquidity that restores their solvency and credibility. For instance, if there 
are credit constraints, then the sustainability of a Ponzi, and especially, of an ultra-
Ponzi government sector might require debt restructuring, as a complement to 
adequate macroeconomic and fiscal policies.
7
 Without debt restructuring, the 
restoration of a viable financial structure might not be possible. Besides, without debt 
restructuring money managers are likely to speculate on the default of Ponzi or ultra-
Ponzi governments, triggering higher interest rates. 
 
Employing the classification among the four finance regimes, the following liquidity 
index (LI) is constructed and proposed: 
 
                     
AMORT
INTTETR 
,                       if   INTTETR   
 
LI             1
 AMORTINTTE
TR
,         if   INTTETR 0  (5) 
 
                      2
 AMORTINTTE
TR
,        if   0TETR  
 
The financial fragility of the government increases as the liquidity index becomes 
lower. The government is: (i) hedge when the index is higher than 1; (ii) speculative 
                                            
7
 See also Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010). 
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when the index takes values between 0 and 1; (iii) Ponzi when the index lies between 
-1 and 0; and (iv) ultra-Ponzi when the index takes values between -2 and -1.
8 
 
 
Our proposed liquidity index improves and extends the index suggested by Ferrari-
Filho et al. (2010) along the following lines.
9
 First, in the index proposed by Ferrari-
Filho et al. (2010), when 0TETR , the financial fragility of the government turns 
out to increase as the sum of interest and amortisation )( AMORTINT   becomes 
smaller. This seems counterintuitive since an increase in debt commitments of the 
government decreases, ceteris paribus, its liquidity. On the contrary, when our index 
takes negative values, it becomes more negative as the debt commitments increase. 
Second, and more importantly, when the primary budget surplus does not cover the 
sum of interest and amortisation, the index proposed by Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010) 
does not distinguish between a regime in which the government can cover its interest 
payments and a regime in which the government needs new debt to repay its interest. 
In our index, when the primary budget surplus does not cover the debt commitments, 
there are two cases: first, the case in which the index takes values between 0 and 1 
which implies that the government can cover its interest payments (speculative 
government), and, second, the case in which the index takes values between -1 and 0 
which implies that the government cannot cover its interest payments (Ponzi 
government). 
 
It should be pointed out that the government’s liquidity index provides accurate 
information only about the past and the present situation of the government’s financial 
structure. The estimation of the future values of the liquidity index requires 
projections over the government’s primary balance and debt commitments. Both 
variables are dynamic and depend on prior knowledge about many other monetary, 
fiscal and macroeconomic variables. 
                                            
8
 Note that the mathematical formula used in the cases of hedge and speculative finance is the same. 
Moreover, the mathematical formula is almost identical in the cases of the Ponzi and the ultra-Ponzi 
finance: the only difference is that in the case of the ultra-Ponzi regime, -1 has been added to penalise 
for the existence of a primary deficit. In this way it is ensured that the index for a government that runs 
a primary deficit always lies between -2 and -1. This enables a clear distinction between a Ponzi and an 
ultra-Ponzi regime. 
9
 In Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010) when the index is higher than one, the government sector is hedge: total 
revenues are larger than the sum of total primary expenditures, interest and amortisation. If the index 
lies between zero and one, the government sector is speculative: the primary budget surplus is unable to 
cover the sum of interest and amortisation. If the index is negative, the government sector is Ponzi: the 
public sector runs a primary budget deficit. 
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6.3 The application of the liquidity index to Greece 
 
Figure 1 displays the liquidity index for the Greek government sector over the period 
2001-2009. This corresponds to the period after the entrance of Greece in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and before the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. 
We observe that the Greek government sector was in the Ponzi finance regime in the 
years 2001 and 2002 while it shifted to the ultra-Ponzi regime in 2003. We also 
observe that the index deteriorated significantly over the time span 2006-2009. It is 
noteworthy that the ratio of total government revenues to the sum of government 
primary expenditures, interest and amortisation in percent decline from 72.8% in 2006 
to 55.2% in 2009. 
 
Fig. 1. Government’s liquidity index (LI), Greece, 2001–2009 
 
Note: For the data sources and the definitions of the variables used to construct the index see Appendix. 
 
Using as a basis the data presented in Table 1, it can be argued that the main driving 
forces behind this evolution of the index were (i) the gradual deterioration of the 
primary fiscal balance and (ii) the rise of the amortisation payments in the period 
2007-2009. In particular, the primary fiscal balance decreased from 2% in 2001 to 
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-10% in 2009. While the government revenues in percent of GDP declined over the 
period under examination, the primary government expenditures increased 
substantially. The rise in the primary expenditures was basically due to the increase in 
the intermediate consumption, the compensation of employees and the social benefits. 
It should, however, be highlighted that in 2001 the government primary expenditures 
were in percent of GDP much lower than in the average in the Eurozone. Therefore, 
the rise in government expenditures after 2001 can be interpreted as a process of 
convergence to the Eurozone average. The problem, hence, was not the rise in 
government expenditures per se. It was that this increase in expenditures was not 
accompanied by a corresponding rise in government revenues. Note also that the 
important deterioration of the fiscal balance in 2008-2009 partly occurred due to the 
recession of the economy and the resulting impact of the automatic stabilisers.
10
 
 
Regarding the amortisation payments, their rise in the period 2007-2009 is associated 
with the accumulation of a significant amount of long-term debt that started just 
before the entrance of Greece in the EMU. The easy access that the Greek government 
attained to the global bond markets enabled it to substitute long-term debt for short-
term one. This substitution caused a fall in the amortisation payments in the early 
2000s. However, after 2007 a significant amount of long-term debt needed to be 
refinanced, causing a rise in principal repayments. Note that the interest payments of 
the Greek government sector remained low over the period under examination 
basically because of the low lending interest rates due to Greece’s participation in the 
EMU. 
 
Due to the ultra-Ponzi finance regime of the Greek government, its debt in absolute 
terms increased substantially over the period 2003-2009 and so did the need for debt 
refinancing. The surge in debt did not initially lead to a much higher debt-to-GDP 
ratio since the growth rate of the economy remained till 2007 higher than the real 
interest rate (see Table 1).
11
 However, when the economy slipped into a recession in 
2008, the real growth rate became lower than the real interest rate leading to a 
significant rise in the government debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009. This rise was enhanced 
by the substantial increase in the budget deficit in the period 2008-2009. The increase 
                                            
10
 See Papadimitriou et al. (2010). 
11
 In Table 1 the real pre-tax interest rate has been used instead of the real after-tax interest rate due to 
the absence of available data for the tax rate on interest payments. 
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in the debt-to-GDP ratio combined with the increasing financing needs rendered the 
Greek government sector extremely vulnerable to the expectations of the sovereign 
bond holders and the speculation in the global financial markets.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a liquidity index has been developed that applies Minsky’s well-
known financial taxonomy to the government sector. This index has been estimated 
for the Greek government sector over the period 2001-2009. It has been shown that 
the Greek government sector was Ponzi in the years 2001-2002 and ultra-Ponzi 
thereafter. Moreover, the proposed index deteriorated substantially since 2006 
revealing the growing fragility of the public sector in the years before the onset of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This deterioration of the index is among the factors that 
contributed to the financial instability that the Greek economy has been experiencing 
over the last years. 
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Appendix Definitions and data sources 
Variable/ Index Definition Data source
Total government revenues (TR ) AMECO database 
(code: URTG)
Total primary government 
expenditures (TE )
AMECO database 
(code: UUTGI)
Interest payments (INT ) Interest paid by the general government
2 
(EDP). AMECO database 
(code: UYIGE)
Amortisation (AMORT ) Amortisation of the medium- and long-term debt of the 
central government and social security funds + short-
term debt of the central government at the end of the 
previous period.
3
Hellenic Republic 
Ministry of Finance and 
Bank of Greece
Gross domestic product (GDP ) Gross domestic product at current market prices. AMECO database 
(code: UVGD)
Real interest rate The real long-term interest rate (based on the GDP 
deflator), in percent (%). The data refer to the central 
government.
AMECO database 
(code: ILRV)
Real growth rate The growth rate of gross domestic product at constant 
(2005) market prices, in percent (%).
AMECO database 
(code: OVGD)
Government debt-to-GDP ratio The gross general government
2
 debt (EDP), in percent 
(%) of GDP.
AMECO database 
(code: UDGGL)
Sales of market output and output- for own final use + 
payments for other non-market output + other 
subsidies on production, receivable + taxes on 
production and imports, receivable + property 
income, receivable + current taxes on income and 
wealth, receivable + social contributions, receivable
+ other current transfers, receivable + capital 
transfers, receivable.1 The data refer to the general 
government.2
Intermediate consumption  + gross capital formation  
+ compensation of employees, payable
+ other taxes on production, payable + 
subsidies, payable + property income, payable + 
current taxes on income and wealth, payable + social 
benefits other than social transfers in kind, payable + 
social transfers in kind related to expenditure on 
products supplied to households via market 
producers, payable + other current transfers, payable + 
adjustment for the change in the net equity of 
households on pension funds reserves + capital 
transfers, payable + acquisitions of non-produced non-
financial assets.1 The data refer to the general 
government.2
Notes:  
1/ For a description of these variables see AMECO (2005). 
2/ The general government in Greece comprises the central government, the social security funds and 
the local government. 
3/ There are no available data for the amortisation payments of the local government. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide some new theoretical and empirical insights 
into the issues of financial fragility and instability of the macroeconomic systems. The 
thesis paid attention and explored various aspects of the financial fragility of both the 
private and the public sector of the economy. In the private sector, the analysis 
covered the fragility of households, firms and banks, while in specific cases emphasis 
was also given to the investigation of the interaction of the financial structures of 
these sectors. A number of factors that can contribute to the financial fragility and 
instability of the economy were investigated in an innovative way. These, inter alia, 
included endogenous changes in the euphoria of economic units, wage stagnation and 
financial innovation. Furthermore, various links between financial fragility and fiscal 
policy were scrutinised, while emphasis was also placed on specific aspects of bank 
regulation policy concerning its role in preventing financial fragility. 
 
The main findings of the thesis can be summarised as follows. According to the 
theoretical macrodynamic model developed in chapter 3, the endogenous change in 
the desired margins of safety of firms and banks plays a critical role in the emergence 
of investment cycles and instability. The mathematical and simulation analysis 
indicated that higher sensitivivity of the firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety to 
the investment cycle makes the system more prone to instability. They also illustrated 
that the endogeneity of the margins of safety can produce, under certain conditions, 
investment and leverage cycles during which investment and leverage move both in 
the same and in the opposite direction. An important finding is that the 
implementation of fiscal expansion (contraction) during periods in which the the 
derired margins of safety are excessively high (low) relative to the actual ones can be 
conducive to stability.  
 
The stock-flow consistent model developed in chapter 4 illustrated the potential 
destabilising effects of securitisation practices. It was shown how securitisation can be 
conducive to a borrowing-induced expansion, a housing boom and an appreciation in 
MBSs prices that are of temporary nature. It was also indicated that the adverse 
effects of securitisation on financial fragility can be substantial reinforced by wage 
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stagnation. The latter is likely to influence financial fragility by inducing households 
to get more credit in order to attain some specific living standards, by strengthening 
financial speculation due to the redistribution of wealth towards investor households 
and by reducing the income of indebted households. According to our simulation 
experiments, the joint rise in securitisation and wage stagnation is likely to increase 
financial fragility in the short run and lead to financial instability in the long run. 
 
Chapter 5 highlighted the need for a dynamic definition of liquidity in the regulatory 
framework of banks. By constructing an index that allows for a time-varying 
definition of bank balance sheet items’ liquidity and stability and applying this index 
to the EMU countries it was shown that the actual liquidity problems of banks can 
more successfully captured by this index rather than by the static index proposed by 
Basel III. Furthermore, the econometric evidence presented in this chapter illustrated 
that in most EMU countries bank liquidity is not positively related with 
macroeconomic fragility. This implies that the banking sector in the EMU does not 
broadly self-impose fragility-related requirements. Based on this evidence, it was 
argued that the regulatory agents should introduce a positive link between bank 
liquidity and macroeconomic fragility. 
 
Chapter 6 pinpointed the importance of the financial fragility of the public sector in 
countries that are not currency-issuers (like the EMU ones). Using Minsky’s well-
known financial taxonomy of economic units, it developed a liquidity index that can 
be used as a measure of the government sector’s financial fragility. The estimation of 
this index for Greece over the period 2001-2009 illustrated that the Greek government 
was Ponzi in 2001-2002 and ultra-Ponzi in 2003-2009. Moreover, the data analysis 
indicated that the proposed index deteriorated substantially since 2006 revealing the 
growing fragility of the public sector in the years before the onset of the sovereign 
debt crisis. It was argued that this deterioration of the index was among the factors 
that contributed to the financial instability that the Greek economy has been 
experiencing over the last years. 
 
The essays of this thesis covered only some certain issues which are at the heart of the 
current research on financial fragility and instability of the macroeconomic systems. 
Clearly, there are many other important topics in this field that have not been deeply 
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explored both in the current thesis and in the related literature and is essential, 
therefore, to be the subject of future research. Some of them are the following. 
 
First, a more thorough understanding of the functions and the effects of the shadow 
banking system is essential. Although in this thesis some specific macroeconomic 
implications of securitisation were explored at a theoretical level, many other aspects 
of the shadow banking system, which are likely to have important effects on financial 
fragility and instability, have not yet been adequately studied theoretically and 
empirically. Some important issues include (i) the factors that determine the liquidity 
and the leverage of the financial vehicles corporations, money market funds, hedge 
funds and other shadow banking institutions, (ii) the various interlinkages within the 
shadow banking sector and between the shadow and the regulated financial 
institutions and (iii) the links between inequality, household wealth and hedge funds. 
Lysandrou (2011-2), Adrian and Ashcraft (2012B), Bakk-Simon et al. (2012), 
Godfrey and Golden (2012) and Pozsar et al. (2012) have provided some initial useful 
insights into these issues. 
 
Second, the open economy aspects of financial fragility need further investigation. 
International capital flows have in the past played a critical role in the boost of 
domestic credit growth and the development of unsustainable financial structures. 
Although this role has quite often been the subject of economic research, the recent 
events, most notably the rise in global imbalances, the tremendous development of the 
shadow banking sector, the rise in wealth and income inequality and the new 
geopolitical structures require a fresh look into this issue. This new look is essential to 
shed light not only on the factors that explain international capital flows but also on 
the conditions under which these flows can lead to the financial fragility of the 
domestic economies. Some interesting recent works towards this direction include 
Acharya and Schnabl (2010), Borio and Disyatat (2011) and Lane and McQuade 
(2013). It is also important to note that the open economy aspects of financial fragility 
have only scarcely been the subject of theoretical macroeconomic models. 
 
Third, further research is necessary in the field of banking regulation. The proper 
regulation of the financial system is of paramount importance for the stability of the 
macroeconomic systems in the future but remains a quite complex issue with many 
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unexplored dimensions. Some topics that should be investigated in greater detail 
include the macroeconomic effects of the various regulatory rules, the links between 
the financial cycle and the fragility of banks, the impact of the regulation rules on the 
incentives and the behaviour of banks, as well as the ways through which the shadow 
banking sector can be regulated effectively. For a discussion of these topics see, for 
instance, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010), Kregel (2010), Shin (2010), Bank of 
England (2011), Wray (2011), Arnold et al. (2012) and Adrian and Ashcraft (2012A). 
 
The investigation of the above and other issues on the field of financial fragility and 
instability can significantly contribute to a more thorough understanding of the factors 
that lie behind the emergence of fragility and instability in modern macroeconomies. 
This understanding is crucial for the proper design of policies that can lead to more 
sustainable economies and prevent the adverse consequences that stem from major 
economic crises. 
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